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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis presents an interpretivist analysis of institutional development in the English 
regional assemblies.  It presents a history of institutional development in the regions, arriving 
at a conceptualization of this tier as a site of ‘institutional ambiguity.’  Exploring the 
theoretical bases of institutions and conducting a thorough critique of the schools of 
institutionalism, this thesis takes forward the theory of ‘constructivist institutionalism.’  A 
theoretical framework focussed on the processes of institutional design and change is built 
from constructivist institutionalism, as is a complementary and coherent methodological 
package to explore the empirical sites of the West Midlands and North West regional 
assemblies.  The concepts of ‘frames’ and ‘stories’ are set out as interpretivist tools through 
which the primary interview data is analysed, to capture the development of the democratic 
institution of representation as it relates to the local government and stakeholder actors 
involved in these two regional assemblies.   
 
This thesis finds actors engaged in interplay between structure and agency while contributing 
to the processes of institutional design and change.  Actors draw together their ideas with the 
pre-existing institutional context, relating them together in discursive constructions (frames, 
stories) that underpin their strategic-relational action, which in turn underpins the institutions 
of the assemblies.  Regional representation transpires to mimic local governmental norms due 
to the dominant influence of the pre-existing context.  
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CHAPTER 1: GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS AND AMBIGUITY 
 
 
1.1 Introducing regional governance 
 
„Governance‟ is ubiquitous.  Use of the term in texts, academic or otherwise, has 
proliferated over recent decades.   It has become shorthand for what is, arguably, a 
significant change in the way policy is designed and delivered.  Dubbed the shift „from 
government to governance,‟ this movement charts the gradual inclusion of multiple 
stakeholders in the policy-making process alongside or instead of the traditional units of 
government. 
 
It is a contentious issue.  Theorists debate its novelty and are divided over its normative 
value (e.g. Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998).  Particularly pertinent are the ongoing 
considerations over the democratic credentials of governance, leading to claims of a 
democratic deficit as well as to counterclaims of new or different types of democracy 
(e.g. Papadopoulos 2007; Peters and Pierre 2004).  This contestation reveals that 
democracy is not one single, fixed thing, rather there are different conceptions and types 
of democracy.  Democracy is best understood as rhetoric, something that is identified by 
how it is referred to in language and how this is then drawn upon when enacted (Saward 
2003).  Or, different types of democracy can be understood as different democratic 
discourses – collections of ideas and practices bound together through common 
discursive constructions that shape what is thought of as appropriate in the political 
world (Dryzek 1996; Skelcher et al. 2005).   
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What is, or has recently become, important is how these are enacted, how discursive 
constructions are used and how they become embedded, or institutionalised, in the 
political system.  This is the stimulus for this research project.  In this thesis I do not 
seek to contribute towards debates about the novelty or the democratic value of 
governance, but to explore how democracy or elements of democracy may be 
constructed or appealed to in institutional processes, or how actors may „anchor‟ 
institutions in their design to understandings of democracy (Skelcher et al. 2005).  And 
I do this through empirically researching a site that typifies governance, in which there 
is a significant degree of „institutional ambiguity‟ (Hajer 2003): at the regional tier of 
English governance. 
 
Over approximately the last decade, there has been significant activity at the sub-
national level of British politics, which has led to the design and development of a 
regional tier of governance in England.  A very brief summary of the recent regional 
developments in England starts after the Scottish and Welsh devolution projects.  The 
then newly elected Labour Government prioritised London (and its surroundings) as 
what was effectively the first of the English regions, implementing a directly elected 
form of government following a referendum.  Attention then turned to establishing the 
regional development agencies (RDAs) as bodies that would manage economic affairs 
in each region; and it is this legislation (the RDA Act 1998) which enabled the 
development of the bodies that came to be known as the regional assemblies (originally 
called regional chambers), designating them as the executive branch (over the RDA) in 
the region.  
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The eight regional assemblies (RAs) were intended to be a tier of sub-national 
government, like the arrangement in London, but the idea of a directly elected regional 
assembly failed to gain public support when put to referendum in the North East region 
in 2004.  Despite this, the non-elected RAs continued to exist.  Before and after the 
North East referendum, they brought together a range of actors from the local and 
regional levels and from different sectors to perform the statutory duty of scrutinising 
the RDA, as well as a range of other functions that they acquired over time.  However, 
the Government‟s 2007 Review of Sub-National Economic Development and 
Regeneration discontinued the RAs „in their current form and function‟ (HM Treasury 
2007: 4), and it remains to be seen exactly what will develop next. 
 
This brief introduction to the RAs reveals a number features that make them an 
interesting case study for institutional construction.  Firstly, the lack of formality 
regarding the constitutional basis of the RAs is noteworthy.  The RDA Act 1998 
allowed for the development of these regional bodies but the RAs were not prescribed.  
The Government issued guidance for the RAs but there were few formal rules.  Had the 
NE referendum returned a favourable result, a directly elected regional body 
presumably would have gained a constitutional base, and the other regions probably 
would have followed suit to establish a formal layer of regional government with clear 
rules and roles.  But the course of events has meant that the RAs remained essentially 
voluntary bodies, and many subsequently obtained legal bases as companies.  The 
implication of this in theoretical terms is that there was considerable scope for the 
participants at the sub-national level to design and develop their institutions. 
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Secondly, the composition of actors in the RAs is of interest as the RAs included a 
range of regional stakeholders in their membership.  Central government guidance 
recommended that at least 30% of all seats were reserved for stakeholders nominated 
from arts, business, community, environmental and faith organisations (DETR 1998).  
These were known as the social, economic and environmental partners (SEEPs) and 
they sat alongside members nominated from the local authorities in the region that made 
up the other 70% of seats.  This demonstrates that there were new actors involved in the 
policy-making process, and that the governmental actors traditionally involved were not 
necessarily the only or the obvious actors participating in both the policy-making and 
institution-building processes.  
 
Finally, the lack of predecessor body at the regional level is significant.  The designers 
of the RAs‟ operating rules did not have a clear pattern to follow or an institutional 
legacy to inherit (Jeffares and Skelcher 2007).  The regions were, however, part of a 
longer and wider story of local government reform: units of local government known as 
metropolitan county councils, though abolished in 1986, were recalled as conterminous 
with current sub-region or city-region borders; and areas of two-tier local government 
structures in England would have had to undergo significant reorganisation with any 
strengthening of the regions.  Thus, whilst institutions from other times, levels or 
sectors could have been mimicked, no single option was an obvious choice or generally 
accepted by all at the outset, meaning that the selection and deliberation of options 
formed part of the institutional construction process.   
 
It is pertinent to note the source of interest in the regional assemblies in this thesis.  This 
research was funded by a studentship from the Economic and Social Research Council 
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(ESRC) with additional assistance from the English Regions Network (ERN) – the 
umbrella body for the eight assemblies
1
.  This was a collaborative arrangement, known 
as a CASE award, which supported the PhD process whilst also adding a „real time‟ 
dimension that, in this case, required the research to be outputted as three policy papers 
alongside the thesis.  The original plans for the research proposed an exploration into 
accountability, particularly into the performance of accountability by the stakeholder 
members and particularly with reference to the multi-level governance context of the 
RAs.  This was revised over the course of the project, not least because of the 
significant changes in the policy-world with regard to the RAs, namely their 
dismantling, as mentioned above, which also brought about the disintegration of the 
ERN.  The state of flux was felt keenly in the ERN, resulting in frequent organisational 
change (in terms of staffing and regional hosting arrangements), which in turn impacted 
upon the PhD.  The instability meant that at times this project was a relatively low 
priority for the ERN, passing through four different people as supervisor, though at 
other points there was some attempt to capture the added degree of credibility lent by 
the academic input to advocate the continued inclusion of stakeholders at the regional 
level.  This „real world‟ complexity is reflected upon within the thesis.        
 
 
1.2 The art of the state
2
 and the state of the art 
 
Away from the policy-world, back to academia, the discipline of political science could 
be said to be undergoing something of a transformation.  Over the last decade, 
intellectual progress in the field has accelerated due to the growing acceptance by those 
                                                 
1
 Award reference PTA-033-2006-00065 
2
 (Hood 2000) 
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previously unconvinced of the contingent nature of human action.  People are 
unpredictable.  Whilst an individual‟s or a group‟s behaviour under certain 
circumstances or in given contexts can be studied and understood, this cannot provide 
the basis of a prediction of another individual‟s or group‟s behaviour in that same 
situation.  Confidence is waning in the traditional assumption that general laws 
predicting human behaviour can be generated from theoretical modelling and empirical 
testing.  There is greater recognition and acceptance that people are unlike cells, 
particles and forces, and thus the deep-seated aspiration to be „scientific‟ as the natural 
sciences are perceived to be is gradually being relinquished (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; 
Hay 2002; Little 1991; Stone 2002; Yanow 2006).  
 
This is not to say that all are convinced.  Indeed, positivistic political science lives on 
largely undisturbed, to the extent that the progressives described here are a relatively 
marginal group.  But these scholars that are not content simply to conduct large-n 
empirical studies to uncover the „truth‟ about specific social phenomena under the 
dominant paradigm, that are reflective about the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of their work, these political „scientists‟ turned „analysts‟ are at the 
forefront of developing the discipline (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Hay 2002, 2006).  
Key to this movement is the rejection of positivism‟s conception of an objectifiable 
reality and, instead, a sensitivity to the intersubjective nature of the material world; 
„reality‟ is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and shared through 
language, and this cognitive and discursive operation adds a layer of complexity that is 
inexplicable through the traditional methodological framework of the political science.  
And although this movement falls far short of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, it is gaining 
momentum and has attracted enough attention to be labelled, variously, the 
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„interpretive-‟ or „constructivist turn‟ in political science (e.g. Rabinow and Sullivan 
1979 and Checkel 1998, respectively). 
 
Despite the novelty status signified by the label of „turn,‟ the interpretivist perspective 
has a long-, if not well-, established presence in that part of social sciences that 
explicitly addresses ontology and epistemology, that addresses the nature of subjects 
under study and how that can be known (Little 1991;  Taylor 1971; Marsh and Furlong 
2002).  Therefore, it can be easily be given in shorthand, as above, in a way that perhaps 
focuses too much attention to what interpretivism is not, or what it rejects, and also in a 
way that somewhat conflates the ontological and epistemological facets of 
interpretivism.  These two are, indeed, closely related, and much of the position is, in 
fact, developed away from the dominant scientistic paradigm.  However, it is useful to 
the wider thesis to separate out the strands and state positively what interpretivism is: at 
its core, it is constructivist, meaning that it perceives the nature of things to be socially 
constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966); and translating this to the theory of 
knowledge, interpretivists seek to understand meaningful human practices (Little 1991; 
Taylor 1971; Marsh and Furlong 2002). 
 
It is from this basis that I attempt to develop an interpretivist position.  Though the 
central concern of this thesis is the research project undertaken as my doctoral study, it 
can also be read as a running commentary that charts my development as an 
interpretivist researcher whilst undertaking that study.  The central tenets – that (a) the 
„real world‟ is actually socially constructed and (b) that knowing that world is 
understanding those constructions – are brought to bear upon the theory and methods 
used to research institutional development at the regional tier of English governance.  
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By building specific theory and a research design, as well as through physically 
conducting the research, the ontological and epistemological positioning is honed in on.  
Questions are raised, for example about how to access meanings and what purpose we 
can serve with our unearthed understandings, throughout the thesis as the interpretivist 
position is applied and figured through.  But this is not to suggest that interpretivism 
was „tried and tested‟ in this project.  I concur with the key textbook advice that 
ontology and epistemology are together „a skin, not a sweater‟ (Marsh and Furlong 
2002), though, in the same vein, I add that doctoral training is the process of becoming 
comfortable in one‟s own skin.   
 
Accordingly, this thesis is less about finding answers in the strictest sense, but about 
dealing with the implications of ontology and epistemology when turned towards the 
particulars of the research.  Turning to the specific area that is concerned with the 
structures and process of policy-making, theorists have responded to the interpretivist 
turn by recognising the inherently political nature of any interaction involving more 
than one actor.  Whilst previously the art of analysing the state‟s structures focussed on 
such problems as, for example the efficiency of bureaucratic networks, more recently 
the interpretive turn has highlighted the role of an actor‟s interpretation of efficiency as 
well as  the contestation of such interpretations amongst actors, which draws out the 
normative basis of such understandings and leads to debates about whether (to continue 
with the example) bureaucratic networks should be efficient or in what ways they could 
be democratic.  These are exactly the kinds of issues that could be raised about sites like 
the English regional assemblies.  The discipline of public policy mirrors and reflects 
upon policy-making in practice, and so this academic movement towards interpretivism 
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has, through this lens, problematised anew issues relating to the topic of governance that 
has, as noted above, simultaneously been attracting increased attention.  
 
This interpretive turn in public policy is an ontological movement.  It operates at a level 
that concerns wholesale world-views.  It draws on earlier and ongoing developments in 
the disciplines of philosophy and linguistics, and brings those to the political settings of 
state apparatus.  And, because of the scale of change, theorists advocating the 
interpretive stance have thus far tended to focus on critiquing the dominant positivist 
perspective in political studies and on grand theory, developing interpretivism‟s 
fundamental premises with reference to politics (e.g. Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006a, 
2006b, 2010).  In a similar vein, those academics more concerned with the ways in 
which the interpretive stance could be practically applied to public policy research have 
borrowed and adapted tools from other relevant disciplines, for example ethnographic 
data collection methods from anthropology and discourse data analysis methods from 
linguistics, to political settings (e.g. Yanow 2000; Farrelly 2010).  Whilst these 
theoretical and methodological developments have been essential in asserting the 
interpretivist perspective, the movement is now ripe for opportunities to develop 
interpretivist positions on the traditional subject matters of political studies, such as 
political institutions.  Rather than simply applying the interpretivist lens to political 
settings, trying to distil discourses and draw out contested meanings, attention should 
now turn to the significance of these discourses or contestations – on how people deal 
with these tensions, on the resultant processes – and develop mid-range interpretivist 
theories (Hay 2002). 
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This thesis seeks to address this need.  Turning attention to institutions, it develops an 
approach to institutional analysis that is fitting with interpretivism.  Institutions have 
long been scrutinised in political studies because they are essential components in 
political life: they are the structures that underlie and hold together whole political 
systems.  This thesis takes a modern political setting – a site of governance, where there 
is „institutional ambiguity‟ (Hajer 2003) – and asks, from an explicitly interpretivist 
perspective, how multiple actors together create or change the political institutions that 
provide the structure to their policy-making activities.  It employs an institutionalist 
theory that is consistent with the foundations of interpretivism and develops a 
corresponding research design.  The following section outlines how this thesis addresses 
this research problem. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
 
The first substantive chapter of this thesis expands of the empirical site that is the 
background to this research.  In charting the institutional development of the regions, I 
highlight the unstable and contested nature of the tier.  This chapter covers the ideas 
behind regionalism, the pendulous party political movement and the relationship of the 
regional agenda to the wider setting of British national politics.  In short, it 
contextualises the regional assemblies.  I bring the reader right up to date, describing the 
particularities of each of the assemblies as discovered in the early stages of this research 
project and summarising the national developments in the regional agenda that took 
place over its course.  I then adjust the level of focus, detailing the points that make the 
assemblies particularly interesting to study and translating these points into theoretical 
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terms.  I bring these points under Hajer‟s conception of an „institutional void‟ (2003).  
And this concept points neatly and directly to a body of theory literature for further 
analysis, that which addresses institutions.  
 
Institutions are significant and complex entities of political life.  One of the key 
qualities of an institution, and perhaps the reason it remains an interesting and essential 
entity to analyse in political studies, is the difficulty in fixing their meaning.  
Institutions are defined by what they do.  And, partly for that reason, they can 
simultaneously be understood as one thing and its opposite.  The clearest demonstration 
of this relates directly with the central underlying issue of this thesis, that of structure 
and agency.  There is a definitional bias in institutional analyses towards understanding 
institutions as stable structures in society, and yet they also exert agency in that they are 
a powerful force on individuals in society.  
 
As chapter 3 will set out, there are a number of different conceptions and types of 
institutionalisms, which vary according to different reviewers‟ schemas.  However, it is 
generally accepted that there are three main schools of institutionalism which vary 
according to their leaning on this central question of structure and agency, and which in 
turn reveals the ontological foundation of their stance.  On one end of the spectrum, 
rational choice institutionalism privileges the agent over structure, focussing on the 
agent‟s attempts to create and use institutions to bind the choices and actions of others.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, normative or sociological institutionalism 
concentrates on structure over agency, focussing on the constraining affects of 
institutions on people‟s behaviour.  There is a third main school, that of historical 
institutionalism, of which advocates are united by the central idea that past decisions are 
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the key determinant of individuals‟ choices and actions but, even within this school, 
these advocates are divided along the same continuum i.e. according to structure and 
agency, along their „cultural‟ and „calculus‟ strands (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
 
These institutionalisms are clearly closely related in that they bring together the factors 
of structure and agency, and they invariably reach a similar conclusion through 
empirical analyses: that both factors matter, though to differing extents.  This is what 
makes the institutionalism difficult to compare.  On one side of the central 
structure/agency „cleavage‟ that Lowndes identifies (2002), the institutionalisms 
grouped by their inheritance of a rational foundation of human behaviour there is a 
focus on the individual agent‟s interaction with an institution whereas the 
normative/sociological institutional perspective explores the relationship between 
institutions and individuals from the institution outwards.  Effectively their objects of 
analysis are different and the pull is in different directions. 
 
After a critical analysis of the institutionalisms, I take forward constructivist 
institutionalism, which seeks to reposition the goalposts of this debate.  Indeed, it is 
based on the premise that the structure/agency issue should not be seen as a binary 
debate, that is it something of a false dichotomy since, as mentioned above, studies 
regularly conclude that both structure and agency are both in operation together but to 
differing degrees.  What is necessary, therefore, is a theorization of the relationship 
between these forces, which is the contribution that constructivist institutionalism 
makes to the wider institutionalist perspective.  This theory takes the wealth of literature 
on institutionalism as a point of departure and it seeks to bring the interrelated concepts 
of structure and agency together as a starting point, thus it is based, first and foremost, 
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on a „strategic-relational‟ understanding of human action, whereby an individual actor is 
at once strategic but also maps out their strategy according to the situation around them 
(Jessop 1990, 1996; Hay 2002).  In this way, the individual actor has the capacity to act 
– i.e. has agency – but the choices made and actions taken are located within a context – 
i.e. this occurs within a structured environment.  Thus, constructivist institutionalism 
moves institutionalism forward and places greater attention on how structure and 
agency work together. 
 
Attention then turns to methods, or more precisely to methodology, given the sustained 
engagement with ontology and epistemology throughout this next chapter‟s 
development of a way to operationalise constructivist institutionalism.  In chapter four I 
develop an analytical framework from the theory of constructivist institutionalism as it 
relates to institutional design and change, thus clarifying what data I need, to then state 
how I propose to collect and analyse that data.  I work through the fundamentals of the 
research methods, such as why the case studies were selected and how the interviews 
were conducted, and I do this with frequent reference to the underlying position that sets 
out the vision and purpose of the research because, I argue, it is only through connecting 
to this that the methods and the way they are used can be justified.  Methods are 
themselves neutral tools, not necessarily and certainly not exclusively aligned to a 
researcher‟s ontological position, but they are fundamentally driven by that position.  
The methods of data analysis make this point clear, as this iterative process is 
exploratory in this thesis.  I employ concepts that are derived from previous interpretive 
work to help navigate through the data and I relate these together as they speak to and 
through the findings of the research project.  
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In this thesis and in this chapter particularly, I pay significant attention to issues of „-
ology‟ because they have been raised, challenged and honed iteratively during the 
course of this project.  I was wary throughout – and still am – of merely adopting a 
position within which I could problematise, reference and conclude a study, and instead 
I aimed to engage with limitations, work out issues and concentrate on the peripheries 
of agreements where there is scope for development, however small.  Therefore, this 
chapter conventionally sets out the methods i.e. recognising and making explicit the 
limitations, but it takes this to a further level and re-engages with ontology and 
epistemology to consider limitations and criticisms of the perspective as a whole.  In so 
doing, I balance what can appear to be quite a heavy critique of positivism and its 
scientism throughout the thesis by perhaps coveting to some extent that perspective‟s 
ability to explain confidently and to generate abstract, applicable knowledge.  I 
recognise that these concerns are born of the CASE component of this research project 
and I describe my attempt to manage these issues over the course of the PhD.   
 
The next four chapters present a developmental and exploratory process of empirical 
research.  The first case study – of the West Midlands Regional Assembly – points to 
the significance of different sectoral groupings in this case.  Using this information 
gathered in the early stages of fieldwork, the direction of data analysis is constructed 
around the idea of a „frame.‟  This is used to re-present the different frames of reference 
of the different groups of actors – local government, business and others.  However, this 
does not initially bear much relevance to the next case study – the North West Regional 
Assembly, where actors present themselves as much more united.   The actors here 
repeat the same stories when describing their experience of institutional development, 
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and so the discursive construction of stories is taken forward as a tool with which to 
examine the data.   
 
The two-pronged approach to data analysis is not separated out to the different case 
studies.  Rather, the use of frames in the WMRA case and stories in the NWRA case 
leads to questioning about stories in the WMRA case and frames in the NWRA case.  
Chapter 5 presents the WMRA local government and separate (business, other) 
stakeholder frames and the following chapter presents their shared story of „consensus.‟  
And chapter 7 then presents the NWRA stories, followed by an exploration into the 
original frames that can be revealed.  This generates an understanding that is the key 
finding of this research, brought together and presented in chapter 8: that actors initially 
identify with a particular frame when entering the institutional design/change process 
but they are able to discursively select, construct and share across those frames, thus 
forming collaborative stories that, in stages, realise institutional design and change.  
Finally, chapter 9 draws the conclusions of the project overall, relating back to 
constructivist institutionalism, reflecting back on the journey as well as looking 
forwards to future research with a final word on governance, institutions and ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 2:  A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH REGIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the background detail to the regional tier of governance in 
England that is the subject, in broad terms, of research in this thesis.  It is useful to 
begin with this introduction to the empirical site in order to distil the details that are 
relevant to the wider research programme in this thesis.  Deciphering the points for 
further study enables a translation of those points into more abstract terms that then, in 
turn, direct attention towards relevant theory in the following chapter.  Further empirical 
detail is given later in the thesis with regards to the specific cases – the West Midlands 
Regional Assembly (WMRA) and the North West Regional Assembly (NWRA) – that 
are the subjects of the primary research in this project. 
 
What becomes clear in tracing the history of regional development is how unstable and 
contested the tier is.  Indeed, from a general perspective of the British political system, 
it is hardly considered a tier at all.  However, as I point out in this chapter, it cannot be 
considered insignificant because there have been repeated attempts at establishing a 
regional governmental presence.  This thesis explores, in particular, the most recent 
attempt at regional governance, approximately delineated in the decade of 1998 to 2008.  
This is a period of significant development in the regions but also one of significant 
ambiguity given the autonomy granted to regional actors for the institutional 
development of the English regional assemblies.  This makes the regional assemblies 
both a suitable and an interesting site for research.  
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The first section of this chapter locates the concept of the region in the history of 
governmental expansion at sub-national levels in England and charts the formation of 
the first regional institutions.  I then detail the development of the latest regional 
arrangements, including the main political parties‟ ideological battles over 
regionalisation and the practical hurdles encountered in attempting to establish a tier of 
regional government.  Following this, the focus shifts to the latest regional 
arrangements as the chapter maps out the network of actors now populating the regional 
landscape and analyses the regional assembly in detail.  Finally, the scene is brought 
fully up to date, pointing towards the continued ambiguity in this tier and adopting a 
fitting theoretical conceptualization of that ambiguity in the form of Maarten Hajer‟s 
„institutional void‟ (2003).    
 
 
2.1 From prehistory to precursor 
 
In tracing the roots of the English regions, Mark Sandford states that the „“regions” 
have had only the merest of political and cultural existence since the eleventh century in 
England‟ (2006: 13).  Through this attempt to assert the insignificance of the regions, 
however, Sandford reveals that there was at least some existence of the region many 
centuries ago.  It is almost impossible to determine the shape and size of these regions, 
but they are unlikely to have resembled the regional boundaries in place today and 
probably more closely corresponded to the expansive shire counties dating back to 
Anglo-Saxon or Celtic times (Wilson and Game 2006).   
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If this was the case, there appears to have been a discrepancy between what was the 
region and what was the county, a confusion which extends to the „shires‟ and in some 
places includes the historically large cities.  These might all have been identified as a 
„region‟ given the lack of clear constitutional settlement between the various spatial 
units throughout these Middle Ages.  The region at this time was simply an abstract, 
relational concept, identified and constructed between the local and national.  And yet 
there was little identification with and so „only the merest‟ construction of the region, 
giving rise to the repeated observations of the lack of regional cultural identity and 
tradition in England (Sandford 2006; Tomaney and Mawson 2002), particularly in 
relation to other tiers of political organisation as well as to other countries. 
 
Britain was, by the middle of the nineteenth century, „a hodgepodge‟ or „a tangle‟ of 
parishes, boroughs and counties (Wilson and Game 2006: 50).  This hodgepodge was 
further tangled by a wealth of other „ad hoc authorities‟ established during the 
nineteenth century, for example Wilson and Game note the examples of the Turnpike 
Trustees managing the growing system of roads and the Improvement Commissioners 
providing facilities such as street cleansing and water supply (2006: 51).  With the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution, these public services became essential to alleviate the 
pressures of overcrowding and poor sanitation (Wilson and Game 2006: 51).   
 
The new global economic imperative meant that Britain would be competing with, 
amongst others, the very well-organised French, who had established a clear system of 
communes (at the local level) and départements (perhaps equivalent to the county) at 
the time of the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century (Knapp and Wright 
2001: 342, Wilson and Game 2006: 50).  Government reacted by producing a spate of 
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legislation attempting to impose order on the medieval mess.  In 1888, a tier of 
government was created at the county level across England and Wales (and across 
Scotland in 1889), including a county council for London (Wilson and Game 2006: 52-
53).  This was shortly followed by the creation of 535 urban district councils, 472 rural 
district councils and 270 non-county borough councils in 1894 (and town councils for 
Scotland in 1900) (Wilson and Game 2006: 52-53).   
 
By the twentieth century, then, there were no Acts passed that legislated for the 
establishment of the region.  The discussion above appears, therefore, to track only the 
development of local government in Britain.  However, what this reveals is that there 
was still no significant regional imperative at this point in time.  The parishes, boroughs, 
towns, cities, shires, counties, as well as countries in Britain were all in a state of flux, 
yet to be fully fixed.  The English regions cannot be discussed in complete isolation 
from these other tiers of government; the regions can be separately focussed up on but 
developments in the localities and counties as well as, later, the countries of Britain are 
integral to the context within which regionalisation is to occur.  It is important, 
therefore, to gain an understanding of the centuries of change in British sub-national 
governance whilst tracing the history of the English regions. 
 
Following the reorganisation of local and county level government in the late eighteenth 
century, still more changes occurred in the early twentieth century and eventually a 
„serious structural reform‟ was initiated in the 1960s (Wilson and Game 2006: 55).  It 
was during this period – the early twentieth century – that the first demands for 
organisation at the regional level were made.  Wannop hails the 1909 Housing and 
Planning Act as the beginning of an „experimental era‟ in regional planning (1995: 1).  
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This, coupled with the division of England into administrative regions in case of 
invasion during the First World War (HC 2007: 6), provides the earliest examples of 
central government‟s recognition and tacit approval of institutionalising the region 
when appropriate. 
 
Planning economic growth and land-use were quickly taken up as appropriate tasks to 
be conducted at the regional level, and so several towns and cities organised committees 
to discuss how to implement the Act.  The first successful attempt at regional planning 
materialised in the form of the Doncaster Regional Planning Scheme produced in 1922, 
considered the „first significant regional plan of modern British planning history‟ 
(Wannop 1995: 2).  In the more complex situation of Manchester, where several small 
towns surrounded a large city, 76 local authorities collaborated under the Manchester 
and District Joint Town Planning Advisory Committee during the early 1920s (Wannop 
1995: 2).   
  
These are just two early examples of regional networks that became established 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  The region was beginning to take root.  The 
development of regional planning was stalled by the Second World War, but the region 
reappeared as the interim unit of government in case of emergency.  In the immediate 
post-war era, eleven „standard regions‟ were founded with the purpose of devolving 
decision-making and ensuring greater coherence between local and central government 
policies (Sandford 2006: 16-17).  However, these new regional institutions had little 
opportunity to make an impact on the practices of sub-national governance as a change 
in Government triggered their demise. 
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The Conservative Government elected in 1951 did not support the gradual 
regionalisation in England, but the party governed Britain during an extraordinary time 
and witnessed ten years of considerable change.  The decline of heavy industry and the 
growth of the service sector caused a shift in the pattern of employment across the 
country and a consequent movement of people from northern England, Scotland and 
Wales to London and the South East (Sandford 2006: 17; Wannop 1995: 9).  The stark 
regional inequalities forced the Conservatives to accept the economic imperative of 
regional planning and to recognise its steady growth in demand over the three decades 
since the first regional planning experiments.  Thus, the Conservatives made the first 
tentative steps towards instituting regional planning, primarily through a wealth of 
regional studies (Wannop 1995: 9), and in 1961 SERPLAN, a planning body for 
London and the South East (officially London and South East Regional Planning 
Conference), was established (Sandford 2006: 17). Soon after, planning committees and 
industrial development associations mushroomed across the country. 
 
In 1964, a change in Government generated a change in tack.  Having spent thirteen 
years in opposition, the Labour Party was eager to separate its ideas about regionalism 
from the Conservatives‟ eventual acquiescence.  It focussed on the Conservatives‟ early 
attitude to planning, ridiculing their worries of the loss of liberty caused by planning 
(The Labour Party 1964, cited in Dale 2000: 104).  It also criticised the Conservatives‟ 
late attempts at regional planning, disapproving of the concentration of efforts on the 
management of the pressures of population drift to the South East of England (through 
SERPLAN), rather than on the amelioration of the consequences of economic decline in 
Scotland, Wales and northern England (Lindley 1982: 171), which had been neglected.  
However, rather than supporting the planning committees and industrial development 
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associations that had organised in the regions and encouraging the establishment of 
others, the Labour Party proposed a National Plan supported by statutory regional plans 
(Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).   
 
Inspired by the pace of progress in other countries, the party looked to France which 
had initiated a programme of indicative planning with a National Plan and central-
regional contracts (Knapp and Wright 2001; Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).  The 
regional element of this proposal was essential; regional plans would be able 
 
„…to solve the problems of slum clearance and overcrowding in our major 
cities; to carry out a vigorous programme for new town and overspill 
development […]; to clear up the ugly, scarred face of industrial Britain; to 
save the countryside from needless despoliation; and to get the co-
ordination of higher education, further education and industrial training 
required to maintain economic expansion‟ 
       (The Labour Party 1964, cited in Dale 2000: 112). 
Importantly, the regional plans would no longer be developed in isolation, as they had 
been in the past, and instead they were to be designed „in harmony both with each other 
and with national policies and priorities‟ (Lindley 1982: 171). 
 
In 1965-66, the Labour Government instituted Regional Economic Planning Boards 
(REPBs) and Regional Economic Planning Councils (REPCs) in each of the eight 
newly defined regions (Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).  The Boards had responsibility 
over the regional plans; they were to draw together any streams of work from central 
government departments that had a regional dimension in a single, co-ordinated plan 
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(Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).  The REPCs were to assist the REPBs in this process by 
providing information about the region‟s particularities, for example their resources 
(Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).  Together, these institutions would  
 
„provide for a full and balanced development of the country‟s economic and 
social resources; and […] ensure that the regional implications of growth are 
clearly understood and taken into account in the planning of land-use, of 
development […] and of services‟ 
 (Brown 1964, cited in Lindley 1982: 172).   
As explained above by the Secretary of State for the parent department for the REPBs 
and REPCs (the new Department of Economic Affairs), the Government was committed 
to incorporating the specific needs of the regions into the planning process and tailoring 
policies accordingly.   
 
This systematic institutionalisation of regionalism could be viewed as a watershed in the 
development of institutions at the regional level.  The REPBs and the REPCs were the 
culmination of decades of evolution, although now enhanced by a number of features 
that separated them from earlier structures.  In contrast to the experiments of the 1920s, 
the new network of REPBs and REPCs across the country represented a systematic 
approach to regionalism; they did not develop on an ad hoc basis, but were established 
in each region.  And in contrast to the standard regions founded in the 1940s, the new 
institutions sought to include the demands of the region rather than only ensuring local 
and central government objectives were met.  In bringing these two – standardised 
institutions and regionalism – together, the first regional institutions were established.    
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The Government openly stated an intention to include a region‟s particularities and 
demands into planning, but how was this to be achieved?  The REPCs, tasked with 
providing information about the region, were to be composed of people from the region.  
Described by Sandford as what the French would call „notables‟ (2006: 18), these 
people were noteworthy, distinguished individuals from the region deemed to be able to 
collate information about the region and communicate its needs.  The Secretary of State 
selected and appointed 25-30 of these people to form the REPCs.  Lindley describes 
them as „drawn from both sides of industry, local government, and other walks of life in 
the regions‟ (1982: 172), and Sandford points out that „business, trade unions and the 
universities were all represented on the REPCs‟ (2006: 19).  In contrast, the REPBs 
were made up of senior figures from central government departments involved in or 
affected by regional planning.  Together, these bodies were to create a more consensual 
approach to planning. 
 
The members of the REPCs, being people from the region with an interest in the region, 
could be seen as regional „stakeholders.‟  Their inclusion in the planning process, 
assisting in decision-making that could effect and affect regional policies, was novel.  It 
could be seen as the first of many attempts to involve territorial and/or sectoral interests 
in policy-making processes, as an experiment in corporatism and perhaps the 
germination of the Labour Party‟s recent interest in the ideals of „partnership.‟  Some 
suggest that the inclusion of the regional perspective in the planning bodies of the 1960s 
could have been part of the Labour Party‟s mimicry of the French National Plan, which 
too allowed an advocacy role for regional representatives (Lindley 1982; Sandford 
2006).  Equally, it could be inferred from the Labour Party‟s specific history with the 
trade union movement, from which it is commonly understood to originate, that the 
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Party has a long-standing willingness to involve societal interests in public policy and 
thus the REPCs were an early embodiment of this predisposition to corporatism. 
 
The Labour Government, whether through imitation or due to principle, appeared to be 
committed to involving regional stakeholders in the planning process.  Despite clear 
intentions, though, there was some confusion about the stakeholders‟ representational 
role.  Whilst Sandford describes business, trade unions and universities as „represented‟ 
on the REPCs (above, 2006: 19), he also points out that the members were appointed 
„for their individual qualities rather than as representatives of particular sectoral 
interests‟ (Friend et al. 1974: 86).  And yet at the same time, „representativeness‟ would 
also be taken into account.  In this respect, the national and regional planning in the UK 
contrasted starkly with the French model, in which regional actors had a clear mandate 
to act in the interests of the region as well as significant power in the planning process 
(Lindley 1982: 174; Wannop 1995: 34). 
 
Further questions arose around the regional planning bodies and their roles just two 
years after their establishment, when they changed function.  In March 1966, 
responsibility for drawing up the regional plan was shifted from the Boards to the 
Councils (Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006).  It appeared that the REPCs, and thus the 
regional stakeholders, had gained weight vis-à-vis the REPBs, the arm of central 
government.  However, although the Government transferred the task, it did not transfer 
the attendant power; the plans would now not be written by civil servants, and so would 
no longer be binding on Government (Lindley 1982; Sandford 2006). 
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This discussion raises a number of issues that are relevant to the current regional 
institutions.  A significant feature, the inclusion of regional stakeholders, has endured; 
the tensions around the stakeholders‟ representational role persist; and the regional 
landscape continues to be subject to frequent changes, relative to other tiers of 
government.  These themes and issues will be discussed in detail below, following an 
exploration of the developments that led to the establishment of the current regional 
institutions. 
 
 
2.2 An attempt at regional government  
 
In the post-war era, the successive Labour and Conservative governments engaged in an 
ideological battle over the regions.  The Labour Government of the late 1940s instituted 
the standard regions, which the Conservative Government of the early 1950s promptly 
discontinued.  However, during their time in power, the Conservatives recognised the 
necessity of strategic planning at a regional level and established SERPLAN, the 
planning body for the South East region of England mentioned above.  The eventual 
election of a Labour Government in 1964 saw the replacement of SERPLAN with two 
standard regional planning bodies, common to all the redefined standard regions.   
 
The Conservative Party was then elected to government in 1970 but it defied the 
adversarial pattern of developments in the region.  This Conservative Government 
instead decided that a reorganisation of local government was required, rather than an 
attempt to reform the regional tier which it had previously deemed unnecessary and 
undesirable (Lindley 1982: 179).  Dismissing the recently published recommendations 
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to establish a system of all-purpose unitary councils by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission 
initiated by Labour, Heath‟s Conservative Government created a two-tier system of 
county and district councils (with metropolitan county and district councils in major 
conurbations) across England (Wilson and Game 2006: 57-58). 
 
Following a relatively uneventful (in terms of sub-national government) period in office 
for the Labour Party between 1974 and 1979, the Conservative Party, now with 
Margaret Thatcher at the helm, was elected to government.  During its first year in 
power, the new Government abolished Labour‟s REPBs and REPCs.  This was not, 
however, simply a continuation of a pattern of adversarial politics.  The regional Boards 
and Councils were discontinued because they were no longer serving their purpose.  
Indeed, these bodies had been ineffective for approximately a decade before they were 
abolished (Sandford 2006: 21).  Some, including the former Labour Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, argued that the REPBs and REPCs were bound to be 
„inadequate and meaningless‟ since their founding as they had to be cautious around 
physical planning, which was firmly a local government domain (Crossman 1975: 93, 
cited in Lindley 1982: 173).  But ultimately it was not local government concern that 
brought about the demise of the planning Boards and Councils, rather macro-economic 
factors caused the National Plan to fail, which in turn brought an end to the need for 
regional plans and planning (Lindley 1982: 178).  
 
The Thatcher Government‟s efforts to „streamline‟ government structures also extended 
to the recently reorganised city councils (The Conservative Party 1983).  Just over a 
decade after the last Conservative Government had legislated to restructure local 
government, the Thatcher Government proposed and passed its own Local Government 
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Act in 1985, which abolished the metropolitan county councils that had been established 
by the last.  Wannop describes this as a „curbing‟ of local government, and notes the 
growth of a range of government agencies, for example Urban Development 
Corporations, City Action Teams and Enterprise Zones, created to undertake former 
local government tasks (1995: 39).  The Government made no other significant changes 
to the regional landscape until 1994, when it established a network of regional 
Government Offices (GOs) to co-ordinate the multitude of government agencies and 
departments at work in the regions (Russell Barter 2002; Sandford 2006). 
 
Despite the failure of the regional planning Boards and Councils during the 1970s, the 
Labour Party continued to be committed to the idea of devolving governmental powers 
to both the regions of England and the countries of the UK.  The Labour Party spent 
eighteen years in opposition, and during this time it witnessed an intensification of 
economic disparities across the UK and a growth in the number of government agencies 
and quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations) operating at the 
regional level (Russell Barter 2002; Sandford 2006).  In this context the Party‟s 
arguments for regionalisation, which were at once practical and ideological, gathered 
strength. 
   
The decline of industry in the 1980s gave rise to economic arguments for 
regionalisation.  Partly compounded by the pace of globalisation, which had accelerated 
due to the advance of technology, there was a competitive imperative to assist the 
northern English regions in diversifying their economies from industry as well as to 
better support the weaker areas overshadowed in the more prosperous regions (Russell 
Barter 2002; Sandford 2006).  By establishing regional institutions that could provide 
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more focussed attention for these tasks, it was hoped that the whole national economy 
would be better able to compete in the global economy (The Labour Party 1997, in Dale 
2000).  At the same time, this fulfilled the core Labour value of equality, by reducing 
disparities between and within the regions (Russell Barter 2002; The Labour Party 
1997, in Dale 2000). 
 
It could be argued that a degree of Europeanization, too, may have contributed to 
Labour‟s drive for regional institutions.  Some thought that creating a tier of regional 
government, as existed in other European states, could generate practical advantages for 
the UK.  For example, as an organised institution, the English region could participate 
in EU arenas such as the European Committee of the Regions and the regions would be 
better able to prepare successful bids for EU funding (Russell Barter 2002).  
Ideologically, the move towards regionalism could be seen as an approval and 
institutionalisation of the EU-inspired principle of subsidiarity, whereby tasks are 
delegated to the lowest, most appropriate level of government.  Indeed, the Labour Party 
General Election Manifesto 1997 claimed that „subsidiarity is as sound a principle in 
Britain as it is in Europe‟ when making the case for devolving powers to Scotland and 
Wales (cited in Dale 2000: 375).   
 
Alongside these bids to improve the economic fortunes of the UK and to create a tier of 
government that could most successfully strategise to this end, the Labour Party put 
forward the democratic case for institutionalising and formalising the regions.  It argued 
that a tier of regional government already existed in the form of quangos and GOs, but 
this was uncoordinated and unelected and so a democratically elected and transparent 
regional government was required to address the democratic deficit (The Labour Party 
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1997, in Dale 2000; Russell Barter 2002: 13).  It was thought that the quangos operating 
in the region ought to be held to account by the region, which could be achieved 
through regional government.  
 
Finally, regionalisation was, in part at least, a tacit recognition of feelings of regional 
identity that existed in some areas of England.  Although uncommon, there were 
dispersed minority groups in the population that did acknowledge a regional 
particularity but had no opportunity to express this in the policy-making process 
(Russell Barter 2002; Tomaney and Mawson 2002).  At the same time, the Labour Party 
understood that the vast majority of people did not experience these sentiments and so 
included a manifesto pledge to not impose a uniform blueprint of regional institution but 
to allow the regions to decide for themselves whether to establish one via referenda 
(The Labour Party 1997, in Dale 2000). 
  
The Labour Party, by then refashioned as „New Labour,‟ eventually won the general 
election of 1997.  After a lengthy period in opposition spent preparing for the 
devolution of decision-making powers to the countries of the UK and regions of the 
England, the Government was quick to act.  Within months the Government had 
published White Papers about the proposed devolution and soon after held referenda in 
Scotland and Wales (Wilson and Game 2006: 83).  Having gained public approval for a 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, the Government legislated for their 
establishment and the first Scottish and Welsh elections were held in May 1999 (Wilson 
and Game 2006: 83). 
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During the same period, the Government was working to institute a regional 
government for London.  A city-wide referendum was held in May 1998 and was 
followed by the Greater London Authority (GLA) Act 1999 establishing a directly 
elected mayor and assembly for the city. This assembly has 25 members, all of which 
are politicians directly elected into their posts.  Just over half of them – 14 – are elected 
by constituencies, each made up of two or three London boroughs, and the remaining 
members are elected to represent all of London.  London could be seen as England‟s 
first region.  Indeed, in its early days the GLA described itself as such (Sandford 2006: 
62).  Although not explicit, London‟s new government was a model for other regions in 
that a regional assembly, where a referendum approved its establishment, was intended 
to be a directly elected body (Straw 1995).  The assemblies were designed, in part, to 
strengthen accountability (Straw 1995; Tomaney and Mawson 2002) and so it was 
anticipated that they would be directly elected, therefore resembling the GLA.  
However, in a number of ways London was and remains an exceptional case.  Regional 
government was established in London before in any other region and it has since 
remained unique in status.  
 
The prioritisation of a regional government for London is easily attributed to the 
exceptional needs of the region.  Being the largest city in the UK with a high population 
density, there is a clear need for the local government units to co-operate at a city-wide 
level in order to, for example, improve housing provision or maintain transport 
facilities.  This necessity to collaborate at a scale higher than the individual councils in 
London is not novel, and nor are London-wide institutions designed to manage it.  
Before the creation of the GLA in 1999, there existed the Greater London Council 
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(GLC) since 1963, and this, too, was preceded by the London County Council (LCC) 
established in 1899 (Wilson and Game  2006).   
 
These numerous organisational changes reflect, in part, national changes in local 
government structures (noted above), however the more recent changes in London were 
arguably the manifestation of an extraordinary party political battle.  The GLC was 
abolished by a Conservative Government in 1985, which is openly considered a wholly 
political move against the Labour Party that had control of all of the London councils as 
well as against a particular individual, the Labour politician „Red Ken‟ Livingstone, 
then leader of the GLC (Travers 2004; Wilson and Game 2006).  Despite the abolition 
of the GLC, Ken Livingstone remained a campaigning figure at the forefront of London 
politics and became the first directly elected mayor of London as soon as this post and 
the GLA were established in 1998. 
 
The Labour Government published the Regional Development Agencies Act during the 
legislative flurry that occurred in its first year of office.  This Act instituted Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), bodies tasked with economic planning, in each of the 
regions
3
.  It did not establish a tier of regional government across England, as the 
Government had pledged to gauge public opinion before taking such a step, but the Act 
did allow for the establishment of voluntary regional chambers (Section 8.1 RDA Act 
1998).  These took shape whilst the Government focussed on the countries and the 
capital of the UK. 
 
                                                 
3
 The regions, by this stage, were defined by the boundaries of the Government Office (GO) for the 
regions, in place since 1994 (Sandford 2006: 41). 
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During this interim period, before the regional referenda could be organised, guidelines 
were issued for the chambers (DETR 1998).  These were not prescriptive, 
corresponding with the thinking that the establishment of regional government should 
be a voluntary and regionally determined decision, but they did include 
recommendations for the involvement of non-local authority actors in the chamber 
(DETR 1998).  Whilst the majority of chamber membership was to be made up of 
leaders or deputy leaders from local councils, stakeholder partners were to be drawn in 
from a range of organisations and make up at least 30% of an RA‟s membership (DETR 
1998).   
 
These arrangements were intended to be temporary, and the move towards more formal, 
elected regional assemblies returned to the fore during New Labour‟s second term in 
power.  The Government, spurred on in particular by the then Deputy Prime Minister, 
John Prescott, who is seen as Labour‟s keenest supporter of regionalisation, released a 
White Paper entitled „Your Region, Your Choice‟ (Cabinet Office 2002).  This reiterated 
the point that the establishment of a directly elected assembly was dependent upon 
popular support in each region.  If such a motion was carried following a referendum, a 
fully and directly elected assembly would be instituted, although alongside elected 
members, regional stakeholders would continue to be involved (Cabinet Office 2002).  
Stakeholders could participate in all aspects of the assembly‟s work (Cabinet Office 
2002), but they would not constitute the 30% of assembly membership as had been 
recommended in the interim arrangements (DETR 1998).   
 
Plans were made for regional referenda in the three northern most regions, those furthest 
from London, where feelings of regional identity were thought to be strongest 
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(Tomaney and Mawson 2002).  The first of these was held on 4
th
 November 2004 in the 
North East region.  It returned a majority against the establishment of an elected 
regional assembly (Sandford 2006; Tomaney and Mawson 2002).  Although some 
claimed that the „“no” vote‟ was an expression of dissatisfaction with the Government‟s 
performance in other areas unrelated to regionalism (Sandford 2006; Tomaney and 
Mawson 2002), it could not be ignored that only 22% of the regional population that 
voted were in favour of an elected regional assembly, which was insufficient to be seen 
as any sort of even tentative general support.  The other two planned referenda were 
postponed indefinitely. 
 
The Government‟s interest in regional government waned.  In effect, Labour simply 
adhered to its manifesto pledge – if elected regional assemblies were not wanted, there 
was little the Government would or could do.  However, neither the result of the North 
East referendum nor the lack of central government direction could bring about the 
demise of the regional chambers.  These bodies had become entrenched enough in the 
regional landscape to at least attempt to continue to operate and to develop as they saw 
fit.  These bodies thus flouted electoral defeat, renamed themselves „regional 
assemblies,‟ and remained operational for a number of years. 
 
 
2.3 From regional government to regional governance 
 
This section sketches the regional scene as it was during the majority of the period of 
this study.  This PhD project started after the NE referendum and so amidst significant 
ambiguity in the regions.  Indeed, the impetus for the research on the CASE partner‟s 
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part was most certainly related to this ambiguity, giving rise to questions about the 
unclear patterns of working in sections of the assemblies.  This gave the research a „real 
time‟ dimension that is now tricky to report (particularly due to a significant turn of 
events in the early stages of the primary research with the announcement in mid-2007 of 
the abolition of the RAs from early 2010).  As such, an approximate point in time has to 
be selected to now set the „current‟ scene of regional development and, given that the 
bulk of the primary data collected in the case studies refers to the period after the 2004 
North East „“no” vote‟ but before the 2007 announcement of abolition, the 2005-6 
period is taken as „current.‟  It is important to note that the primary data in this research 
draws on both the past and the anticipated future beyond the 1998-2008 period, but a 
narrower perspective is necessary for the present purpose of describing the regional 
scene and the regional assemblies as they were for the best part of this research.  
 
Rejoining the story of regional institutional development after the North East „“no” 
vote,‟ it is important to note that the landscape which the regional government 
institutions were expected to enter was already a crowded space.  As mentioned, the 
outgoing Conservative Government left a network of Government Offices that were 
surrounded by a multitude of government agencies and quangos.  The establishment of 
regional government was, however, supposed to resolve this problem and bring order to 
the region.  When the idea of regional government failed to gain public support and the 
interim regional institution failed to quietly disappear, the renamed regional assemblies, 
still unelected and therefore without jurisdiction over the quangos, became yet another 
piece of the regional muddle.  Before analysing the regional assembly, it is helpful to 
examine its spatial context in further detail. 
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The first component of the regional tier is the network of regional Government Offices 
(GOs).  These were established in 1994, in an effort to bring together the various units 
of government departments that were already working separately in the region (Russell 
Barter 2002; Sandford 2006).  Their role was then and now continues to be an agent or 
an extension of the centre – they effectively represent central government in the regions.  
The GOs are part of the national civil service, and so are made up of public sector 
employees rather than politicians, stakeholders or appointees.  These regional civil 
servants ensure that national, centrally determined objectives and targets are met and 
oversee the implementation of a range of government policies.  The policies come from 
a number of different government departments and so there exists a Regional Co-
ordination Unit (RCU) as part of central government administration to aid the 
communication between the GOs and the government departments. 
 
In 1998, the Labour Government created the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs).  
The RDAs could be described as wholly economic and rather technocratic bodies.  
Charged with the task of reducing economic disparities within and between the regions, 
the RDAs plan and implement policies to encourage economic growth and instigate 
regeneration.  This includes increasing the rate of employment in a region, as well as 
ensuring that the regional workforce is able to gain and develop the skills necessary for 
their employment.  These are business-led bodies, with their chairs appointed on the 
basis of their success in business combined with experience of working and 
understanding of the region.  The appointments are made centrally by what was the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), more recently the Department Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR).  The key responsibility of the RDAs is to 
draw up a Regional Economic Strategy (RES), a 10-year plan for the regional economy.  
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In preparing this document, the RDAs work closely with the regional assemblies as the 
RAs draw up regional strategies for housing and transport, which should be compatible 
and complementary, and later scrutinise the RES.  In many regions this relationship has 
become one of continual collaboration where the RDAs seek to gain the input of the 
RAs earlier in the process than at the final stage of scrutiny. 
   
The plethora of government agencies and quangos operating in the region, which was 
criticised by Labour while in opposition and a significant part of Labour‟s democratic 
case for regional government, remains in place.  Given that the proposal for regional 
government was not endorsed, the government agencies and quangos could not be 
reined under democratic control.  Now, the RAs are situated alongside this teeming web 
of regional organisations.  Examples of these agencies include the Learning and Skills 
Councils, the Environment Agency, the Arts Council for England and English Heritage 
(Sandford 2006).  It could be argued that the RAs have compounded the regional 
clutter.  Critics of the entire regional project could claim that the RAs are themselves 
just another unconstitutional regional organisation or government agency.  
Nevertheless, it is apparent that a number of new regional organisations have become 
established since the RAs have been in place.  Perhaps having recognised the value of 
co-ordinating their work and seeking representation at a regional level, these regional 
organisations have grown „like creepers round a tree‟ (Sandford 2006: 59).  The clearest 
example is this is from the voluntary and community sector, where a number of 
typically small and resource deficient organisations joined forces to create regional 
umbrella organisations and thus gained representation on the RAs. 
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That there is scope for regional organisations to gain representation on the RAs is 
pertinent.  A number of seats on the RAs are reserved for social, environmental and 
economic partners, which means that the RAs are inextricably linked to a number of 
regional stakeholders.  These may be local or regional organisations, as well as regional 
offices of national organisations.  Examples of these include local and regional housing 
groups and voluntary and community groups, as well as trade unions, NHS trusts, the 
National Trust and the Confederation of British Industry.  The RAs clearly operate in a 
complex regional environment. 
 
Internally, they are equally complex.  The constitutional basis of the regional assemblies 
is confused.  The Government‟s intention was to legislate for a tier of regional 
government but when its efforts collapsed, legal clarification for the RAs regarding their 
status and roles was not forthcoming.  The RAs fell back on the guidelines issued for 
their operation before the North East regional referendum.  Given that this was merely 
guidance, hence technically not enforceable, the RAs were never and still are not 
statutory bodies; their legal form is equivalent to unincorporated associations or private 
companies (Sandford 2006: 49).  However, the RAs do have an „existence in statute‟ 
(Sandford 2006: 50).  The RDA Act 1998 that allowed for, and consequently initiated, 
the establishment of the RAs stated that the RDAs were to provide information about 
their work to these bodies (Section 8.1).  This means that the RAs, although not 
statutory bodies, were granted a statutory role.  And whilst it is not described as such in 
the legislation, this role has now developed into and is commonly described as the RAs‟ 
statutory responsibility of scrutinising the RDAs (Sandford 2006; Tomaney and 
Mawson 2002: 50).  
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The RAs worked to strengthen their position in the region, taking on the role of co-
ordinating regional work and publicising themselves as the region‟s representative.  In 
2004, the RAs gained another statutory role – they were designated as Regional 
Planning Bodies (RPBs) under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 
(Sandford 2006; Tomaney and Mawson 2002).  In these ways, the RAs had gradually 
become entrenched both in the region and in the law.  For many regions the North East 
„“no” vote‟ caused little disruption to operations, bar the prevention of providing the 
RAs with a written constitutional base, which is arguably unnecessary given the 
acceptance of convention in Britain‟s uncodified constitution. 
 
The description above of the RAs‟ constitutional basis revealed their first and main 
function: the RA is to scrutinise the work of their RDA (Section 8.1 RDA Act 1998).  
The RDA is responsible for designing and implementing a Regional Economic Strategy 
(RES), which involves making decisions about public funds with potentially huge 
financial and other implications.  An RA, with its political and other regional 
representatives, holds these decisions and plans to account.  Through select committees 
and/or public hearings, an RA aims to ensure that the RES meets the needs of the 
region. 
 
The RAs‟ second main function is to act as the designated body for regional planning 
(Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004).  This involves drawing up statutory 
documents such as a Regional Housing Strategy and a Regional Transport Strategy, as 
well as planning for the environment and waste.  These plans feed into an over-arching 
planning framework, the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS), which sets out the region‟s 
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long-term plan for sustainable development.  This responsibility can generate a number 
of subsidiary tasks, for example planning for social inclusion or health. 
 
Complementing the roles of scrutineer and planner, the RAs have the task of strategic 
oversight of the region.  In order to ensure that all the separate strategies fit together, the 
RAs work to integrate regional policies.  The RAs also aim to co-ordinate the work of 
other regional organisations, preventing the duplication of efforts and attempting to 
ensure that all regional working complements the RSS.  And the final role of the RAs is 
to be the „voice of the region‟ (The Labour Party 1996, cited in Dale 2000).  Being a 
body that brings together local authority members with stakeholders from the social, 
environmental and economic sectors, the RAs can claim to represent the people and 
organisations of the region and to protect and further the interests of the region as a 
whole in all partnership working. 
 
As stated earlier, the RAs are made up of representatives from local authorities and 
partners from the social, economic and environmental sectors.  Approximately 70% of 
the membership is nominated from the local authorities in the areas bounded by the RAs 
and no less than 30% of the RAs‟ membership is made up of social, economic and 
environmental partners (SEEPs) – representatives nominated from arts, business, 
community, environmental and faith organisations (DETR 1998).  These SEEPs are also 
called „stakeholders,‟ demonstrating that they are seen to have a „stake‟ in the region, an 
interest that grants them a right to be involved in dealings that might affect that interest.  
A SEEP member could be, for example, a trade union representative, a chief executive 
from an NHS trust or a Member of European Parliament (MEP).  
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Similar provisions were made for the involvement of social and economic partners in 
Scotland, Wales and London, although these partners did not gain the full member 
status granted to the regional stakeholders.  Partners and partnerships have become 
central to New Labour‟s „joined-up government‟ (Newman 2001; Sandford 2006) and 
could now be described as an embedded feature of modern public policy.  The concept 
of partnership built on that of consultation in that it recognised the equal footing of 
partners (Newman 2001), granting them a higher status than those who were 
occasionally consulted as and when policy-makers saw fit.  In the same vein, the use of 
the stakeholder label has promoted these agents again; they are more than consultees – 
they are entitled to a role in the decision-making process (Sandford 2006).   
 
These rights are conferred on the SEEPs not only because of the potential impact of an 
RA‟s work on them, but because they themselves could affect the work of the assembly.  
Their connections to a variety of local and regional organisations across different 
sectors give the stakeholders invaluable knowledge which can benefit the regional 
assembly as well as the region as a whole.  This knowledge is not bound by the lines 
that traditionally demarcate policy areas but can contribute to the development of 
strategies in a variety of areas.  The stakeholders are, therefore, not restricted to the 
policy areas for which they are deemed relevant to consult but they are involved in all 
aspects of the RAs‟ work.  They aid the integration of strategies in planning, housing 
and transport, which are themselves inextricably linked.  The purpose of this 
inclusiveness is to encourage a well-rounded approach to the functions of the RAs, one 
that takes a range of interests into account in order to stimulate economic growth that is 
both socially and environmentally sustainable. 
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There is some differentiation across the regions regarding the stakeholder members.  In 
some regions, the SEEP group is further divided into sub-groups – the economic 
partners are organised into a separate groups and this allows them a greater proportion 
of the third of seats reserved for all three stakeholder categories (i.e. social and 
environmental as well as economic).  In some regions, seats are allocated to town and 
parish councillors and/or MEPs, who are technically political members but not local 
authority representatives and so take up SEEP seats.  These are just two examples of the 
variation across the RAs. 
 
Within the RAs, too, there are different conventions regarding the individual 
stakeholders, for example whether they are personally known members of the group or 
whether they are seen only in terms of their seat – for example, John Smith may be a 
well-known personality in the region or he may be labelled „an assembly member,‟ „a 
stakeholder member,‟ or „the Trades Union Congress (TUC) seat.‟  This gives rise to 
questions about the representational role of stakeholders, mirroring the uncertainty 
experienced regarding the members of the Regional Economic Planning Councils in the 
1960s.  
 
 
2.4 An ambiguous present and future for the regions 
 
The previous section described the regional scene and the RAs as they were at the point 
in time of starting the research and as they were discussed by interviewees in the 
primary research phase of this project.  As mentioned at the beginning of that section, 
the North East „“no” vote‟ was followed by a period of sustained ambiguity for the RAs 
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(that is the main interest in this research) and marked by an (anticipated) announcement 
of the RAs‟ discontinuation.  A very recent change in Government has since hammered 
a final nail in the coffin for regionalism.  It is to this period (and back again) that this 
chapter now briefly turns before attempting a translation of the „current‟ scene into 
theoretical terms.  
   
Back to the North East „“no” vote,‟ opinion was divided over how to proceed.  Given 
that Labour‟s original intention was to institute regional government that would 
improve accountability in the regions, allowing the RAs with their non-elected 
membership and non-local authority members was considered an uneasy settlement.  
The Opposition during that period continually criticised the RAs and, gradually, a 
number of independent analysts joined them.  The New Local Government Network 
(NLGN), a think-tank promoting the primacy of local authorities, was influential in 
reigniting the debate about the form and function of regional institutions (2006, 2007).  
A range of other ideas also came to the fore, for example that of „city-regions‟ for the 
parts of England that surround and depend on large conurbations. 
 
As a result, the then Government responded by re-examining the RAs as part of its 
regular Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR).  Conducting a separate and specific 
review of sub-national economic development and regeneration, the Government 
demonstrably thought it had to take a decision on the future of the RAs.  The 
conclusions of the Sub-National Review (SNR) were soon published and it was decided 
that the 
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„Regional Assemblies in their current form and function will not continue.  
Instead, local authorities in the region will be responsible for agreeing the 
regional strategy with the RDAs.  Local authorities will also be responsible 
for effective scrutiny of RDA performance…‟ 
(HM Treasury 2007: 95). 
 
It was clear that the RAs would be discontinued and that their key statutory functions of 
planning and scrutiny would return to local authorities (from March 2010).  However, it 
had not been specifically stated that the RAs would be abolished or dismantled, only 
that they would not continue in their then current form and function.  This fuelled 
suggestions that either another body would soon emerge to fill the new gap or that the 
RAs could continue in an altered form with different functions.  It is in this phase and 
in this mood that the bulk of the primary data collection for this thesis took place.  
Hence, there was a significant amount of ambiguity but also a degree of opportunity.  
Indeed, the assemblies had arguably already used the ambiguity and opportunity to the 
extent that there were perceptible differences between them.  It is useful to map out 
(literally, as the figure below shows) the different assemblies and roughly fix a 
snapshot of them as they were at the early stage of this research
4
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 These „snapshots‟ are drawn from the scoping work undertaken prior to and in conjunction with the case 
study selection process, discussed in chapter 4.  
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Figure 2.1 A map of the English regions (Source: Cabinet Office 2002:8) 
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The North East 
It is apt to begin with a snapshot of the North East because of this region‟s prominent 
role in the story of English regionalisation.  Supporters of the regional assembly 
considered the North East „the first English region‟ (NEA 2001), not only because of its 
speed in response to the challenge of forming a regional chamber but because the North 
East had been influential in creating the opportunity for regionalisation to occur.  With a 
relatively strong sense of regional identity and relatively long history of regional 
institution building (Benneworth and Tomaney 2002), this region furthest from London 
gave the loudest call for regionalisation.  For these reasons, demand was thought to be 
highest here for a directly elected regional assembly and so the North East was the 
chosen site for the trial in the form of a region-wide referendum.  As stated above, the 
referendum returned the infamous „“no” vote‟ and the North East Assembly (NEA) 
remained constitutionally powerless. 
 
This brief outline of its early history reveals that the NEA is in many ways an 
exceptional case.  The North East‟s level of civic regionalism is commonly accepted as 
higher than in any other region, despite the „“no” vote.‟  And it came closest to 
instituting a tier of government, due to its long-standing desire to gain some regional 
control over regional affairs from the distant Palace of Westminster.  These factors have 
generated considerable academic attention for the North East case.  Perhaps because of 
its status as an exemplar case or perhaps simply because many of these academics were 
based at the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) in the 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne at the time of writing, the NEA is one of the most 
researched regional assemblies (for example, Dixon 2006; Humphrey and Shaw 2006; 
Pike, O‟Brien and Tomaney 2006). 
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The North West 
Moving westwards, the North West Regional Assembly (NWRA) presents us with a 
very different story.  Although the North West, too, was understood to be one of the 
regions in which a directly elected assembly would be supported by the public
5
, this was 
not due to any feeling of identity with the region.  On the contrary, the North West is 
seen as one of the most fragmented regions in England.  Many critics of the entire 
regionalist project look to the North West and specifically Cumbria as an example of 
the artificial construction of the English regions.  Cumbria has historic ties with the 
North East and Scotland, and its capital, Carlisle, is geographically closer to both of 
these than the North West‟s major centres of Manchester and Liverpool (Giordano 
2002).  Indeed, these two cities themselves sit together uneasily due to an historic 
hostility.  But assembled together as the North West, these parts make up the second 
largest English region, home to 12% of the UK‟s population and marked by wide 
economic disparities (Giordano 2002). 
 
The assembly has responded to these challenges by acting as a collective of 6 sub-
regions: Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside.  This 
unique pattern of working has been institutionalised into the organisational structure of 
the NWRA, in which an executive board is made up of 3 representatives from each of 
the 6 sub-regions, plus 6 stakeholder representatives.  This institutional arrangement 
raises interesting questions about the geographical spread of stakeholder representation.  
Just a brief exploration into the organisation of stakeholders exposes another situation 
unique to the NWRA: in some assemblies (as will be revealed shortly) the economic 
                                                 
5
 This understanding was based on the Government‟s „soundings exercise‟ in which the regions were 
asked if they would vote for a directly elected regional assembly (ODPM 2003).  This measure of public 
support is often misunderstood or misquoted as an indicator of the strength of regional identity (which is 
obviously not the same thing). 
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partners are separated from the social and environmental partners, but in most 
assemblies they form one group.  In the NWRA, the stakeholders have moved from 
having a wide collection of stakeholders together, to a smaller group arguably only 
loosely linked to the stakeholder representatives, providing an interesting case for 
research. 
 
Yorkshire and the Humber 
Sandwiched between the North East and the East Midlands and bordered on one side by 
the North West, the most immediately distinctive feature of this region is that its name 
does not refer to a compass point position of England.  And like its north eastern 
counterpart, it has also dropped „region‟ from its title, becoming Yorkshire and the 
Humber Assembly (YHA).  This was the only other region where demand for an elected 
assembly was deemed sufficiently high for a referendum to be planned (but later 
postponed due to the North East result) although, again, this was not due to any 
particularly strong feeling of regional identity but rather support for regionally focussed 
action (ODPM 2003).  Like its two northern neighbours, Yorkshire and the Humber in 
the late decades of the twentieth century was a region suffering the consequences of 
deindustrialisation and actors were eager to collaborate in order to qualify for European 
Union structural funds (Lee 2002). 
 
As the YHA developed, important decisions were made about its composition that have 
given rise to its two very distinctive features – firstly, this is the smallest assembly with 
only 35 members and secondly, this assembly allocates the largest proportion of seats to 
its stakeholder partners.  Government guidance stipulated that „at least 30%‟ of 
assembly membership was to be drawn in from the social, economic and environmental 
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sectors; and whereas most assemblies have effectively spun this around and interpreted 
the rule as requiring at least two thirds of seats to be filled by local authority 
representatives (which is obviously not the same thing), the YHA has allocated a 
relatively large 40% of seats to its stakeholders.  This means that 14 stakeholder 
partners sit alongside 21 councillors in this exceptional regional assembly.  
  
The East Midlands 
Leaving the North and entering the Midlands takes us away from the regions where the 
North-South divide was acutely felt to a region where demand for an elected assembly 
was absent.  In the East Midlands there was no real need or desire for regional working, 
nor much consideration of its potential benefits.  However, as regionalism came onto 
the agenda with the Government‟s drive for subsidiarity, the East Midlands responded 
with enthusiasm.  Key actors grouped together and formed a strong regional partnership 
in this region that was „working with a “blank sheet of paper” unencumbered by historic 
roles and animosities‟ (Foley 2002: 150). 
 
Over the years, the East Midlands Regional Assembly (EMRA) has adjusted its 
structures and practices.  For example, the assembly now includes the region‟s 
Members of European Parliament (MEPs) in its membership, making it one of only two 
regions to do so (the other being the North East).  It has also drawn up a constitution 
and a members‟ code of conduct, as is found in some but not all regions.  In an 
appendix to its constitution (EMRA 2003), EMRA sets out the allocation of the 
stakeholder seats and states that the stakeholder members are generally organisations, 
not individuals (which is also true of other regions, but perhaps not as explicit).  These 
documents are in the public domain and (were) available online. 
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These actions suggest that EMRA is a particularly reflexive organisation, one that has 
evolved since its inception and has thoroughly and publicly considered the questions 
that could be posed about its operation and composition.  Its distinct lack of 
regionalisation prior to the design and development of the assembly makes it an 
extraordinary case in the story of English regionalism.  
 
The West Midlands 
To the west, the West Midlands Regional Assembly (WMRA) provides a complete 
contrast to EMRA.  The West Midlands has an exceptionally long history of partnership 
working across the region, which is perhaps due to its uncomplicated city-region shape, 
where there is not a competitive hostility but rather a mutually supportive relationship 
between the greater Birmingham area and the surrounding countryside.  During the 
post-war era, ties between local government units and key economic actors in the region 
were forged for the purposes of strategic planning and these soon became formalised, 
creating organisations that can be recognised as predecessors to WMRA.  These long-
standing links with the economic community were understandably maintained as 
WMRA developed, whereas the „other‟ stakeholders (as they are labelled in the 
assembly) were a relatively new addition to regional working.  The current 
organisational structure of WMRA reflects this legacy: the economic stakeholders form 
a separate group to the social and environmental stakeholders, and each group has 16 
seats on the assembly.   
 
This appears to be a harmonious arrangement as WMRA has operated under this 
68:16:16 structure for a number of years, but it does mean that the economic partners 
have half of the seats reserved for the all the stakeholders, which allows them a 
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relatively loud voice, louder than in most other regions.  Furthermore, the relative 
weakness of the other stakeholder group is arguably accentuated by the lack of co-
ordinating officer or key contact for the stakeholders within WMRA – the stakeholders 
are expected to organise themselves (although they are supported financially), which 
may be difficult for small voluntary organisations that continually report a lack of 
„capacity‟ and could explain the persistent absence of WMRA stakeholders at national 
stakeholder meetings.  These factors taken together lead to a questioning of this 
institutional design and development in a region that promotes itself as a beacon of 
successful, long-standing partnership working. 
 
The South West  
The South West is probably the region least engaged with the entire regionalist project.  
It is described as having one of the lowest levels of regional identity and one of the 
lowest levels of „institutional inheritance‟ (Bridges 2002) and, although actors in the 
East Midlands experienced similar circumstances, the South West could not respond to 
this challenge with the East Midlands‟ enthusiasm.  Being the largest and most diverse 
English region, the South West faced significant barriers to regional integration, similar 
to the North West.  In place of the „Cumbrian question,‟ the South West was confronted 
with the much tougher „Cornish question.‟ Cornwall has a distinct regional history and 
identity, and has long fought for recognition of this, so the move to institute an artificial 
South West region did not help but hindered this effort.  Furthermore, the South West 
region has had more experience with sub-regional working than partnerships at the 
regional level and, whilst the North West made use of such prior arrangements, the 
South West yet again faced a greater challenge because its sub-regional partnerships 
often cut across regional boundaries. 
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The South West did, however, overcome initial frustrations and form a regional 
assembly.  This may not be surprising given the Government‟s drive for subsidiarity but 
it is worth remembering that the chambers were technically voluntary organisations, to 
be established only where regional actors saw fit and to be elected only where there was 
sufficient public demand.  The South West Regional Assembly (SWRA) perhaps 
mobilised around EU funding bids and other strategic ends, and has since developed 
into an important regional actor.  But it appears unwilling or unable to assert its 
independence, demonstrated by the fact that it shares a secretariat and website with the 
South West LGA and the South West‟s Local Government Employer‟s Association 
(although it is not alone in this arrangement), and thus the SWRA appears something of 
a formality or an afterthought in the region. 
 
The South East 
In the South East, there was a similar discomfort with the crusade to create regional 
assemblies, but this came in the form of a direct opposition to the regionalist imperative 
contrasting with the nonchalance experienced in the South West.  The resistance of 
regionalism in the South East came from the large number of Conservative county 
councils in the region.  As part of the move towards directly elected regional 
assemblies, the Government had indicated that a reorganisation of local government 
would be likely in regions where the elected assemblies were supported.  This would 
have involved the replacement of county councils with unitary authorities.  Thus, the 
county councillors felt understandably threatened by the move.  Furthermore, the 
prevalence of Conservative-led county councils in this wealthy region meant that a free-
market attitude was widespread (John, Musson and Tickell 2002).  With high levels of 
prosperity, there was no need for economic institutions such as the regional 
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development agency and a certain resistance to an „extra‟ tier of government 
„intervention‟ or „bureaucracy,‟ as it would have been viewed. 
 
However, as highlighted above, the South East region did have a planning body at the 
regional level in the post-war period.  The existence of SERPLAN demonstrates that the 
South East did have an understanding of the need for regional strategic planning due to 
the particularly high demand for housing in the region, as well as the need to tackle or 
plan for other consequences that arise from neighbouring (indeed, nearly encircling) the 
capital city.  Thus, the South East of England Regional Assembly (SEERA) was born.  
Like WMRA, SEERA has separate groupings of stakeholders, although the economic 
dominance is perhaps understandable here and cross-stakeholder activity is facilitated 
by an „Assembly Partner Support Manager.‟  This, coupled with the clear focal point of 
London, has led to a good deal of consensus and supra-regional working. 
 
The East of England 
Flanking the other side of London, SEERA‟s regular partner in economic development 
was, too, partly born out of SERPLAN.  Areas that were included under this 
organisation‟s banner are now part of the relatively new geographical construct that is 
the East of England region.  What this region has in common with both SERPLAN and 
SEERA is its proximity to and preoccupation with London.  However, it also contains 
an area that feels a distinct separateness from both the capital city and the artificial East 
of England region that surrounds it.  East Anglia has strong ties with Europe and, as its 
enthusiasts point out, its capital city – Norwich – is physically closer to Amsterdam than 
to London (Ward and Tomaney 2002: 114).   
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Despite this bipolar attitude to regionalism in the region, the East of England Regional 
Assembly (EERA) appears to have responded to regionalism like its northern 
neighbour.  Like EMRA, it seems eager to publicise its regional working arrangements, 
making an „EERA Position Paper on Regional Governance‟ (EERA 2004) easily 
accessible through its website as well as a „stakeholder template‟ (EERA 2005) that 
clarifies which organisations its stakeholders are drawn in from.  EERA also organises 
its stakeholders collectively, unlike WMRA and SEERA, and has given this group the 
novel and inclusive label of „community stakeholders.‟  Overall, EERA appears to be 
one of the more proactive and reflexive regional assemblies. 
 
All the regional assemblies, therefore, have interesting points to them, ripe for further 
research.  However, it is beyond the scope of this project to further engage with them 
all.  Beyond the research conducted to capture the snapshots above (through general 
scoping involving primary and secondary sources), two case assemblies were explored 
using in-depth methods.  Chapter 4 later sets out this selection but, here, while bringing 
the reader as far up to date as possible, it can be noted that the two cases taken forward 
– the West Midlands and the North West regions – took fairly different approaches to 
the SNR announcement, which affected the direction of the research to some extent.  In 
the West Midlands, the response to the SNR was much like their response to the North 
East „“no” vote‟ in that they were both taken rather calmly and the RA rather quietly 
transferred to the recommended Leaders‟ Board format, now (as at March 2011) „West 
Midlands Councils.‟  In the North West region, the SNR was anticipated to a large 
extent and preparatory measures were built into the institutional development explored 
in that case study.  The format that ensued endured beyond the SNR announcement with 
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minor rebranding of their „4NW‟ model as the region‟s Leaders‟ Board, discussed 
further (as is the West Midlands case) later in the thesis. 
 
Instability and contestation have continued at the regional tier past the SNR 
announcement.  A recent change in the political complexion of Government (in May 
2010) coupled with a period of significant austerity in British politics have led to an 
even wider-reaching weakening of the regionalist project.  The new Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, having conducted their Comprehensive 
Spending Review, decreed the abolition of both the Regional Development Agencies 
and the regional Government Offices network.  These details are less significant to the 
primary research of this thesis, but serve to demonstrate the continued uncertainty that 
actors involved in the region find themselves in.  As clearly stated, the specific period 
under study does not (and could not) stretch to the present situation briefly given above.  
What is of prime interest is that period of institutional ambiguity between 1998 and 
2008.  There are a number of reasons why this specific period is of interest.  The first 
has already received attention: the original plans for the RAs allowed the actors 
involved here a significant degree of autonomy.  The description above of the RAs‟ 
unclear constitutional basis emphasises this autonomy.  This means that the RAs 
provide a rare opportunity to explore the process of institutional development. 
 
This opportunity to explore institutional development is made much more interesting 
and relevant to modern policy-making sites due to the inclusion of stakeholders in the 
process.  During the period of time under analysis and even with the SNR, there was 
significant scope for stakeholders to be part of regional institutional development.  
There is frequent mention in the SNR of continued stakeholder involvement, for 
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example in housing and neighbourhood renewal, and a particular emphasis on engaging 
private sector partners, with whom „effective working [...] is required at every level‟ 
(HM Treasury 2007: 3).  However, it was not entirely clear how and how much 
stakeholders would be able to participate.  These decisions had yet to be finalised at the 
time of conducting the fieldwork for this research.  Thus, many stakeholders and their 
supporters were vocal in reiterating the rationale for their inclusion and the value that 
they added to regional working, feeding „live‟ into the policy papers for the CASE 
component of the research.  From the informally gathered primary data, I could distil 
that many believed that the original reasons for including the stakeholders had not 
changed.  They still provided the RAs with a wide range of expertise, helping to 
develop well-informed policy.  The stakeholders‟ continued involvement in their 
nominating organisations alongside their participation in the RAs allowed them to 
channel information in both directions, encouraging a collaborative approach to 
working as well as achieving wider regional consensus.   
 
In addition, some argued that there were a number of potential problems inevitably 
associated with the local political representatives that the stakeholders could help to 
alleviate, thus complementing the councillors and improving regional working.  Firstly, 
SEEPs were not constrained or distracted by the instructions of political parties.  
Stakeholders were not obliged to follow a party line which may have been decided upon 
due to issues not related to the region.  This reduced the potential of an adversarial style 
of working, which was not unusual at other levels of government in England.  The 
stakeholders could instead focus their attention on the social, economic and 
environmental concerns of the region.  Secondly, the stakeholder members were not tied 
to a particular locality.  Councillors were attached to their local authority area and more 
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specifically their council ward, whereas stakeholders were able to work for the region as 
a whole.  When brought together, as in the regional assembly, the local knowledge of 
council members and the regional oversight of stakeholder members could generate 
more effective policy decisions.   
 
Some stakeholders also argued that they were not wholly without democratic 
credentials.  Stakeholders could be seen to ensure regional accountability in two ways: 
firstly, stakeholders ensured regional accountability to more constituents, their 
constituencies being those organisations that were both affected by and able to affect 
regional policy-making; and secondly, the stakeholders were themselves accountable to 
these organisations due to their election from them and their continual involvement in 
them.  They could be seen as enhancing democracy because they were, or at least 
claimed to be, elected into their positions by the organisations they represented, just as 
the local authority members were elected by the people they represented.  They were in 
constant dialogue with their nominating organisations, thereby constantly engaged with 
and accountable to their electorate.  Furthermore, they could help to ensure that the 
regional assembly was representative of society as a whole due to the greater levels of 
gender and minority representation in these stakeholder groups (Aulakh et al. 2005).   
 
Thus, not only does the empirical site of the regional assembly enable the opportunity to 
research the process of institutional development, it also allows research of this process 
with the inclusion of stakeholders.  It allows the stakeholders to voice their arguments 
for inclusion in public policy, as summarised above, and thus to carve out and to 
confirm a role for themselves in the regional arena alongside those more usually 
involved.  In this way, due to the inclusion of a multiplicity of voice, the regional 
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assemblies provide a site in which to research the potential for specifically 
intersubjective institutional design and change.  Because of the instability and 
contestation demonstrated as inherent in this tier throughout this chapter, the RAs in this 
period also allow for the consideration of what Maarten Hajer labels an „institutional 
void‟ (2003).  Hajer‟s concept of an „institutional void‟ is a site where „there are no 
clear rules or norms according to which politics is to be conducted‟ (2003: 175).  In the 
regions, given their almost continuous state of flux, the RAs correspond with this 
conception.  There are no clear patterns to follow in the process of regional institutional 
development.  The intersubjectivity here, born of the inclusion of stakeholders alongside 
traditional policy-makers, further complicates matters by introducing more rules and 
norms into the site without bringing any further clarity but, indeed, muddying waters.  It 
is in such instances that Hajer depicts a scenario in which institutional design results 
from the deliberation between different actors.  
 
There are a number of specific points in Hajer‟s projection of institutional design in an 
institutional void to which the RAs correspond.  Hajer describes a modern world of 
policy making in which there is a „new order‟ and a „new spatiality‟ of decision-making 
whereby he is pointing specifically to a movement away from the traditional mode of 
public policy to one where there is cross-level working and a new „territorial synchrony‟ 
paving the way for greater recognition of other levels of identification (2003: 178-179; 
184).  The examples he gives makes it clear that he is referring to instances of global, 
European and regional (in the trans-state sense) institutional design, however these 
ideas are relevant within the British context at the regional level precisely because of the 
lack of institutionalised entity yet here.  The attempt at institutional design and change 
towards the development of the RAs exemplifies a new level of identification for the 
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actors that have become involved, thus this is a new spatiality.  And the RAs also move 
the process of policy-making out of the exclusive domain of traditional actors and into 
an arena in which stakeholders can participate, hence fitting the description of a new 
order. 
 
Hajer draws specific attention to the rethinking of the standard view of participation and 
democratic governance, thus capturing the inclusion of multiple actors (2003: 179).  
These actors bring with them their own rules and norms into the site and into the 
institutional mix.  Hence, there is a mire of institutions but none that are generally 
accepted, until new ones are discursively designed.  This clarifies the point that by use 
of the term „void‟ Hajer does not mean a site that is devoid of institutions, only that 
there are not (yet) any „generally accepted rules and norms according to which policy-
making and politics is to be conducted‟ (2003: 175, emphasis in the original; 2006: 53, 
fn1).  Given the regular misinterpretation of his term, Hajer revises the concept to 
„institutional ambiguity,‟ which better makes reference to the presence of institutions 
but the lack of clarity concerning them (2006: 53, fn 1). 
 
This is clearly not a full analysis of Hajer‟s work on this concept, and it is not intended 
to be.  It is included here because of the goodness of fit of the void/ambiguity concept to 
the empirical site of research in this thesis.  It enables a translation of the RAs, or more 
specifically the points of interest of the RAs‟ institutional development, into theoretical 
terms, pointing to large bodies of literature (institutionalism and interpretivist policy 
analysis) that underpin the theoretical and methodological development of this project, 
and thus allowing for further engagement with Hajer and colleagues later.  Suffice to 
state that this institutional void or ambiguity concept (which will be used 
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interchangeably herewith) is more than an interesting hook to hang this work from and 
contributes to the articulation and the development of the ideas of institutional design 
and change together with the potential impact of intersubjectivity in sites of institutional 
ambiguity.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a detailed history of the regional tier in England.  Stretching 
back into the Middle Ages for any reference to or identification with the regions, it 
charts the slow pace of development, and even recognition, of this concept.  The chapter 
then addresses the early attempts at regional institutionalisation, demonstrating how rife 
adversarial party politics hindered attempts to sustain a regional governmental presence.  
The latest attempt at institutional development is finally reached, and this section 
portrays the current regional scene and details the current form and function of the 
regional assemblies („current‟ being relative to the majority of the primary research 
phase of this research project).  The final section of this chapter briefly updates this now 
historical account before returning to and detailing the specific points of interest for 
further research. 
 
The central point of interest is obviously institutional development in the regions.  But 
what is unique about this site is the opportunity it presents for exploration into the 
process of institutional design and change.  The regional assemblies were granted a 
significant degree of autonomy regarding their institutional arrangements and, therefore, 
there was potential for the actors in the region to come together around this process.  
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The multiplicity of actors is another specific point of interest.  The role of 
intersubjectivity in institutional design becomes a route for theoretical and empirical 
research.  And, finally, given the multiplicity of actors as well as the unstable and 
contested nature of the site, as demonstrated throughout the chapter, the regional 
assemblies are theoretically conceptualized in Hajer‟s terms as site of „institutional 
ambiguity‟ (2003, 2006). 
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CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I present the theoretical development that underpins the research project.  
This chapter builds on the advance towards theory presented in the final stretch of the 
previous chapter that translated the empirical site of this research into a site of 
„institutional ambiguity‟ (Hajer 2003, 2006).  As such, there is a clear and logical 
pointer towards addressing theory on institutions more generally.  It is now necessary to 
get to the foundation of Hajer‟s concept, to address what institutions are before being 
able to better understand institutional ambiguity, institutional design and change as well 
as the potential impact that intersubjectivity may have on the process of institutional 
development in such ambiguous sites, which is the central research problem of this 
thesis.   
 
Questions and considerations about the background ontological position of this research 
are brought to bear on the analysis of institutional theories within this chapter.  The 
foundational ideas of interpretivism, which highlight the significance of actors‟ 
interpretations and the critical role of discussion in sharing and shaping those 
interpretations, leads to a thorough analysis of recent contributions to institutional 
theory that draw attention to and address these central interpretivist tenets.  
Constructivist institutionalism is taken forward as an institutional theory that broadly 
fits with the interpretivist ontology.  Its key author, Colin Hay, puts forward a distinct 
ontology that draws attention to the strategic capacities of political actors (2006).  This 
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raises an issue for consideration within and beyond this research.  Alongside this, 
discursive institutionalism is discussed and considered, but constructivist 
institutionalism is preferred for its open engagement with questions around ontology 
and how this impacts upon the empirical analysis of actors, their discursive selections 
and their strategic-relational action in processes of institutional design and change.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, I break down the basis and development of 
institutional theory, from old to new institutionalism and from three new institutionalist 
schools to one central cleavage around ontology.  In the following section I trace how 
new institutionalists have addressed their theoretical weaknesses, the issues of 
institutional emergence and transformation, and explain how further research in these 
areas is leading towards the refinement of the institutionalist perspective into a useful, 
coherent theory.  This useful, coherent theory, constructivist institutionalism, is then 
detailed.  Contributions from other pools of literature that help to address the specific 
point of intersubjectivity, or more precisely the discursive sharing it implicates, are also 
taken forward as supplements to constructivist institutionalism.  
 
 
3.1 Institutionalism 
 
Institutionalism developed over the final decades of the twentieth century in reaction to 
the behaviouralism and rational choice theory that was dominant in the decades before.  
Colin Hay usefully maps the mainstream of political science since the 1950s, charting 
the dominance of behaviouralism since the „behavioural revolution‟ in the 1960s and 
the growth of rational choice theory from the 1970s (2002: 7-13).  Behaviouralists focus 
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on behaviour, apparently without prior theoretical assumptions, attempting simply to 
derive generalisations and predictions based on empirical observations of regularities in 
human action.  Rational choice theorists also focus on the behaviour of individuals, 
although they start (and end) with the theoretical position that human action is 
motivated by the principle of utility-maximisation.   
 
Both of these perspectives aspire to be scientific.  They aim to generate predictive 
models of individual behaviour, treating people in political environments just like the 
natural sciences treat organisms or physical forces in natural environments.  They 
produce parsimonious accounts of human action and, in so doing, they lean towards a 
„methodological individualism,‟ whereby they tend to overlook the potentially different 
dynamics of social behaviour, preferring instead to view this as simply the aggregates of 
individual action (Hay 2002; Schmidt 2006).  Institutionalism takes specifically this as 
its point of departure (Hay 2002; Rhodes 1995).  It is not the scientism per se that is an 
issue (indeed, one strand of the new institutionalism, that of rational choice 
institutionalism, is arguably just as scientistic (Steinmo 2001)), but that the 
behaviouralist and rationalist accounts of political life are pared down to the individual.   
 
Institutional theorists reject the reductionist tendency of behaviouralism and rational 
choice theory, and emphasise instead the impact of collections of individuals.  They 
explore the effects of group behaviour, the patterns of which are inscribed into or 
effectively realised in the form of institutions in society.  Institutionalists draw attention 
to the structuring effects of institutions, arguing that the behaviour of an individual is 
affected by its institutional context.  In short, „institutions matter‟ (Weaver and 
Rockmann 1993; Rothstein 1998). These new institutionalists argue that human action 
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cannot be assessed without recognition of the social context in which it is structured.  
Therefore they seek to bring structure into the picture.  At a time when political science 
was dominated by a concern with the individual actor, institutionalists sought to „bring 
the state back in‟ (Evans et al. 1985). 
 
It should be noted that this growth of interest in institutions since the 1980s constitutes a 
second wave of institutional analysis
6
.  Institutions were being re-discovered (March 
and Olsen 1989) and the state was being brought back in (Evans et al. 1985) because 
institutions of the state had previously, indeed even traditionally, been of prime 
importance in political science.  Studying the organisational blocks of government and 
the mechanisms of democracy that together made up the apparatus of the state gave 
political science its identity apart from other disciplines of the social sciences.  Indeed, 
as Lowndes states, this „institutionalism was political science‟ (2002: 90, emphasis in 
the original).  State institutions had been a central subject matter in the discipline during 
the 1950s, prior to the behavioural revolution (Lowndes 2002: 90).  However, as 
Schmidt points out, this earlier interest with institutions was qualitatively different from 
the new wave of institutionalism, in that the former was primarily descriptive and 
concerned with assessing components parts of government against concepts of political 
philosophy (2006: 99, 100). 
 
The new wave of institutionalism did not represent a return to the institutionalism of 
old.  The new institutionalists were keen to stress the progress that they made and 
distinguished their perspective from what can subsequently be understood as „old‟ 
institutionalism.  Hay (2002), Lowndes (2002) and Schmidt (2006) all begin with 
                                                 
6
 Note that this is not the same as the second movement of new institutionalism, as conceptualized by 
Campbell and Pederson (2001) and discussed later in this chapter.  
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setting out this history in their reviews of new institutionalism because it is useful to see 
where it came from in order to understand what it developed into.  Key to this 
development was a reconceptualization of institutions as „the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the relationships between 
people in various units of the polity and economy‟ (Hall 1986: 7).  This is by no means 
a definitive definition of an institution, but it clearly demonstrates the movement away 
from the old institutionalist pre-occupation with the machinery of government to the 
more intangible structures that underlie that machinery.  
 
Whilst these concepts of rules and standard operating procedures are helpful, they are 
not strictly synonymous with institutions.  Institutions are notoriously difficult to define 
succinctly, and this is not because the definitions put forward are contested as such but 
because institutions are complex entities that they are difficult to capture.  Vivien 
Lowndes has identified six „analytical continua‟ constructed around six points of 
development from old to new institutionalism that, taken together, can facilitate a 
greater appreciation of the conceptual complexity of these entities in contemporary 
institutionalist literature:  
      
(i) From a focus on organisations to a focus on rules  
The contemporary understanding of institution moves away from the 
organisation of government to focus on the practices of people, on the rules 
that guide the patterns of behaviour that underlie and sustain political 
organisations, and exist between or beyond those organisations; 
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(ii) From a formal to an informal conception of institutions  
The regular and regulated patterns of behaviour that are studied are not only 
driven by formally constituted rules, so new institutionalists also explore the 
informal rules that guide individual or group behaviour – these theorists 
focus on unwritten conventions as well as codified constitutions; 
      
(iii) From a static to a dynamic conception of institutions 
Through developing the conception of institutions from formal 
organisations to informal rules, new institutionalists have come to regard 
institutions as processes rather than solid structures, however although they 
are stable entities, new institutionalists theorize that this stability is achieved 
through human action and they explore the relationship between this 
dualistic stability and dynamism; 
      
(iv) From submerged values to a value-critical stance 
The contemporary reflection on what is now old institutionalism revealed 
the normative undercurrent running through this body of work – old 
institutionalists were concerned with „good government‟ and tended to 
advocate particular models of political organisation, whereas new 
institutionalists are sensitive to the multiplicity of peoples‟ values and the 
contestation that arises from this, exploring how this impacts on institutional 
forms and processes; 
      
(v) From a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions 
Whereas old institutionalists tended to research whole systems of 
government, new institutionalists focus on the component parts of these 
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systems and on the „differentiated‟ nature of institutions, recognising that 
the component parts do not necessarily fit neatly together, that they embody 
power differentials by privileging certain actors and actions over others, and 
that contestation and institutional shifts result so that institutions are never 
fully „closed;‟ 
     
(vi) From independence to embeddedness     
Moving away from the static whole systems approach through which 
institutions could be viewed as independent entities, the reconceptualization 
of institutions in the contemporary approach recognises the embeddedness 
of institutions, that they are part of layered webs of institutions, as well as 
part of their temporal and spatial contexts    
         (2002: 97-101). 
 
Lowndes unpacks these analytical continua in a way that not only demonstrates the 
movement from old to new institutionalism but also brings together what is a relatively 
fragmented body of theory.  The divisions in the literature contribute towards the 
difficulty in pinning down institutions because they have differing understandings or, at 
least, differing foci with regards to the direction of institutional processes.  Institutions 
are variously seen as the subjects as well as the objects of research (in a literal 
grammatical sense), in that they can perform actions (or, if such expression is 
excessively animate, they can exert such force in society as to induce certain actions of 
individuals) and they can also be on the receiving end of action through individuals‟ 
perpetuation, modification and creation of them.  To appreciate the interesting 
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implications here raised, the separate schools of new institutionalism must first be 
addressed.   
New institutionalism is commonly divided into three schools of thought (after a seminal 
article by Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996)), reflecting the schools‟ roots in 
different traditions and their subsequent differences in approach.  These are briefly 
introduced below.  Firstly, rational choice institutionalism is considered in terms of its 
perforated relationship with pure rational choice theory.  Next assessed is an 
institutionalism that is variously labelled normative, organisational or sociological 
institutionalism.  These labels are here understood as synonymous, the reasons for 
which will become clear.  Finally, the school of historical institutionalism is reviewed 
with specific attention paid to its central division that has contributed towards a 
rethinking of the divisions, indeed even the internal diversity, of new institutionalism 
overall.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism, like its theoretical bedrock of rational choice theory, is 
based on the underlying assumption that actors are strategic, utility-maximising agents.  
From this point onwards, however, rational choice institutionalism moves away from 
rational choice theory.  This new institutionalism sheds the reductionism of rational 
choice theory and instead views institutions as the key explanatory factor in instances of 
collective action that rational choice theory fails to explain.  By extension of pure 
rational choice theory, attempts at collective action can only fail as the rational, utility-
maximising actor would strategically calculate that they could benefit effortlessly from 
the collective action of others.  And yet societies are replete with instances of collective 
action.  Thus this, Mancur Olson‟s now classic „free-rider‟ problem (1965), revealed 
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rational choice theory‟s limitations and instigated an examination of social action that 
recognised the importance of institutions.     
 
The converts to the new rational choice institutionalism (e.g. Knight 1992; North 1990) 
emphasise the embeddedness of regular and regulated patterns of behaviour between 
individual actors.  From this perspective, acting collectively is something that social 
actors believe they have to do because breaking this pattern results in negative 
consequences.  Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2000), at the forefront of this development, argues 
that collectivism and rationality do not have to be mutually exclusive through her case 
study research of institutions that actors have designed and developed together to 
protect „common pool resources‟ (CPRs) in which  
 
„the appropriators designed basic operational rules, created organizations to 
undertake the operational management of their CPRs, and modified their 
rules over time in light of past experience according to their own collective-
choice and constitutional-choice rules‟       
(1990: 58).   
 
Institutions are thus conceptualized as rules, however informal, and these are met with 
sanctions, again however informal, if not followed.  This modifies the wholly rational 
motivating principle of rational choice theory into one here known as the „logic of 
consequentialism,‟ which still has echoes of rationality in that action is taken with what 
is effectively calculated risk but there is equal recognition that this rationality is 
„bounded‟ within society‟s structures (i.e. by institutions).  However, rational choice 
institutionalism retains its focus on the (still rational) actions of the individual actor and 
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could therefore be described as an agency-centred approach.  Whilst the autonomous 
effect of institutions is recognised, institutions are viewed primarily as the deliberate 
constructions of strategic actors seeking to reduce the uncertainty of decision-making by 
controlling the actions of other actors through rules (i.e. institutions).  Weingast 
expresses the conscious rationality of, in his case, legislative representatives who by 
„pursuing their own interests will prefer institutional arrangements (or norms) which 
increase their chances of success‟ and, as he continues with clear connections to 
rationalist game theory, these actors „in choosing their operating rules, must decide 
which games to play‟ (1979: 250). 
 
In contrast to this parsimonious account of political action, there are a group of new 
institutionalists that perceive political life to be much more complex.  As mentioned 
above, they are known by different labels, but they are united by their leaning towards a 
much more structuralist approach, which, in new institutionalist terms, renders them 
effectively the opposite position of rational choice institutionalism.  These 
institutionalists work with a broader understanding of institutions (Hall and Taylor 
1996).  Institutions are conceptualized as not simply the rules that constrain behaviour, 
but also the norms and values that guide behaviour.  Given this emphasis on „norm-
governed‟ behaviour, one of this group‟s names, that of normative institutionalism, 
becomes understandable and most apt (and is the favoured in this thesis hereafter).  In a 
similar way, the prefixed terms of „sociological‟ and „organisational‟ demonstrate this 
group‟s primary interest in society‟s structure or organisation (as well as the 
connections to the disciplines of sociology and organisational sciences, respectively), 
but these perhaps draw attention too far away from what individual actors are doing or 
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how they are thinking.  The label „normative‟ institutionalism, like rational choice 
institutionalism, makes direct reference to actors‟ logics, and is thus most useful here.    
  
Whilst structure is key, the feature that gives new institutionalism its distinction is 
specifically the (causal) relationship between institutions and individuals.  Normative 
institutionalism is structuralist, relative to the agency-centred rational choice 
institutionalism, but the theoretical interest focuses on the impact of institutions on 
actors.  Here, norms and values are internalised and become part of the logic of an 
individual, shaping behaviour prior to or instead of any consideration of what course of 
action might generate the greatest utility.  This is captured by normative 
institutionalism‟s „logic of appropriateness,‟ whereby an actor faced with a given 
situation will act in a way that they deem to be appropriate, that is understood to be the 
logical course of action (March and Olsen 1989).  In this way, the normative strand of 
institutionalist literature emphasises an explicitly cognitive dimension to 
institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 
1989).   
 
Finally, a collection of theorists concerned with the ways in which the past shapes the 
present and future are grouped together under the banner of historical institutionalism.  
Much of the theorizing from this perspective has developed from and retained a 
decidedly statist and comparative starting point.  Being concerned with the ostensible 
differences between institutional systems, these institutionalists have looked back into 
history in an attempt to explain those differences (e.g. Castles 1993; Hall 1986; 
Katzenstein 1985; Pierson 1994). And a number of theorists hold that history 
accountable while explaining instances of continued divergence, particularly with 
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regards to contemporary institutional development in relation to the European Union 
(e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2005; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Majone 1991).  For 
these institutionalists, decisions taken along the route of institutional development are 
made in accordance with, or at least are coloured by, the pre-existing cultural and 
temporal context.  Historical institutionalists have developed the concept of „path 
dependence‟ to capture this dynamic: it is argued that institutions will develop along 
certain trajectories due to contextual features inherited from the past, and actors will be 
adversely affected if they deviate from this path (Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000).   
     
Hall and Taylor (1996) detect a division in historical institutionalist literature, between a 
„calculus‟ tendency and a „cultural‟ tendency.  Although both strands share an 
assumption that past behaviour affects present-day decision-making, they differ in their 
expression and emphasis while explaining political action.  The calculus strand shares 
the premise that actors are strategic utility-maximisers with rational choice 
institutionalists; their explanation of path-dependent behaviour stresses the conscious, 
strategic choice of continuing on a given trajectory due to the cost of deviating (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 940).  Theorists tending towards the cultural strand, however, 
emphasise the normative element of path-dependent behaviour, arguing that decision-
making is less consciously strategic but rather more bounded by perceptions of a 
situation and its appropriate response (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939). 
 
These three strands of rational choice, normative and historical institutionalism 
constitute the most commonly cited categorisation of the institutionalist perspective, but 
this is not the only method of organising the literature.  Bob Goodin (1996) focuses on 
the new institutionalisms as they have developed directly from their respective social 
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science disciplines, in relative isolation from each other, and Guy Peters (1999) 
identifies as many as seven institutionalisms, not dissimilar to Goodin‟s discipline-
based distinctions.  Indeed, even Hall and Taylor‟s now classic three institutionalisms 
began life as four in earlier versions of the paper (Hay 2006: 56).  New institutionalism 
can thus appear as something of an incoherent assortment of positions that simply share 
a common interest in institutions.  This is certainly a fair assessment of the literature as 
it would have appeared to these early reviewers, but as the perspective has matured, 
many new institutionalists are keen to stress the commonalities between the schools.   
    
Taking a stride in this direction, Lowndes‟ 2002 review of new institutionalism already 
presents a significantly more tidy depiction of the new institutionalist landscape.  
Lowndes argues that new institutionalists are divided by one central cleavage (2002: 
95).  This is essentially based around their fundamental assumptions regarding the 
nature of political actors.  Quite simply, theorists either believe that actors are utility-
maximising rationalists or that they are norm-governed.  Under this schema, rational 
choice institutionalism remains undisturbed; although they have modified their position 
significantly from pure rational choice theory by recognising the importance of 
institutions, they remain convinced that actors behave rationally within or to create their 
institutional context.  On the other side of the divide are those theorists that object to the 
ontological foundation of rational choice.  Here, these new institutionalists believe that 
actors are governed by norms.  This position does not necessarily preclude rational 
action because rationality can be one of the norms that govern behaviour, although 
rationality would not be seen inherent but rather as a norm socially constructed.  
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This cleavage is fundamental not only to the distinction between the rational choice and 
normative schools of institutionalism, but also to the calculus and cultural divide within 
historical institutionalism.  What is significant, now, is that the other clusters of new 
institutionalism can be positioned around this cleavage between rational choice and 
normative institutionalism.  Hence, rational choice and normative institutionalism 
comfortably fit on their respective sides of the divide but theorists under the banner of 
historical (and other topic-related institutionalisms if they are deemed relevant) must 
critically assess and be assessed for their ontological and epistemological assumptions 
in order to identify with either one side.  Schmidt presents a similar portrait, charting the 
new institutionalisms on a continuum with rational choice institutionalism and 
normative institutionalism at either extremes and also relates these to the divide (or, 
again, continuum) between the positivistic and constructivist ontologies respectively 
(2006: 116). 
 
Lowndes‟ concept of a central cleavage and Schmidt‟s (multi-dimensional7) chart of 
new institutionalisms are not simply tools with which to organise and analyse this body 
of research.  They are related to an important and growing debate within the literature 
that considers the ability of new institutionalism to progress beyond this divide.  This 
mirrors a key ontological battle within the discipline of political science as a whole 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984).  As introduced above, theorists have 
traditionally been divided over their regard for either „scientific,‟ parsimonious agency-
centred explanations of political action or more complex, structuralist (often 
descriptive) accounts of political life (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Goodin 1996; Hay 
2002).  A number of contemporary researchers (both institutionalists and others), 
                                                 
7
 Schmidt‟s second axis of her chart organises the institutionalisms along a static-dynamic continuum 
(2006).   
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however, aspire to generate more sophisticated analyses that capture the relative 
influence of structure and agency (Hay 2002, 2006).   
 
New institutionalism, in general, already represents a significant step in this direction.  
Regardless of whether scholars lean towards rationalist explanations or normative 
accounts of political life, their theories highlight the interplay between structure and 
agency: in rational choice institutionalism, agents create institutions that then structure 
other agents; and in normative institutionalism, agents are structured by institutions that 
they then perpetuate.  Thus, whilst institutionalism is divided, the positions within this 
perspective are seen as remarkably close relative to the wider discipline of social 
science, and arguably show signs of convergence (Campbell and Pedersen 2001). 
 
Having condensed the separate schools of new institutionalism into two main clusters, 
these theorists are now faced with issues surrounding the potential convergence of 
rational choice and normative institutionalism.  How compatible are these positions, and 
is such a development desirable?  Again, positions are divided.  Many argue that these 
two opposites are fundamentally incompatible due to the ontological premises upon 
which they are built, whilst others value progress beyond the binary debate that plagues 
this perspective and the wider discipline (Blyth 2003; Hay 2002; Hay and Wincott 
1998; Lowndes 2002; Schmidt 2006).  The normative stance underlying the latter 
argument is, at least in part, related to a critique of the theoretical status of new 
institutionalism.  Because of its appearance as an eclectic collection of positions brought 
together by the causal relevance they attribute to institutions, it has been argued that 
new institutionalism is better viewed as an „organising perspective‟ than a theory 
(Lowndes 2002; Rhodes 1995).   
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New institutionalism is very much in a state of development, building into its theoretical 
exploration considerations about ontology and epistemology that are impacting upon the 
discipline as a whole.  This has been, in part, galvanised by and is most clearly 
demonstrated by new institutionalist attempts at theorizing on the issues of institutional 
transformation and emergence, where it has been formerly described as weak (Lowndes 
2002).  The following section unpacks institutionalism‟s exploration into the matters of 
institutional stability, design and change, before then turning to the ontological 
developments that have occurred while addressing these points.  
    
 
3.2 Institutional stability, change and design 
 
Institutions, by their very definition, are stable entities.  But inextricably linked to 
defining the nature of institutions is understanding the dynamics of institutions.  What 
institutions do, i.e. how they function, particularly as they have been reconceptualized 
in the new institutionalist literature, is central to the definition of institutions and 
institutionalism.  And, within this, dynamism is intrinsic but implicit: although 
institutions are stable social structures, their stability is created or ensured by the 
activity of actors, such as through an adherence to rules or the repetition of social 
practices.  Lowndes makes this explicit in her third analytical continuum (above, 2002: 
99).  Both rational choice institutionalism and normative institutionalism take a 
similarly process-oriented approach to institutional analysis, although they differ in their 
emphasis on the direction of movement and, therefore, the object/subject positions in 
their theoretical causal chains.   
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The rational choice institutionalist literature, ever fixated with the utility-maximising 
agent, concentrates on the creation of institutions by actors for their gains i.e. to reduce 
uncertainty in decision-making by controlling the behaviour of other actors.  The 
institutions created are rules, and actors adhere to these rules.  Recall that pure rational 
choice theory struggles to explain the existence of collective action institutions (Olson 
1965), therefore the theorists that seek to modify the idea of full or „perfect‟ rationality 
focus on how and why rational actors can and do create collective action institutions to 
resolve the free-rider problem (e.g. Ostrom 1990, 2000).  The activity on this rationalist 
side of the new institutionalist cleavage put forward by Lowndes or at this positivist end 
of Schmidt‟s chart, then, focuses on the individual agent as the designer of institutions 
that structure others as well as on the adherence by those others to the institutions 
designed. 
  
In the normative institutionalist literature (e.g. March and Olsen 1989; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991), given its structuralist leaning, stability appears even more emphasised 
relative to the wider institutionalist perspective.  Institutions are social phenomena 
through which collections of people – social groups, societies, nations etc. – understand 
and perpetuate the „standard operating procedures‟ of social life (Hall 1986).  
Institutions give meaning to social practices and provide the „cognitive scripts‟ for the 
performance and continual re-enactment of social practices by actors (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991).  Thus, there is a force that could be described as a mutually constitutive 
dynamic between institutions and actors: institutions are stable social entities whilst 
their stability is a process realised by actors (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hall and 
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Taylor 1996; Offe 1996).  Therefore, whilst this perspective generally emphasises the 
structuring effect of institutions on actors, it also allows for the activity of people.  
 
This activity may not be tantamount to the agency of rationalist institutional designers, 
as can be demonstrated by actors‟ predisposition to sustain institutions even beyond 
their use in a number of instances i.e. because they are structured to do so.  But within 
this activity there is considerable scope for institutional adjustment over time.  
Lowndes‟ fifth continua on the disaggregated nature of institutions whereby different 
individuals may be operating under different institutions (2002: 100) can be taken 
forward to generate an understanding of how and why there is potential for institutional 
change.  Lowndes goes further, stating that „normative institutionalists expect 
institutions continually to evolve‟ (2002: 150, emphasis added).  The implicit dynamism 
at this normative structuralist end of the new institutionalist continuum, then, focuses on 
the structuring action of institutions on individuals but also allows for institutional 
change as individuals perpetuate and enact institutions.   
 
Institutionalists, therefore, account for and emphasise stability, though they do not 
imagine institutions to be static, impervious entities.  These theorists recognise that 
there is underlying movement that holds institutions in place, and that individuals play 
an active role in the process of creating and sustaining stability.  Thus, they are 
relatively stable, but not static.  As explained above, both sides of the institutionalist 
cleavage recognise the dynamism of or within institutions.  And, furthermore, this 
recognition gives rise to the ideas and issues of institutional design and change.  New 
institutionalism has often been charged with being „weak‟ in addressing the issues of 
institutional design and change (Lowndes 2002: 104).  The question asked is: if 
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institutions are stable structures, how does institutional change occur?  If stability is 
emphasised, it follows that institutionalism‟s key challenge is explaining instability, or 
change.  But this „if‟ is significant and, as has been demonstrated, the dynamism that is 
intrinsic in the new institutionalist conception of institutions means that it does 
implicitly allow for institutional development.   
 
New institutionalism‟s weakness, then, is not being explicit or exacting enough about 
the definition of institutions including the processual element.  Or perhaps its greater 
weakness in this regard arises, again, from the different and conflicting ontological 
roots that are held together within this perspective because new institutionalists cannot 
present a single, coherent stance on theory regarding institutional design and change.  
As summarised above and by working through the implications of the definition of 
institutions, rational choice institutionalism does tackle design and normative 
institutionalism does address change, but they each struggle with their counterpart‟s 
strength and they battle on the grounds of their opposing ontologies.   
 
Before explaining these points of conflict and exploring the implications of these battles 
further, it is useful to begin with a clarification of the concept of specifically design.  
The two actions of design and change are effectively very similar.  The terms „change,‟ 
„transformation‟ or, most clearly, „redesign‟ make implicit reference to the prior 
presence of something, here the institution or the institutional context, from which the 
change is occurring, whereas „design‟ suggests something altogether more novel.  
Design implies, in the first instance, an activity that occurs from scratch – it evokes an 
image of a designer with a clean slate, free to innovate at will.  It is questionable, 
though, whether this genuine design can happen in a social world already replete with 
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institutions.  Public policy environments are densely populated with institutions and so 
new institutions are not designed „de novo‟ but „social engineers always work with 
materials inherited from [...] the past‟ (Goodin 1996: 30). Thus, an understanding of 
design as wholly novel is misleading and institutional design may refer to a movement 
involving a greater degree of change or one not ostensibly linked to the pre-existing 
context (Goodin 1996; Hajer 2003; Offe 1996).   
 
What is arguably more significant about the terminology is the difference in approach 
ascribed to the different words: change, development, emergence and transformation 
can be interpreted as actions without actors, although they can also be processes led by 
actors.  Design, however, is much more readily understood and is much more frequently 
interpreted as an intentional action attributable to the rational, resourceful actor (e.g. 
Pierson 2000).  The term presupposes intentionality.  It follows that institutional design 
is an action or set of actions undertaken to make an institution (and thus its adherents) 
be or behave in a certain way.  It is no surprise, therefore, that rational choice and 
calculus historical institutionalists better deal with this issue.  Normative 
institutionalism does not allow much space for this institutional actor-cum-designer, and 
yet someone somewhere at some stage must have intentionally designed institutions if 
they are understood to be the embodiment of embedded value and power differentials in 
society (Goodin 1996: 20; cf. Lowndes‟ fifth as well as fourth and sixth continua, as 
above, 2002: 97-101). 
 
However, this depiction of a fully intentional designer arguably rests on narrow view of 
design.  Goodin, again, widens the notion of design by including accident and evolution, 
arguing that if some factor or a combination of factors contributes to the establishment 
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of an institution, then those factors can be seen as part of the process of institutional 
design (1996: 24-27).  Those factors have helped shape the institutions to become what 
they are, they have helped create them, and so they have played a role in the design 
process.  Goodin warns against the „myth of the intentional design‟ (1996: 28), i.e. 
design „de novo,‟ and goes on to argue that both accident and evolution are attributable 
to intentional actions by agents.  Accidents may be unintended outcomes but they are 
consequences of actions that are intentional in the first instance despite the erroneous 
results, as in oversights and miscalculations (1996: 25). And institutions may evolve via 
a Darwinian „survival of the fittest‟ mechanism or by means of a „central animating 
idea...working itself pure‟ in a Hegelian vein (1996: 26), but these movements are 
subject to the intentional actions of actors that cause or allow institutional development 
(1996: 24-30).  
    
The distinguishing feature of design, then, as against change, is the recognition of and 
the emphasis placed on intentionality.  This touches upon a major debate regarding 
intentionality in general, about whether it is an innate quality or capacity in an 
individual, and so it relates to the ontological position that underpins and therefore 
impacts upon the assertions of an institutional theory (Bevir 1999; Bevir and Rhodes 
2006a; Dowding et al. 2004; Hay 2006).  However, this debate will not be repeated 
here.  Taking institutionalism as a mid-level theory, something of a „mid-level‟ 
interpretation of intention will here suffice; it is recognised that intention grants a level 
of autonomy to the individual actor, but whether that actor‟s intentions are a priori 
structured or are an expression of „true‟ agency is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The 
thesis, presenting an interpretivist analysis, places the actor at the centre and will 
gradually demonstrate the interplay of their agency and their interpretation of structure.  
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Thus, I allow for some degree of autonomy, whilst noting that the implicit 
connectedness of strategy and intention, present in the processes of institutional design 
and change.   
 
Where prior intentionality is embedded in resultant resources (power, knowledge) 
differentials in normative institutionalism, it needs to be drawn out.  And engaging with 
the parts of new institutionalist literature that do make an attempt to address design and 
change more fully with intention – rational choice institutionalism and the calculus 
strand of historical institutionalism – is necessary.  After all, describing new 
institutionalism as „weak‟ at explaining institutional design and change is not to say that 
explanations of design and change have not been attempted.  Indeed, arguably, a 
significant proportion of historical institutionalism has come into being through its 
engagement with observable, large-scale institutional difference and the development of 
those institutional differences (e.g. Blyth 2002a; Castles 1993; Hall 1986; Katzenstein 
1985; Pierson 1994).  However, this part of the literature, in highlighting the path 
dependency of institutional development, particularly deals with incremental and less 
intentional change.  The charge of weakness arises because institutionalism‟s attempts 
at explaining more transformative and more intentional design and change have thus far 
proved unsatisfactory.  Historical institutionalist theorists have attempted accounts of 
change though they, unhelpfully, rest on what could be deemed „wild cards.‟  This 
literature tends to rely on the concepts of „exogenous shocks,‟ „punctuated equilibria‟ 
and „unintended consequences‟ to explain the cause, tempo and direction of institutional 
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change, reasons which are ambiguous to the extent that they are „non-falsifiable‟8 (Blyth 
2002b; Hall and Taylor 1996; Krasner 1984; Steinmo et al. 1992; True et al. 1999).   
 
Rational choice institutionalism, as has been stated, posits institutional creation at the 
centre of its account of the form and function of institutions: actors create institutions to 
control the behaviour of others.  However plausible this line of argument, though, it 
entails a degree of cognitive manipulation and embedded power differentials that could 
be said to belong to the normative camp of institutionalism.  This, in itself, should not 
pose a significant problem, but it demonstrates that the way out of the impasse 
presented by institutional design/change has necessitated ideational explanations, i.e. 
they involve the adaptation of cognitions under the influence of ideas.  These 
institutionalisms‟ treatments of design and change will now be explored with reference 
to a key debate between the two that has revolved around the introduction of ideas.   
 
Progress has been made on these questions of institutional design and change with a 
turn to ideas.  Ideational factors have received greater attention throughout the 
discipline in general, doubtless linked to the growing regard for a more interpretivist 
approach to political analysis in which actors‟ perceptions are of prime importance.  The 
new institutionalist literature has been at the forefront of this development.  Already 
working with a cognitive element within the perspective, a number of new 
institutionalists have focussed upon and developed the role of ideas as a causal factor.  
Their argument, in short, is that it is ideas that shape behaviour via institutions.  This is 
most clearly demonstrated by normative institutionalists: actors‟ decision-making 
                                                 
8
 This term is used with caution, hence the inverted commas, because of its positivist connotations, but 
the adoption of the word in this instance serves to judge historical institutionalism on its own basis and in 
its own terms, in which case these concepts are rendered „non-falsifiable‟ in that they could effectively be 
used to explain away any and every change. 
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behaviour is shaped by what is appropriate, or rather what is thought to be appropriate, 
for a given situation, thus it is determined in the cognitive or ideational realm rather 
than the material.  Similarly, although more implicit, rational choice institutionalism 
must contain an ideational element in that, if actors are all innately rational, their 
motivating principle of utility-maximisation must be modified to persuade them to act 
collectively and follow rules. 
  
Contributions from Mark Blyth (2002a; 2002b; 2003) have been critical in the 
development of the ideational as a causal factor in the process of institutional 
development or change, and even design with a broader reading.  He is, however, 
critical of the rational choice school of thought, from its very foundation to its ability to 
subsume ideas as factor in institutional design and redesign.  His critique demonstrates 
well that the divisions between the (already close) institutionalisms rest on their 
foundational ontology.  The following discussion draws from Blyth‟s engagement in 
battle with other key authors (e.g. Hay 2002, 2006; McNamara 1998; North 1990; 
Ostrom 1990; Pierson 2000; Wendt 1999) revealing that, whilst it may be interesting 
and fruitful to encourage dialogue between the institutionalisms, the camps will remain 
divided if the theoretical developments are inconsistent with their respective ontological 
positions.  These authors and the fissure between rational choice institutionalism and the 
calculus strand of historical institutionalism in particular are now focussed upon 
because they both conceive of a strategic actor (agent) acting in and with an institutional 
context (structure) while questions are raised about their ability to do so on ontological 
grounds.  
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Rational choice institutionalism is based on the premise that rational actors endeavour 
to establish institutions – rules – to structure the choices of other actors and, therefore, 
reduce the uncertainty in a decision-making environment, in order that the rational actor 
– the designer – can make decisions so as to derive maximum utility from the given 
situation.  Thus, this school of institutionalism depicts a rational designer that is 
endowed with the resources, the power and the full or perfect information required to 
create such institutions that function as desired.  This is already implausible, or at least 
it is an account that is restricted to but few actors.  If pre-existing institutions and the 
resource differentials they embody are held to account for the unequal capacity to 
design, this position is hardly distinguishable from historical institutionalism of the 
calculus strand.   
 
A fundamental problem exists with relation to the reasons behind institutional creation, 
or more precisely to the discovery of reasons for institutional creation.  If institutions 
are purposefully designed to constrain the actions and structure the choices of 
individuals, how do those individuals conceive of creating institutions for their own 
self-interest?  It does not seem plausible that actors, themselves structured by existing 
institutions, would be able to detach themselves from their institutional environment in 
order to consider establishing new institutions (Blyth 2002b: 301).  This echoes of the 
same problem that plagues normative institutionalism‟s difficulty in explaining 
institutional emergence or design.  Calling upon the disaggregated and embedded nature 
of the pre-existing institutional context to explain this again demonstrates how the 
institutionalisms are brought together.   
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The very stability that institutions are brought into rational choice theory to provide is 
suspect.  If individuals are all rational agents motivated only by their self-interest, why 
would some individuals allow themselves to be subjected to rules created by others?  It 
would appear that all individuals are rational, but some – institutional designers – are 
more rational than others – rule-followers.  In following the rules, that individual would 
effectively be serving the interest of the designer, rather than exclusively themselves.  
Or, if they refused to follow the rules and instead tried to create other rules for their own 
benefit, the decision-making environment would be one of extreme volatility (Blyth 
2003: 695).  Yet, empirical evidence suggests that it is not; indeed, rational choice 
theorists brought institutions into their paradigm exactly in order to explain the 
prevalence of stability. 
 
Rational choice institutionalists respond by emphasising the presence of enforcement 
mechanisms: individuals would follow rules because this is more rational than suffering 
the penalty associated with breaking rules (Ostrom 1990).  However, establishing a 
system of monitoring and penalty is itself an exercise in designing an institution for 
collective action, therefore the same problems would come into play, as well as the 
original free-rider problem meaning it is more rational for individuals to defect.  As 
Blyth highlights, rational choice institutionalism seeks to resolve a collective action 
problem with another collective action problem; the argumentation is circular (2002a; 
2002b; 2003).  Again, rational choice responds, this time with the concept of incentive 
systems (Ostrom 1990).  Resonating with the utility-maximising principal, individuals 
can be persuaded to follow rules if the protection or furthering of their own interest can 
be demonstrated.  In this way, the concept of self-interested utility-maximisation is 
modified to accommodate a longer-term self-interest. 
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These modifications of rationality demonstrate how rational choice institutionalists have 
joined the turn towards ideas.  In attempting to respond to problems, these theorists 
have relied upon ideational constructs as explanatory factors.  The long-term rationality 
of collective action, for example, is an idea of which actors must be convinced and must 
work towards to create and sustain institutions.  Indeed, even the rational choice 
institutionalists‟ acceptance of the structuring capacity of institutions admits a degree of 
cognitive manipulation that belongs to the realm of the ideational rather than the 
material.  These are in themselves plausible arguments, but they do not fit with the 
ontological foundation of rational choice.   
 
The underlying, and hard-wearing, assumption of this perspective is that actors are, and 
can only be, motivated by the principal of utility-maximisation.  Therefore the pursuit of 
collective action, even if it is rational in the long term, cannot provide the basis for 
motivation.  Granted, it could be argued that this is a rather severe reading of the 
rational choice institutionalism.  This institutionalism choice does not, after all, 
determine a priori what „utility‟ in a given situation might be and, therefore, long-term 
rationality may be the end from which an actor derives greatest utility.  However, such a 
move away from the central premise of rationalism would allow theorists of this 
persuasion to explain almost all situations, except that persistent free-rider problem, 
which would probably require altruism to be assimilated into the paradigm as utility, 
demonstrating the absurdity of stretching the concept in such a manner. 
  
Prevalent in the literature is an account of institutional design based on functionalist 
argumentation.  According to this line of reasoning, an institution is efficient, meaning 
that it functions as intended, and that this intended function was the reason for its 
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design.  Paul Pierson‟s summation draws out the backward-facing logic of this 
argument: „the explanation of institutional forms is to be found in their functional 
consequences for those who create them‟ (2000: 475).  And as Blyth continues, redesign 
is explained through the same direction of logic: „the elements of a present set of 
institutions are juxtaposed to those of a previous set, and then a (usually exogenous) 
variable is imputed that “explains” why the latter emerged out of the former. [...] The 
logic behind this model is post hoc, ergo propter hoc – that is, that which comes after 
explains that which comes before‟ (2002a: 7-8).  This argumentation is itself 
inadequate, but it is further weakened by the same obstacle that rational choice faced in 
explaining (in)stability, which is that the empirical evidence points to the contrary.  
Society is replete with institutions that are inefficient, unintended and even undesirable 
(Dryzek 1996; Goodin 1996; Offe 1996). 
 
This could be resolved through an insistence that institutions, if not already efficient, 
will eventually become so via mechanisms of perfectibility.  Institutions will shed their 
inefficient or irrational elements through the processes of learning and evolution.  Blyth 
points out that this grants institutions a level of animation not consistent with the 
rational choice ontology (2002b), though Goodin argues that such processes are always 
attributable to rational individuals within institutions, as are even the accidents and 
errors made en route which „arise in the backwash of intentionality‟ (1996: 25).  
Whether or not it is individuals or the institutions themselves that are agents in these 
processes of learning and evolution, Pierson (2000) argues that institutions are resistant 
to change and that any gradual development occurs in accordance with past decisions, 
i.e. along a path upon which that institution is now dependent.  His argument typifies 
the historical institutionalist position.  And whilst this argument is significant, it rests 
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within the bipolar structure-agency debate, in this case weighting structure over agency, 
rather than focussing on any flaw internal to the rational choice position.  This means it 
faces the same criticisms as the structuralists, restarting the cycle of questioning rather 
than advancing beyond it. 
 
The mechanisms of learning and evolution can, within the rationalist perspective, be 
brought into question on wholly theoretical grounds.  Pierson moves towards this with 
his recognition that „[p]olitical actors frequently pursue a range of goals. While 
politicians often will be focussed on reelection, others (e.g., bureaucrats, interest 
groups) have different ambitions‟ (2000: 489), thus there is no single, universal 
optimum, he argues, for political systems.  This argument is relevant at the individual 
institutional level as well as the system-wide level.  Since institutions are understood to 
be social phenomena and individuals are, according to the rationalist perspective at 
least, all utility-maximisers, there cannot be one single optimal institutional form 
towards which the processes of learning and evolution are moving.  Each actor would 
have their own, individualistic optimum, deriving maximum utility for themselves by 
constraining the choices of others.   
 
If there is one optimum, however, it follows that it would take the form that would be 
most beneficial to the designer who created it.  And, if this is the case, the line of 
reasoning returns to a situation where apparently some actors are more rational than 
others.  Even if it is conceded that some actors are more „bounded‟ than others, i.e. they 
have different levels of information and resources, and that the processes of learning 
and evolution do develop institutions towards their designer‟s goal, by extension all 
institutions, and presumably whole political systems, have an optimal end-point towards 
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which they are advancing.  This conclusion is consistent with the kind of pre-destiny 
associated with extreme structuralists and brings the apparently agency-centred rational 
choice perspective under a whole new line of questioning (Hay 2002).   
 
As has already been conceded above, it could be argued that this is a particularly harsh 
reading of rational choice institutionalism and that it is more accurately described as a 
critique of rational choice not modified by institutions, but this point renders a number 
of things of note.  Firstly, though perhaps least importantly, there is a degree of 
defensiveness on the part of some institutionalists that view their institutionalism as 
„best‟ and not needing to progress through dialogue and development with others, thus 
their critiques will lean towards criticism over appraisal (Schmidt 2006: 116).  
Secondly, it could be argued that rational choice institutionalism (as others) have to be 
judged on their core principles, in this case of utility-maximisation as motivation for 
action specifically because this is its single, distinguishing feature.   
 
Finally, this is not intended to be a critique of rational choice institutionalism per se, but 
a demonstration of how extremely close the new institutionalisms are.  In general, all 
the institutionalisms are pointing, with differing degrees of emphasis, towards a mix of 
intentional strategy with some mediation by the pre-existing institutional context, which 
happens in the ideational realm and transpires into the material.  This effectively points 
towards a dialectical relationship between structure and agency in which actors realise 
institutional stability, design and change.  The proximity of institutionalisms is best 
demonstrated at the border between rational choice institutionalism and the calculus 
strand of historical institutionalism.  And it is also at this point that new institutionalism, 
in terms of the classic three schools at least, has advanced explorations into the 
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interactivity between individuals and institutions that gives rise to stability, design and 
change.    
  
This section of the chapter has highlighted, furthermore, that there are significant 
implications held within the conceptualization of institutions that require greater 
attention.  Firstly, there is a multitude of actors involved in institutional processes and, 
secondly, there is a definite cognitive element to the perpetuation and development of 
institutions. Thus, there arises an issue about the multiplicity of cognitions and how this 
transpires into institutional stability, design and change – the subject of this thesis.  The 
discussion above also demonstrates how progress, for those who do have such a goal, 
will continuously be precluded if the theoretical advances on institutional processes are 
not developed together with consideration and development of a compatible ontological 
base regarding human action.  The following section takes these issues further.    
 
     
3.3 Towards an interpretivist institutionalism 
 
As has been demonstrated, rationalist choice institutionalism is fundamentally weak.  
Being the product of two perspectives – rational choice theory and institutionalism 
generally – forced together, rational choice institutionalism is at times ontologically 
incoherent.  When faced with challenges, theorists have tried to soften and modify the 
utility-maximising principle upon which their position is founded with structured ideas.  
In this way, it can appear to be ceding ground to the normative institutionalist 
perspective, which does allow for such structuring both theoretically and ontologically.  
However, this should not induce a wholesale disqualification of all things rational.  
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Indeed, the assumption that individuals are rational utility-maximisers is not „incorrect‟ 
or even, in many instances, implausible; it is only the ontological status of this claim, 
i.e. that actors are intrinsically rational, that is problematic.  Otherwise, this 
institutionalism has illustrated the now most significant point that the processes of 
institutional design and development combine both rational, utility-maximising 
considerations and norm-governed behaviour. 
 
This „concession‟ represents a positive development for many theorists who advocate 
greater dialogue across and progress beyond the new institutionalist ontological 
cleavage, or engage in what Campbell and Pedersen describe as a „second movement in 
[new] institutional analysis‟ (2001: 249; also Rhodes 1995 and Schmidt 2006).  
However, Campbell and Pedersen have a tendency to focus on the methodological 
traditions that appear to separate the schools of institutionalism and overlook the 
ontological divisions from which those methodologies stem.  Thus, they would not 
convince those theorists that oppose such a movement on the grounds that the 
ontologies of rational choice and normative institutionalism are incompatible.  The 
foundations of these positions are incompatible, indeed they are diametrically opposed.  
This does not, however, need to preclude progress – progress does not require the 
merging of ontologies.  The only requirement is consistency between a perspective‟s 
basic understanding of the nature of, in this discipline, political actors and its theoretical 
premises.   
 
Normative institutionalism possesses this consistency, or has at least has this potential.  
Its stance on the nature of political actors emphasises the complexity, especially the 
multiplicity, of values and norms that motivate (political) action.  Importantly, these 
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motivations are not innate, but are socially constructed, and they build up towards a 
logic of what is thought of as appropriate behaviour.  Normative institutionalism rests 
on a constructivist, anti-foundationalist ontology, at the opposite end of the spectrum 
from the positivist, universalist ontology of rational choice institutionalism.  This allows 
normative institutionalism to be more flexible than its rational choice counterpart, to the 
extent that it does not preclude the intentional, strategic behaviour as that could be just 
one of many norms constructed in, arguably, all modern societies (with capitalist 
economies).  However, it could be argued that this is as generous an appraisal as the 
previous critique of rational choice institutionalism was harsh, because normative 
institutionalists do not themselves bring even that structured level of intention to the 
fore.  
 
Thus, having disallowed the rational choice perspective its modifications (although 
reasonably, because of their lack of coherence with its ontological foundation) and 
assessed it in its most rudimentary form, it is fair that normative institutionalism is 
assessed in a similar light.  Whilst it does not suffer serious ontological problems, as 
explained above, it does lean towards structure over agency, rather than transcend the 
binary debate or even grant adequate attention to the dialectic relationship between the 
two forces.  As a consequence, the majority of theorists that incline towards 
structuralism within the normative school face the same questions as rational choice 
institutionalists that seek to draw attention to structure: where does the impetus for 
institutional design come from – how can actors detach themselves from their 
institutional context enough to think they require or desire institutional design/change?   
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Beyond the implicit incremental change born of the multiplicity of actors, such 
questions on institutional design/change are not addressed.  Normative institutionalism 
remains wedded to its structural bias, denying any space for an intentional designer, and 
is therefore rather left behind the other two schools in developing the perspective (hence 
the relative brevity of its inclusion in this and the previous section).  It is the critical 
engagement of rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism that has 
advanced the perspective to a centre-ground where both interests and ideas are deemed 
to matter.  However, that centre-ground is, at this stage, a morass.  The position that has 
been distilled from the institutionalisms requires an ontology that gives it coherence. 
 
Colin Hay develops constructivist institutionalism to that end.  Building on Blyth‟s 
work and the turn to ideational factors in institutional processes, Hay recognises the 
structuring ability of institutions in shaping people‟s cognitions, in line with the basic 
premise of new institutionalism.  At the same time, Hay brings the agent back in, by 
conceiving of people as intentional actors that have the autonomy to cognitively 
manipulate the ideas and interests that are manifest in the pre-existing institutional 
context.  Neatly summarising the position, Hay states that 
 
„[a]ctors are strategic, seeking to realize certain complex, contingent, and 
constantly changing goals.  They do so in a context which favours certain 
strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that context which 
are at best incomplete and which may very often prove to have been 
inaccurate after the event.  Moreover, ideas in the form of perceptions 
“matter” in a second sense – for actors are oriented normatively towards 
their environment.  Their desires, preferences and motivations are not a 
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contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance 
– but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed moral, 
ethical, and political) orientation towards the context in which they will 
have to be realized‟ 
         (2006: 63-64). 
 
Constructivist institutionalism brings equal attention to both the structure – the 
institution – and the agent – the actor that is constructing the ideas and interests that 
inform the institutional (re)design process.  Here, the actors are intentional.  This does 
not mean that they are fully rational as rational choice theory and its derivatives would 
have them; they are unlikely to be conscious of or informed about the wider impacts of 
their actions and it is unlikely that institutions are realised exactly as intended.  But 
actors use the ideas and information that they have, their perceptions of reality, and act 
accordingly (Hay 2002; Jessop 1990, 1996).  This is intentional action, even if by acting 
according to these perceptions effectively amounts to those actors being structured into 
particular ways of thinking and behaving (Goodin 1996).  The distinguishing feature is 
that actors are able to use or choose the structured ways of thinking (i.e. the pre-existing 
institutional context), to discursively select them, in order to achieve their ends.  In this 
way actors are strategic but contextualised, which is an explication that marks a 
significant step in institutionalist theory. 
    
Bob Jessop, later assisted by Hay, developed the „strategic-relational‟ model to capture 
the mutually constitutive nature of the ideational and the material (Hay 2002; Jessop 
1990, 1996).  To begin, structure and agency are reconceptualized as context and 
conduct, which usefully brackets the ontological baggage and allows a more readily 
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understandable relationship between the two: context shapes conduct just as conduct 
shapes context.  Thus, the strategic actor selects between courses of action it perceives 
as available in the context, but they are circularly related because the actor‟s perceptions 
of the context are affected by and will affect the material circumstances.  As Hay 
explains  
 
„to act strategically is to project the likely consequences of different courses 
of action and, in turn, to judge the contours of the terrain.  It is, in short, to 
orient political courses of action to perceptions of the relevant strategic 
context and to use such an exercise as a means to select the particular course 
of action to be pursued‟                    
          (2002: 132). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.1 The material-ideational dialectic (Source: Hay 2002: 214) 
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Importantly, before this descends into a neo-rational account of the „blind pursuit of 
transparent material interest‟ (Hay 2006: 64), it must be emphasised that actors are not 
understood to have perfect information, neither about the context or the consequences of 
each course of action.  Instead it is the perception, their interpretation, of the context 
that is emphasised.  Actors interpret the context, in so doing construct the ideas and 
interests that motivate their response, and then act as they think accordingly appropriate.  
For constructivist institutionalists, it is this relationship between the ideational and the 
material worlds that is of interest.  How do actors‟ perceptions of the material world 
impact upon their strategic efforts to act within, and thus realise, it?  And how does the 
ideational strategising, formulated into attempts at change, impact upon the material 
world?  Implicit here is the role of discussion.  Hay points to this whilst analysing 
Blyth‟s cases of American and Swedish trajectories of capitalism in which business 
actors were noted for „setting the discursive parameters within which influential crisis 
narratives are likely to be framed‟ (2006: 68, emphasis added).  Hay includes 
„discursive selection‟ as a key component of the strategic-relational model (2002: 132).  
 
It is at this point pertinent to address a contribution to new institutionalism that draws 
attention specifically to the role of the discursive.  Vivien Schmidt posits her „discursive 
institutionalism‟ (2006, 2008, 2010) as the forth new institutionalism, aligning her 
„logic of communication‟ with those of consequentialism, path-dependence and 
appropriateness (2010: 5).  Importantly, though not included in the labelling of this new 
institutionalism, Schmidt draws as much attention to ideas as discourse.  The central 
premise is that both ideas (in the form of „background ideational abilities‟) and 
discourse (in the form of „foreground discursive abilities‟) are key to explaining 
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institutional design and change.  Schmidt pulls this together under discursive 
institutionalism because  
 
„[b]y using the term discourse, we can simultaneously indicate the ideas 
represented in the discourse (which may come in a variety of forms as well 
as content) and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed 
(which may be carried by different agents in different spheres)‟ 
          (2008: 309). 
 
By keeping ideas at the fore in this way, Schmidt‟s starting point is the same as Hay‟s, 
which is the incorporation of the ideational turn in explanations of institutional 
design/change.  On that level, there is little difference between Schmidt‟s discursive 
institutionalism and what could be described as Hay‟s earlier attempt towards 
constructivist institutionalism presented in the form of „ideational institutionalism‟ 
(2001).  At that stage of development of these new institutionalisms, the difference was 
a matter of emphasis, of pulling into focus those elements that were seen to have been 
inadequately addressed.  However, Hay goes on to replace ideational institutionalism 
with constructivist institutionalism to reflect the development of a distinctive ontology 
for his version and to draw attention to the core premise that the pre-existing 
institutional environment is constructed by the institutional actor engaged in 
institutional processes (2006: 57, fn. 2).  
 
Schmidt draws attention to the distinctiveness of the discursive institutionalist approach 
by highlighting the role given back to agents in institutional design/change processes, 
thus this serves to „unstick institutions and unfix preferences and norms‟ (2008: 313).  
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However, Schmidt goes on to advocate a multi-theoretic approach to institutional 
analysis stating that discursive institutionalism „can be seen as complementary to the 
other three institutionalisms,‟ that „the older new institutionalisms could be seen to 
provide background information for what one normally gets‟ rendering this discursive 
version as the institutionalism that can explain the unexpected (as in instances of 
institutional design/change) (2008: 314).  Thus, Schmidt does not adequately address 
the issue of ontology, neither by fully developing a distinctive position for discursive 
institutionalism nor by critiquing the older new institutionalisms at the points in which 
they violate their own ontology (Blyth 2002b: 306). 
 
Before potentially drowning in „deep ontological waters‟ (Hay 2009: 897) and 
descending into what could be an unanswerable debate about the nature of man, it is 
suffice to state here that analysing the cores of the new institutionalism is critical to 
advancing the perspective.  Engaging in dialogue across the schools is certainly 
productive, as demonstrated by the development of constructivist, discursive and 
ideational through the limitations of others.  However, the mid-level theoretical 
projections that are generated from such engagement cannot simply be incorporated into 
a new institutionalist school without reference as to how they fit into the bedrock 
worldview that underlies the institutionalist position.  Otherwise, we are simply 
generating a proliferation of institutionalisms based around pools of interest or on points 
of emphasis, giving rise and adding to collections of seven or more new 
institutionalisms as described by Peters (1999). 
 
Hay deals specifically and directly with ontology, unearthing and developing a 
constructivist position to underpin this institutionalism (2006: 63-66).  In so doing, and 
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in so labelling this institutionalism, Hay‟s contribution can be said to sit alongside the 
rational choice and normative schools as these three institutionalisms are irreconcilably 
divided on ontology
9
 (although its advocates [myself included] would see constructivist 
institutionalism as having brought together intentional agents with interests and ideas 
into a coherent, ontologically sound whole, and thus as having advanced the perspective 
as a whole).  Schmidt does readmit the agent, but perhaps does not go far enough in 
addressing that actor‟s autonomy or interest and would presumably leave that for 
rational choice institutionalists to explain (2008: 313-314).  This collaborative approach 
exposes Schmidt‟s preference for an additional school, revealing the contribution of 
discursive institutionalism as a point of emphasis or, at most, an advance on the specific 
issue of institutional design/change, rather than an attempt to advance the perspective as 
a whole.   
   
Therefore, it is Hay‟s constructivist institutionalism that is concentrated upon within 
this thesis.  But that is not to say that Schmidt‟s call to attention on discourse is not 
significant, as indeed the recognition of the multiplicity of voice is proving popular in 
many pools of literature, not least because of the interpretivist/linguistic turn.  Some of 
those pools contain contributions that deal specifically with institutions and even more 
specifically with the issue of institutional design/change, variously with reference to 
ideas, interests, the multiplicity of those and the role of dialogue.  Although they are not 
expressly or strictly aligned with a new institutionalist school, these contributions are 
                                                 
9
 Historical institutionalism here is notably omitted.  This is because of its internal division along the 
calculus and cultural strands, which means that its theorists can be divided into the opposing rational 
choice and normative ontological camps (along the cleavage identified by Lowndes 2002).  However, it is 
important to highlight, as Hay does (2006: 60-63), that there are historical institutionalists that reject this 
divide and promote a distinct ontology that bring the calculus and cultural together (most notably Steinmo 
et al.1992).  In this case, Hay‟s contribution could be described as refining, rearticulating and promoting 
this distinct ontology (Hay 2006; Hay and Wincott 1998).  
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interesting for the detail that could complement constructivist institutionalism and thus 
they require attention. 
 
Turning to empirical, though not empiricist, pools of research is helpful because they 
mirror the theoretical explorations of institutional design/change.  In the subject area of 
international relations, theorists have posed questions about the design and development 
of international organisations.  The second half of the twentieth century saw a 
significant number of international organisations become established, thus this has 
sparked an interest in design, especially with those theorists questioning the less 
obvious rationality of such a development.  Indeed, Hay openly notes the role that 
constructivism from this neighbouring discipline of international relations has played in 
developing his position (2002, 2006).  
 
Particularly interesting is the development of the European Union, which goes beyond 
the description of an international organisation and has generated a number of novel 
institutions, attracting attention from both international relations theorists and 
mainstream political scientists (e.g. Lindner and Rittberger 2003).  This subject area has 
also developed an interest in the institutional design processes that have occurred with 
East European transition.  Following the collapse of communism, these countries have 
had to undergo large-scale adaptation of their political and economic systems, 
establishing the institutions that support these.  These institutions have been imported, 
and research on institutional design here has focussed on observing the elements 
required for successful institutional implementation (e.g. Offe 1996).   
 
       
  
103 
 
Another pool of interest lies in the subject area of public administration.  Less explicitly 
concerned with institutional design though it is, work in this area considers the 
modernisation of established systems in which institutions need to be created or 
significantly adapted to fit the requirements of modern societies.  Often related to the 
phenomenon of „governance,‟ the changes observed here are significant enough to 
constitute institutional redesign.  Looking from the empirical site outwards, this 
research is most closely aligned with this pool or discipline area.  Indeed, the two 
previous chapters make explicit reference to the driving interest of governance in the 
regions.  However, that theorists take different empirical sites for their research is 
relatively unimportant.  What is important is the contributions these can now be 
demonstrated to be making towards developing and complementing constructivist 
institutionalism.  
 
Blyth, as detailed earlier, has made significant steps towards constructivist institutional 
design with two key arguments.  Firstly, he posits that the construction of a crisis 
instigates the process of institutional change (2002a).  Interested in the widespread 
changes in many political economies around the world during the twentieth century, 
Blyth investigates the cases of Sweden and the US to find that widespread institutional 
change is initiated, and its disruption justified, through a constructed crisis as a tool.  
Further, and secondly, the changes are developed and legitimated by appeal to an idea, 
thus the ideational is transferred to the material construction of institutions.  Lindner 
and Rittberger (2003) also theorize about the importance of ideas in the creation of EU 
institutions.  They use the concept of „polity ideas‟ to describe the differences between 
nation states‟ thoughts about the appropriate form and function of EU institutions.  
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Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) point to the importance of the political actors‟ acceptance 
of attempts at institutional design, without which the institution will not take hold and 
become institutionalised.  They point to the layers of complexity that the actors 
involved add, both vertically between the levels of instruction in design and horizontally 
between the actors accepting and enacting the institutional designs.  Lowndes (2005) 
pinpoints more precisely the methods that give rise to this complexity and impact upon 
institutional design: they engage in institutional remembering, borrowing and sharing, 
which positions these actors as „institutional entrepreneurs‟ during moments of 
creativity.  Offe (1996), too, points to the construction of actors into, in his terms, 
„heroes‟ of the design process.  And Wendt (2001) touches upon the momentum that 
can be generated from the construction of identities, which itself can impact upon the 
process of design. 
 
Despite a lack of consensus on the terminology, there is an emphasis on the importance 
of discussion or story-telling.  The political actors involved have to communicate their 
ideas to design an institution, as well as to sustain an institution more generally; they are 
founded on shared understandings between groups of people, and so are fundamentally 
based upon communication.  Linder and Peters (1995) draw attention to the „dialogic 
tradition‟ of institutional design, emphasising this over the „decisional tradition‟ that has 
been dominant.  To a large extent, this mirrors the move from rational assumptions in 
the process of design to the constructivist turn that has been central to this chapter.  
Significant to this turn is the work of Hajer, who illustrates the novelty of modern 
public policy problems and posits that institutions are designed as the by-products of 
policy deliberation (2003).  Also, Dryzek (1996) and Skelcher et al. (2005) highlight the 
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importance of a shared „discourse‟ between actors, pointing to the capacity of such a 
story or repeated frame of reasoning to construct and legitimise institutional processes. 
 
The complexity brought in by the actors and their verbal constructions is crucial.  It 
demonstrates the relationship between the ideational and the material that is an 
important part of the constructivist approach.  Constructivism does not deny the 
importance of material factors, but emphasises the meaning of those material factors.  
So, looking closer at the complexity caused by actors, it is clear that there are actors 
with different resources (in terms of information, authority etc.) – these are material 
factors – and it has been demonstrated that these actors engage in ideational and 
discursive activities, all of which together impact on the process of institutional design.  
Importantly, these factors can be described as mutually constitutive in that they make 
each other real; the ideational processes realise institutional forms and functions that 
materially affect the actors involved, which in turn affects their capacity to engage in 
the ideational and material processes of institutional design. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a thorough analysis of institutional theory, gradually moving 
from the broader, older contributions towards more contemporary developments that are 
more narrowly focussed on the issue of institutional design and change as well as the 
impact of intersubjectivity, which together form the central research problem of this 
thesis.  In so doing, this chapter fully engages with debates about the ontologies that 
underpin the different institutionalist perspectives.   
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At times, the reviews and deeper analysis of the more recent institutional theoretic work 
may seem excessively preoccupied with ontology, particularly given that there are some 
high-profile scholars who advocate dialogue across the institutionalisms with much less 
regard for their foundational ontologies as they can prove a hindrance to advancing the 
perspective.  I, however, align myself with Hay‟s openly acknowledged position that 
ontology is critical for analysis, not only of research data but also of the contending 
institutionalist positions (2002; 2009).  Whilst dialogue across the camps is valuable, as 
such engagement exposes their relative strengths and weaknesses, a unique position 
then has to be developed, or otherwise the resultant forged formulations lack coherence.  
They become all things to all men, „non-falsifiable‟ and thus lose their analytical 
capacity.  In a similar vein, a multi-theoretic approach to empirical analysis could 
borrow terms across the new institutionalist perspective to explain away any empirical 
conundrum and this approach to theoretical analysis has no basis for judgements and 
therefore progress.   
 
New institutionalism can offer more.  Indeed, constructivist institutionalism offers 
more.  By relinquishing ties to earlier positions and developing an ontological 
foundation that is consistent with mid-level institutionalist projections, constructivist 
institutionalism emphasises the construction of ideas and interests in processes of 
institutional design and change.  The specifically discursive construction of these is 
developed and taken forward into the explicitly interpretivist methodological 
development of this thesis (in the following chapter) and the strategic-relational action 
that both puts together and results from these discursive constructions forms a core part 
to the later analysis of data (drawn out in chapter 8).  
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CHAPTER 4: MEANINGS, METHODS AND MATTERS ARISING 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Thus far, this thesis has presented the site of empirical exploration of this research (the 
regional assemblies in chapter 2) and the theoretical problematising that arose from the 
conceptualization of the „real world‟ site in terms of the „cutting edge‟ of a relevant 
theory base (i.e. of institutionalist theory‟s consideration of institutional design and 
change in chapter 3).  This chapter brings the two together, integrating more specifically 
the institutional design and development of the regional assemblies and chiselling out a 
programme of research.  This chapter sets out the research design, the specific methods 
used and a discussion of the difficulties and limitations of this project.   
 
In this operationalisation of the research, I make frequent reference to the underlying 
ontological position at the foundation of this work.  Whilst the forerunning history of 
the regional assemblies was presented as a factual account or, at least, in something of a 
neutralised light, the introductory chapter made clear that this thesis develops an 
interpretivist position, which comes to the fore in the analysis of institutional theory and 
the constructivist institutionalism arrived at.  This positioning remains at the fore in this 
chapter.  Just as it has impacted upon the direction of theoretical development, 
interpretivism also impacts upon the methodological development of this project.  
Indeed, it arguably affects this stage of development more so than the last, since there 
continues to be a surprising level of debate over whether and to what extent ontology 
affects the „selection‟ or perception of theory (as recounted in the final section of the 
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preceding chapter), but its related epistemological stance more straightforwardly 
determines what data can be generated and how it can be accessed.  
 
However, too often an epistemological position can appear to make methodological 
choices almost too straightforward.  Whilst an interpretivist position clearly privileges 
qualitative, more ethnographic methods due to its focus on contextualised meanings, 
this does not compute backwards to mean that these methods solely or wholly fit any or 
all interpretivist projects.  These methods cannot simply be picked once the 
epistemological position has been declared. There is a greater intellectual journey here. 
And, as such, this chapter does not fully separate out a discussion about ontology and 
epistemology followed by a list of methods to be used, but explains how and why – as 
well as how and why not – the methodological choices were made with reference to 
interpretivism as well as to the regional assemblies and their institutional construction 
processes.  
 
 
4.1 The „-ology‟ triad to research design 
 
From ontology, to epistemology, to methodology  
As introduced in chapter 1, interpretivist ontology and epistemology go hand in hand to 
focus upon the meanings of the subjects of study, but these „-ologies‟ are distinct: 
ontology addresses the nature of things whilst epistemology is concerned with how 
things can be known.  Now it is necessary to bring these to bear on methodology as the 
three sets of philosophical considerations together frame the project.  As Jackson 
explains 
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„methodology is enacted philosophy.  It is “philosophical” in that it 
embodies and stands upon ontological and epistemological commitments.  It 
is “enacted” in that it is not satisfied with simply thinking these 
commitments, but endeavours to apply these ontological and 
epistemological commitments to concrete questions of how research is to be 
conducted‟   
(2006: 278).  
 
Here, interpretivism‟s underlying ontologically constructivist component has driven the 
theoretical development of this project to a position that effectively states that 
institutions are constructed of a multiplicity of actors and their meanings, so that the 
processes of design and change are, too, constructed of these multiplicities.  In turn, the 
epistemological component now focuses attention on understanding those meanings, so 
the methodology, the final part of the -ology triad, can, with reference to the ontology 
and epistemology, then focus attention on the processes of finding those meanings – i.e. 
on methods of data collection – as well as the processes of understanding those 
meanings – i.e. on methods of data analysis.   
 
This issue of understanding is central to interpretivism.  It sets the tone of the 
perspective whilst also being a topic of much sustained debate regarding the value and 
direction of the perspective, as will be discussed.  Whilst the concept of „understanding‟ 
is itself readily understandable, its frequency of use within the interpretivist tradition is 
historic, translated from the German „verstehen‟ as used by the sociologist Max Weber, 
who was prominent in the development of the anti-postivist current underlying 
interpretivism.  Weber, whilst considering the nature of social action, argued for a 
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distinction between the natural and social sciences (Little 1991: 71).  In conducting 
social enquiry, the role of the researcher is to understand the meaning behind social 
action, either the meaning that was actually intended or the meaning attributed, but  
 
„[in] neither case is the “meaning” to be thought of as somehow objectively 
“correct” or “true” by some metaphysical criterion.  This is the difference 
between the empirical sciences of actions, such as sociology and history, 
and any kind of a priori discipline, such as jurisprudence, logics, ethics, or 
aesthetics whose aim is to extract from their subject-matter its “correct” or 
“valid” meaning‟          
(Weber, cited in Runciman 1978: 7). 
The meaning and significance of social action is, therefore, not something that can be 
scientifically extracted from an actor objectively, but is embedded in their subjectivity 
in relation to their situation.  It is this embeddedness – this relationship between the 
actor‟s actions to the social situation – that is the feature that makes a social action 
specifically social.  It is the role of the researcher, therefore, to capture this action in all 
its fullness in order to be able to understand its meaning. 
 
The central significance attached to context and its contribution towards generating a 
fuller understanding of meaning is the epistemological foundation of a number of 
disciplines focussing on humans and their practices.  Anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
makes a direct connection to Weber in advocating the purpose of analysis to be „an 
interpretive [science] in search of meaning‟ focussed upon understanding the „webs of 
significance‟ that a person has spun for themselves (1973: 5).  A number of prominent 
ethnologists and phenomenologists, too, draw attention to the socialising impact of 
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context, thus requiring an interpretation of meaning in order to understand the subject of 
study (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966; Husserl 1931).  The phenomenological 
approach, in particular, brings context to the centre with the Husserlian concept of 
„lifeworld‟ (or „Lebenswelt‟ in the original German) which, distilled by Yanow, is „the 
bedrock of beliefs against which the very ordinary, mundane moving through one‟s 
everyday world, interacting with others, takes place and through which one shapes and 
reaffirms one‟s sense of oneself and the elements of one‟s social world‟ (2006: 12).   
 
There are a number of other theorists who have contributed to the strengthening of this 
perspective, developing over time a move away from the standards set by science based 
on an understanding that humans work differently specifically because they are engaged 
in a social setting that is mutually constitutive (Bourdieu, 1977; Schütz, 1967; Taylor 
1971).  However the aim here is not to chart these contributions, but to relate the ideas 
behind the perspective, the epistemology that was developed by these theorists, to the 
development of this research project.  The point is that, whether it be labelled a „web of 
significance‟ of a „lifeworld,‟ the role of the researcher is to burrow into that context in 
order to understand its meanings to the actors involved.  To conduct research from an 
interpretivist perspective is to engage in the micro level of human practices, with the 
humans that are practising them, „ferreting out [their] mental framework‟ (Yanow, 
2006: 11) and making sense of their sense-making processes.  
 
In order to do this, the researcher must attend to language.  Returning to Weber, we are 
referred to the „collective concepts‟ from which „to develop an intelligible terminology‟ 
because  
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„“the state” does not necessarily consist only or exactly of those elements 
which are legally relevant. [...] Rather, when [one] speaks of a “state,” a 
“nation,” a “limited company,” a “family,” an “army corps” or any similar 
collectivity, [s/he] means by such expressions nothing more than a 
specifically structured outcome of the social actions of individuals, either 
actually performed or constructed as possible‟ 
           (Weber cited in Runciman 1978: 17). 
What Weber approaches here is, in two significant ways, related to the theoretical 
development of constructive institutionalism given in the previous chapter: social 
actions are practices – regularised into institutions – embedded with layers of other 
institutions that are constructed and shared through language.  Other contemporaries 
philosophised more specifically and explicitly on language and its role in constructing 
the world around subjects, thereby contributing towards the interpretive stance (e.g. 
Winch 1958; Wittgenstien 1972).  Bringing together these latter two in summary, 
Buckler clearly exposes the implications of this collective epistemological foundation 
and advises that „without mastery of conceptual frameworks given in language, it is 
hard to see in what sense we could have meaningful experiences at all.  Thus, language 
“constitutes” reality for us and investigations into language are investigations into the 
world as we experience it‟ (2002: 177-8).  
 
Research design and data requirements 
What this preceding discussion about specifically the epistemology of interpretivism 
now enables is the distillation of the key factors that will drive forward the research 
design.  Interpretivist epistemology directs attention to context and to language as the 
two key access points to knowledge – it is through a thorough appreciation of these that 
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a subject matter, in this case the process of institutional design/change, can be known.  
It is through researching the context of and the language used in the empirical site of the 
„real world‟ problem that we can understand the meaning of the institutional 
development processes for the actors involved in those institutions.  This means that the 
next step in this programme of research, the step that operationalises the research by 
designing a way to physically conduct it, must first consider these data requirements of 
context and language together with the theoretical suppositions arrived at in the 
previous chapter.  This is relatively easily done, given that the main argument in that 
previous chapter centred on the complementarity of constructivist institutionalism and 
interpretivism.  It was demonstrated that constructivist institutionalism, working from 
the same ontological standpoint, draws attention to actors‟ discursive selections (i.e. to 
language) impacting upon their material reality (i.e. on context), thus it follows 
epistemologically that these are the key access points as in interpretivism.   
 
Returning to Hay, we can see that this is drawn out explicitly.  Hay develops Jessop‟s 
„strategic-relational‟ model to map out how actors interpret the world around them and 
then act according to that understanding.  This depiction represents how the ideational 
and material affect one another – how the pre-existing institutional context as 
interpreted by one actor is shared with the next through language, and the selection of 
the details shared contributes towards institutional development as it is being 
performed.  At the same time, that selection is not necessarily or fully autonomous – it 
does not happen in a vacuum, but in a pre-existing institutional context, that influences 
an actor‟s discursive selection.  This is the interplay between structure and agency, as 
represented through context and language.  Hay explains that the  
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„dialectical understanding of the relationship between  the ideational and 
material is logically entailed by a dialectical understanding of the 
relationship between structure and agency [...] For ideas, narratives, 
paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors 
interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors‟ 
direct and mediated experiences [...] In this sense the discursive or 
ideational is only ever relatively autonomous of the material.  Just as it 
imposes a strategic selectivity, then, the context also imposes a discursive 
selectivity, selecting for and selecting against particular ideas, narratives and 
construction‟     
         (2002: 210-212). 
 
This being a dialectical relationship, it is impossible to determine the beginning from 
which to describe a strictly linear process of institutional development.  However, it is 
possible to select a beginning, if the continuously cyclical nature of institutional 
processes is appreciated.  From this, we can draw together an analytical framework to 
function as a heuristic device in order to navigate the fieldwork and the findings of the 
research.  This is an attempt to artificially fix an understanding of the action of an 
individual in a developing institutional context, from which to widen that understanding 
to a collection of individuals involved in that institutional design/change process, which 
is the specific issue under research in this thesis.  
 
 The (pre-existing) institutional context and the ideas about the direction of 
institutional design/change privilege or empower different actors to varying 
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degrees (according to their own perceptions) to participate in the institutional 
design process; 
 those actors that perceive themselves to be involved strategically use their 
interpretations of the institutional context and the available ideas, effectively 
becoming institutional designers;  
 these designers use their perceptions of the context and ideas to promote certain 
strategies over others, constructing relationships with others and sharing their 
discursive selections; 
 and as those discursive selections become generally accepted, they transpire into 
material designs and effectively become institutionalised;  
 finally, these new institutions affect the terrain of the next attempt at institutional 
design/change, affecting new interpretations of the context and ideas. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 A provisional model of intersubjective institutional design 
 
 
 
Context Ideas 
Designers 
Institution 
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With this heuristic device in place, it is now necessary to generate data pertaining to the 
pre-existing institutional context and, importantly, the data need to reflect the pre-
existing institutional context as it is meaningful to the actors involved.  A range of 
meanings need to be unearthed, from the different designers or groups of designers 
involved.  And the data need to relate the developmental aspect of the institutional 
process, to capture the constant dynamism that is a „live‟ institution as well as the 
constant adaptation of it as it is being performed.  In sum, this research project requires 
rich, qualitative, primary data, generated from the site of institutional ambiguity – i.e. 
directly from the English regional assemblies under investigation.  In this section, I have 
demonstrated how the ontological position at the foundation of this research has 
impacted upon the epistemological position, prioritising context and language as the 
route to knowledge about constructivist institutional design.  I have mapped out the 
theoretical projections about the institutional design/change process to clarify the 
context and the language sought, and built from this further consideration of the data 
requirements for this project.  This will now structure the choices around the methods 
employed, in the following section.  
 
 
4.2 Methods 
 
Of data collection 
Bridging the sometimes chasmal gap between the researcher‟s theoretical musings and 
the empirical world, there is a key research method that essentially brings to life a 
research project.  It takes a case for further study, further than an anecdote or example, 
and enables a focussed and deep analysis of a research problem in the social world as it 
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is really experienced.  As Yin, a major authority in the case study method, states, this 
approach allows the research to „retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events‟ (1994: 3, emphasis added).  It is unsurprising, therefore, that it is a 
popular method in a discipline that largely focuses on „real world‟ and even „real time‟ 
policy issues.  The case study method is so firmly established in public policy studies 
that it can elude the researcher drawing up a list of methods, as the case is often the 
source of the research problem in the first instance and forms an almost unquestionable 
part of any logical research design.  However, Flyvbjerg assists in identifying and 
delineating four key features of case studies: 
 
(i) first, drawing on Stake (2008) and Ragin and Becker (1992), the 
study is „bounded‟ or „cased;‟ 
(ii) it is „intensive,‟ it involves „in-depth‟ research;   
(iii) third, it enables the exploration of „developmental factors.‟ 
demonstrating evolution in time of a phenomenon so as to 
contribute towards the completeness of a case; 
(iv) and finally, in a similar vein, it facilitates a focus on the 
environment of the unit of study, relating it to its context  
   
(2011: 301). 
 
These four features frame the case study approach in general, whilst also allowing for a 
range of more specific methods to be used in conjunction or incorporated within the 
study.  Yin (1994, 2003) lists categories of techniques used within case studies: 
documentation; archival records; interviews; direct observation; participant observation; 
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and physical artefacts.   Flyvbjerg goes further to state that the phenomenon being 
explored „may be studied in a number of ways, for instance qualitatively or 
quantitatively, analytically or hermeneutically, or by mixed methods‟ (2011: 301).  This 
demonstrates that the case study is, like others, a malleable method, and the research 
values underpinning this choice of method can vary.  Case studies may appear to be an 
obvious choice for the interpretive researcher given the value attached to rich detail, but 
it is just as frequently used in primarily quantitative studies to triangulate results in 
context.  What is important is the spirit in which the method is employed – the reasons 
for its selection based on the researcher‟s understanding of its purpose in terms of the 
data it can generate.  Methods themselves are neutral tools, but a researcher‟s 
epistemological position frames the way they are used. It is part of the critical 
researcher‟s role to be transparent about the selection of methods so as not to rest on 
assumptions. 
 
Flyvbjerg‟s clarification is helpful because it distils the neutrality of the tool. Flyvbjerg 
erects the structure of the case study method to extricate it away from the „conventional 
wisdom‟ with which it is often compounded, „wisdom‟ that Flyvbjerg argues 
contributes towards misunderstandings about the case study research (2006: 220).  I can 
hang my selection of the case study method on the points above in that: 
(i) my study is bounded specifically to the English regional assembly; 
(ii) it is the site for more intensive/in-depth research in the form of semi-
structured interviews with the actors involved (as will be detailed 
below); 
(iii) „developmental factors‟ will be of utmost importance due to the focus on 
institutional design and change within the case; 
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(iv) and the exploration of the whole regional assembly, as much as can be 
bounded, enables an appreciation of the pre-existing institutional context 
within which institutional development may occur. 
But the ontological and epistemological discussion that has preceded this section 
suggests that this is not all that is expected of the case study here.  I am aiming to 
generate rich detail, that which Geertz terms „thick description‟ (1973).  Indeed, with an 
interpretivist perspective, I adopt the case study method as one that enables an 
anthropological/ethnographical style of researching the regional assembly, attempting to 
explore as openly and as widely as possible, beyond the scope of initial ideas, with as 
little preconceived as possible.  I can get direct access to the actual actors involved in 
what is being researched through this method, and capture the whole picture so as to 
challenge any personal prejudices or preconceptions that might affect the data.  There 
are, therefore, assumptions here about the method.  These differ from those bemoaned 
by Flyvbjerg, but his critical engagement with the case study method raises important 
issues about not just this method but of this project and its perspective as a whole.  
 
Although it is not his stated aim, a number of Flyvbjerg‟s points of challenge to the 
standard reasons for selecting and employing the case study method chime with what 
would also be the interpretivist critique of that selection and employment.  Flyvbjerg 
leans on the specificity of social science, stating that „there does not and probably 
cannot exist predictive theory in social science‟ (2006: 223) and distancing it from the 
„hypothetico-deductive model of explanation [...], universals and scientism‟ (2006: 220, 
224), all while building a case against the assumptions that theoretical knowledge is 
more valuable than practical knowledge and that case studies are more useful for 
generating hypotheses rather than testing them and building theory (two of his five 
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misunderstandings).  There are echoes of the anti-positivist sentiment of interpretivism 
and Flyvbjerg‟s recommendations to counter the misunderstandings reflect an 
interpretivist response.  This is quite clearly demonstrated through his discussion of the 
misunderstanding that case studies frequently result in researchers verifying their 
hypotheses, when he points to the frequency with which case study researchers in fact 
falsify their hunches (2006: 235), where they are forced to be reflexive, as 
interpretivism encourages.   
 
However, my aim here is not to regurgitate Flyvbjerg‟s article to justify the 
interpretivist approach taken to the case study research in this project.  Rather, it is to 
raise and reflect upon Flyvbjerg‟s point that presents a particular challenge to this 
research project: generalising from a single case to contribute to knowledge.  Flyvbjerg 
draws upon historic examples of (natural) scientific discoveries that were based on 
single cases to counter the general preference of the scientific community towards 
multiple case studies from which they can infer factual truth based on statistical 
significance (2006: 225-226).  He uses this to demonstrate his argument that the 
findings of a single, paradigmatic case study can contribute more generally towards 
knowledge.  Much as this is convincing, it does not fully alleviate concerns stemming 
from the particularities of this research project, in which there are three component parts 
to the challenge here raised: 
(i) This thesis concerns a single entity – the English regional assembly – but 
takes forward two of these for further study (the West Midlands and the 
North West regional assemblies).  Is it, therefore, one or two case 
studies?  
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(ii) If it is two case studies, are the findings comparable and generalisable, 
pertaining to the regional assembly in general?  
(iii) Regardless of these more academic concerns about the implications of 
whether one or two case studies are here presented, what can be reported 
back to the policy world?  Given that this research was supported by a 
CASE award with an external organisation, the umbrella body for the 
regional assemblies, there was a duty to produce (previously unknown) 
knowledge to what are effectively the commissioners of this research.  If 
conducted in the interpretivist vein, what could be deemed valid as 
knowledge from researching these two specific cases for the assemblies 
in general? 
 
These are the reflections of a researcher engaging with the philosophical foundations of 
research and developing interpretivist position, whilst operating in an institutional 
environment with its own demands, such as for justifications of the purpose/impact of 
the research and, particularly for the policy-world, timely facts and figures.  These 
considerations were a constant feature of the research process, not fully resolved prior to 
undertaking the fieldwork nor within the full term of the project.  Thus, they pose as 
limitations to the project and will be discussed further.  But, with this in mind, it is still 
necessary to explain the methodological choices that were made with regards to the 
employment of the case study method.  The reasoning presented above explains why the 
case study method was chosen, but not yet why specifically the West Midlands and 
North West assemblies were chosen.   
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It is, in keeping with much interpretivist positioning within this thesis, easier to say how 
the case studies were not chosen i.e. that the aim was not to single out the particular 
features of the assemblies, to then fix them as controlled elements, to then focus on a 
pre-defined part of institutional development, from which some generally applicable 
truth could be inferred „all other things being equal.‟  This is a somewhat defensive 
stance, but that is almost inevitable given the anti- or post-positivist foundation of 
interpretivism.  Without this construction against its other, the selection of the cases by 
the interpretivist researcher is little more than instinctive.  As Flyvbjerg states, „all that 
researchers can do is use their experience and intuition to assess whether they believe a 
given case is interesting in a paradigmatic context‟ and yet at the same time „it is not 
possible consistently, or even frequently, to determine in advance whether a given case 
[...] is paradigmatic‟ (2006: 233).  Furthermore, as Moses and Knutsen argue,  
 
„as with the tendency to generalize, an author‟s level of attention to 
questions of case selection and sampling does not need to signal poor 
scholarship or methodological ineptitude.  It is quite possible that an 
author‟s lack of attention to these concerns reflects her underlying 
methodological position.  For most constructivists, issues of sampling and 
case selection are simply not methodologically relevant or interesting‟ 
            (2007: 234). 
 
Nonetheless, it is useful to explain how the decision to study further the West Midlands 
and North West assemblies was arrived at, as it relates to the subsequent methods of 
analysis.  Firstly, it was decided that it was beyond the scope of a single doctoral 
researcher to conduct in-depth research of all eight assemblies, particularly to the depth 
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that the interpretivist approach required.  Therefore, they were all investigated briefly 
(relative to the rest of the research) in order to decide which to take forward
10
.  This 
early stage of research drew upon information about the assemblies that was openly 
available to the general public i.e. from the assemblies‟ websites and from documents 
such as the assemblies‟ annual reports.  Given the specificities of the CASE studentship, 
however, I was able to gain „insider‟ information with anecdotal „evidence‟ from 
informal conversations with contacts from the English Regions Network (ERN, the 
sponsoring body).  I also attended my first ERN Stakeholder Meeting, which brought 
together the eight assemblies‟ stakeholder chairpersons, within weeks of starting the 
project, as well as the ERN Annual Conference shortly after, from which I was able to 
become acquainted with individuals from different assemblies, whom I visited in the 
months following
11
.  I reflected upon all of these meetings and conversations, within 
them where possible as well as straight after, in notebooks that effectively functioned as 
research diaries
12
.  From these field notes, I compiled the following table to summarise 
what I was learning about the assemblies, plotting their interesting features against the 
feasibility of taking them forward as case studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This work was the basis for the regional „snapshots‟ given in chapter 2. 
11
 A list of these meetings is available in the appendix (a).  
12
 I say effectively because these research diaries were not exclusively used for the fieldwork, as research 
diaries technically are, but for the whole PhD, reflecting the development of myself as a researcher 
through all the other events and experiences that contributed (supervisions, conferences etc.). 
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Table 4.1 Observations from scoping activities for case study selection  
 
Region Fact file (source: 
ODPM 2003: 70-77) 
Features of interest Potential difficulties 
NE Area: 8, 592 km
2 
Population ≈ 2.6m. 
GDP per head: £10, 024 
LAs: 2 counties with 18 
shire districts; 10 
unitary councils 
- Lots of history – long and distinct 
- Issue of regional identity which may be interesting 
- Calls itself an assembly, not a regional assembly 
- MEP included, part of the „government sector‟ 
- Stakeholders called „ESEP‟ 
- Public info points out that it is not a quango  
- Appears more proactive than passive 
- Its story too distinct? 
- Distance  
 
NW Area: 8, 851 km
2 
Population ≈ 6.9m. 
GDP per head: £11, 273 
LAs: 3 counties with 39 
shire districts; 19 
unitary councils 
- See themselves as having 6 sub-regions - 3 nominations 
from each plus 6 from the NW SEEP group (a separate 
entity?  should be resilient to future change then?) make 
up the exec board  
- From the annual report 2002/3, appears that they used to 
have separate groupings but „put differences behind‟ them 
and formed cohesive group – interesting to probe  
- Appears more proactive than passive 
- Distance? (geographical spread) 
though the focus of the region is 
undeniably skewed to the south, 
given the strategic importance of 
cities like Manchester and 
Liverpool – itself quite 
interesting feature 
YH Area: 15, 400 km
2 
Population ≈ 5m. 
GDP per head: £11, 404 
LAs: 1 county with 9 
shire districts; 14 
unitary councils 
- 60:40 ratio 
- Relatively organised and transparent about the way they 
work?  
- Appears more proactive than passive 
- Currently already 
accommodating a researcher – 
potential difficulties  
EM Area: 15, 627 km
2 
Population ≈ 4.2m. 
GDP per head: £12, 146 
LAs: 5 counties with 36 
shire districts; 4 unitary 
councils 
- Claim to have had a review recently  proactive/reflexive? 
- Include MEPs 
- Interesting interpretation of the ratio – „two-thirds is 
required to be filled by LG‟ 
- Public info states that it is not a quango 
- (local) 
- Leading member/potential point 
of access presents a potential 
barrier rather than a support to 
the research  
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WM Area: 13, 004 km
2 
Population ≈ 5.3m. 
GDP per head: £11, 900 
Las: 4 counties with 25 
shire districts; 10 
unitary councils 
- Claim to have a long history of partnership working 
- Separation between economic and social & environmental 
partners – „business group‟ and „other stakeholder group‟ 
- Sectoral ratio 68:16:16 – privileges LG, then business? 
- Future appears stable, with LG having a clear dominance 
- close connection with WMLGA may be interesting 
- „Other‟ stakeholder group includes parish councillors ( 
why not in LG section?) 
- Appears more passive than proactive 
- (local) 
- Issues arising from propinquity 
– access too privileged, risk of 
„capture‟?  
  
SW Area: 23, 289 km
2 
Population ≈ 4.9m. 
GDP per head: £11, 782 
LAs: 6 counties with 36 
shire districts; 9 unitary 
councils 
- Three regional organisations served by the same website – 
how separate? 
- Apparently officers have been exploring alternative models 
- The assembly does not appear to 
be much of a priority? 
- Distance/ geographical spread/ 
accessibility  
SE Area: 19, 096 km
2 
Population ≈ 8m. 
GDP per head: £15, 098 
Las: 7 counties with 55 
shire districts; 12 
unitary councils 
- History of SE quite distinctive – very much tied to London  
- Separation between economic and social & environmental 
partners  
- General opinion that SEERA likely to be one of the first to 
wind down following conclusions of SNR  
- Its story too tied to London? 
 
EE Area 19, 120 km
2 
Population ≈ 5m. 
GDP per head: £15, 094 
Las: 6 counties with 28 
shire districts; 20 
unitary councils 
- SEEPs known as „community stakeholders‟  
- Have a „template‟ for stakeholder engagement and a 
„position on regional governance‟ – appear to want to be 
organised and transparent  
- Unstable situation with 
officer(s) – staff changes and 
lack of knowledge about who 
does what with stakeholders 
- Distance/ geographical spread/ 
accessibility 
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All of these regions had interesting points ripe for further study.  Moreover, they each had 
interesting points that could have been relevant to this particular thesis for further study, for 
example the impact of the relatively strong regional identity on the construction of the North 
East Assembly institutions and the interpretation of the Government‟s guidance on 
membership proportions producing a 60:40 ratio of local government to stakeholder 
representation in Yorkshire and the Humber Assembly were both fascinating, especially from 
a constructivist perspective.  But, looking across the board, there emerged issues that were 
theoretically interesting and relevant as well as empirically focussed on the stakeholders and 
relevant to the regional assemblies more broadly.  Methodologically, this was the balance that 
had to be struck.  These issues were the division in organisation of the stakeholders, and the 
stakeholders‟ potential impact upon the ongoing processes of institutional design.  In three 
regions, the proportionality of the stakeholders raised critical questions: in Yorkshire and the 
Humber, as mentioned above, but particularly in the West Midlands and the South East, 
where the stakeholders were further divided by type i.e. by whether they were economic 
stakeholders or more closely aligned to the label of „third sector.‟  And in a number of 
regions, notably those further north, there was significant ongoing activity regarding 
institutional design due to the impact of the North East referendum in 2004 and the Sub-
National Review in 2007, where there was an opportunity to gather „first hand‟ evidence of 
institutional development from actors still engaged in that process. 
 
From this, the West Midlands and the North West regions were already appearing to be 
frontrunners for case study research.  Yorkshire and the Humber Assembly, though, clearly 
had a story that spoke to both the intertwined agendas, being distinctive in its stakeholder 
arrangement and proactive in its organisation more generally.  However, YHA was 
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anomalous with regards to the level of stakeholder representation and thus could not have 
borne much relevance to the other regions, bar starkly highlighting that the regions could have 
interpreted the Government guidance of „at least 30%‟ to the letter rather than as „two thirds 
local government‟ as the majority of them did.  In a similar vein, the East Midlands Regional 
Assembly would have been an exceptionally interesting single case study in terms of 
constructivist institutionalism for its account of institutional development on an apparently 
„blank slate‟ (Foley 2002), as this was palpably not the case in other regions, thus rendering 
EMRA anomalous.  The North East and South East regions, too, were too distinct in their 
relationship with London, though in contrasting ways.  But from the epistemological 
discussion above, it is clear that studying „anomalies‟ are not necessarily problematic for an 
interpretivist researcher, however the CASE structure of the project pulled concerns back 
towards the regional assembly as an entity and so away from the specifics of any single 
assembly exclusively.  To further study more, or even all, of the assemblies would have surely 
generated insights that would have contributed towards more regular and thorough analytical 
reflection between cases, though that would have been beyond the scope of the resources 
available in this project.  
 
Feasibility was an inevitable consideration in the case study selection process.  Distance was 
an obvious issue, but there was also a related issue of geographical spread.  Given the regional 
remit of the assemblies, there was significant potential for the in-depth case study work to 
have to be conducted across the whole regional area.  The assemblies were strategic bodies 
that met relatively rarely and, even then, most assemblies rotated their meetings around the 
region for fairness of accessibility for their members.  Therefore, the building in which an 
assembly was physically based served as little more than a hub for administrators and 
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generally lacked the symbolic resonance and pull of, for example, a town hall.  Consequently, 
it was more than likely that I would be visiting people in their own organisational settings, or 
even their own homes, right across their region.  This meant that, for example, the South West 
region, even though it bordered the region in which I was based (the West Midlands), was as 
difficult to pursue to full case study depth as the distant North East region.   
 
The East of England region presented both difficulties, being both distant from the research 
base and geographically spread out over a wide and relatively less accessible area.  But 
perhaps as challenging here was the staffing shift that meant there was a lack of knowledge 
about the stakeholders (however temporary) and, in this particular case, an amount of 
instability regarding the role and responsibility of stakeholder communication and connection.  
This issue of personnel or specific people in the regions was relevant in other cases: at that 
time in YHA, another research project was being conducted, which raised concerns about 
potential participant „research fatigue‟ (Clark 2008) as well as confusion between the projects 
and their researchers
13
; and in EMRA, the lead stakeholder contact, who seemingly exerted 
particularly strong leadership, was disappointingly negative about the research
14
 and thus 
presented a barrier to pursuing that case. 
 
The opposite was experienced in the West Midlands region: given that the CASE partner, the 
ERN, was hosted by WMRA at the beginning of the project, there was a supportive attitude 
                                                 
13
 On an early occasion, I travelled up to YHA for a stakeholder meeting that I learned upon arrival had been 
cancelled.  It transpired that the other researcher had been informed and, in the process, I had been overlooked.  
The experience was as frustrating as it was expensive, and perhaps disproportionately affected my de-selection 
of the case after initial enthusiasm for exploring the 60:40 assembly membership ratio.  
14
 At my first ERN stakeholder meeting, this person opined that this research was simply a „naval-gazing‟ 
exercise and appeared affronted that the stakeholders were being „scrutinised‟ against the councillors, revealing a 
level of hostility that could have been time-consuming to overcome and too resource-intensive for a relatively 
small project.  
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towards the research.  Indeed, organisational and staffing changes during the project meant 
that WMRA effectively became the CASE partner during the mid- to late phase of the PhD.  
There was some nervousness about this – whether it could be seen as an unfairly privileged 
level of access and whether this might have entailed some obligation towards WMRA with 
potential for some conflict of interest if the findings were not agreeable – but I manoeuvred 
the CASE work into the difficult position and decided that the ease of accessibility was 
something to be taken advantage of rather than worry about since it had not been unethically 
gained.  In a similar way, the selection of the North West region was not without its concerns, 
but they were overcome: this region covered an expansive area, a reason that other regions 
had been discounted, but the natural geography of the area meant that human settlement was 
concentrated in pockets that were relatively easily accessible, either in the south of the region 
or in cities with good transportation links (i.e. Preston, Lancaster and Carlisle).  This in itself 
was part of the ongoing institutional development that made the region interesting to study 
from the early stages of scoping the regions.   
 
As has been made clear in chapter 2 with regards to the regional „snapshots‟ and above with 
the table of observations, an amount of research had already been conducted to inform the 
case study selection process.  This drew, in the main, upon publicly available information.  
Any insider information gained at that stage was, at best, on the peripheries of „insider,‟ being 
the result of early and informal contact, and it was generally anecdotal.  It was certainly 
useful, however it was the preliminary stage of much more in-depth work.  The case study 
method, as explained above, bounded the site within which to conduct in-depth primary 
research with the actors directly involved in the processes being researched.  And the key way 
to access the data required for this research was to interview those actors.  Like case studies, 
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interviewing is a well-established and widely used method in social sciences, particularly in 
those disciplines that are outward-facing and have a „real time‟ dimension, because they can, 
for example, relay information from people implementing policy back to those simultaneously 
revising policy.  This method‟s unique capacity to capture qualitative data literally „straight 
from the horse‟s mouth‟ is a clear reason for its popularity, which is reflected by the wealth of 
textbook guidance available, categorising variously the different types of interview and 
advising on step-by-step interviewing technique (e.g. Gubrium and Holstein 2002; Kvale 
1996; Rubin and Rubin 1995).   
 
That there are different types of interview (e.g. survey interviews, life histories, unstructured 
interviews) demonstrates that, just as with case studies, the purpose behind the method is 
paramount.  This serves as a reminder of the argument that runs through this methodological 
discussion: it is the way a method is employed that is significant, more so than the method 
itself.  How the interviews were conducted is shaped by and therefore reflects the ontological 
and epistemological positions that underlie the project for which the method is being 
employed.  An interview can be conducted in a highly structured manner, virtually a spoken 
survey, where neat, plain truths or verifications are sought.  But this is not what is required in 
an interpretivist project where more general exploration of meanings of a problem or 
phenomenon as well as the multiplicity of meanings from different actors are sought.  The 
interview method is appropriate because it allows access to „people‟s understanding of the 
meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and 
clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world‟ (Kvale 1996: 105), but 
it is specifically the in-depth interview that is semi-structured or even unstructured where the 
interpretivist researcher has the „freedom for probes and follow-up questions as opposed to 
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the structured interviews one might find in a survey or some other study that prioritizes 
reliability-as-uniformity over flexible, detail exploration‟ (Soss 2006: 135).  
 
Flexibility is the key characteristic of the less structured interview technique.  It is both this 
method‟s strength as well as its potentially limiting feature.   Experiential knowledge from 
practised scholars can advise on how to approach the interviewing process, for example Rubin 
and Rubin (1995) categorise three types of questioning – main, probe and follow-up – that 
provide a coherent order to sub-sections of the interview, alongside a wealth of other 
suggestions that serve to heighten awareness for the new researcher.  But specifically the 
flexibility required in an interpretive approach means that the probing follow-up questions can 
take centre stage.  Schaffer invites us to ask questions of elaboration, such as: 
 
 Can you explain? 
 Can you elaborate? 
 Please say more. 
 Why do you say that? 
 How so? 
 Really?  
                    (2006: 154).  
Wagenaar (2004) even implies a level of feigned naivety for eliciting data from interview 
respondents.  As a consequence of this approach, expert advice can only guide the process to 
an extent and the in-depth interview can be, as Soss describes, „as unpredictable as any other 
conversation‟ (2006: 135).  Soss paints a colourful picture of the possibilities – the interview 
may, he says, „veer off into topics irrelevant to the research; it may get emotionally difficult 
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for one person or both; it may get tense or boring or develop a running joke; it may breeze 
along or stumble into an uncomfortable impasse‟ (2006: 135).   
 
It is clear, then, that there is a good degree of intuition or responsiveness involved in the in-
depth interview scenario.  This could be seen as a limiting factor, because the unique 
development of each interview would preclude comparison across transcripts, returning to the 
question raised above that niggles away at the interpretivist researcher still in the early stages 
of development: what can really be learned here with this approach?  But the skill to be 
learned here is the ability to strike a balance between allowing for the breadth of data to be 
unearthed whilst also controlling it through the line and style of questioning.  The lack of 
rigidity here, or the lack of strict repeatability of the method and reproducibility of the data, is 
not, as with the case studies above, seen as an indication of a lack of scholarship.  Rather, the 
freedom allowed to the respondent (as well as to the interviewer interacting to some degree 
with that respondent) enables a mechanism of „check and balance‟ in the research.  It 
encourages reflexivity in the researcher to challenge any preconceptions born of theory, 
preliminary and documentary analysis, as well as of other interview data.  And this brings 
greater transparency to the concurrency of developments stemming from data collection and 
analysis as well as revisions to the theoretical framework of the project.  Soss promotes this as 
the method‟s advantage, arguing that 
 
„in-depth interviewing offers flexibility in the interview itself and shifting 
standpoints over time.  It is centred on discursive and dialectical conversations 
with interviewees.  But more broadly, it is an evolving dialogue between 
fieldwork and framework, mediated by concrete activities of transcription, memo 
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writing, purposive reading of literatures, and the like.  It entails simultaneous data 
collection and analysis, but it remains incomplete without more systematic 
analysis after exiting the field‟    
                       (2006: 137). 
 
This was certainly true of the interviewing process in this project.  There was considerable 
movement back and forth between what are typically understood to be discrete stages of the 
research process – between the theoretically planning and physically undertaking the research 
– as well as across the two regional assembly cases.  I found that the difficulty was less about 
how to question interviewees (for which, as noted above, there is a fair amount of helpful 
literature available) but more about what to question them on.  This should have been given 
by the theory work undertaken prior to conducting the research, which to some extent it was, 
but the theoretical framework for the project was by no means fully worked out prior to the 
early stage at which the fieldwork began.  To complicate matters further, I was – and still am 
– contending with the question of to what extent any theoretical projections should have been 
worked out in advance if aligned to the interpretive, more exploratory stance, that aims to 
work from the ground up.  I found that my interviewing skills developed as the project 
progressed, that I could keep my interjections brief but probing, and yet the progression of the 
project necessitated more directed questioning of the issues and events that had come to the 
fore in previous interviews, lest the interviews and project be pulled in too many different 
directions.  Thus, despite the apparent lack of formal systemacity in the interpretive interview 
approach, there is a great level of skill required.  A typical interview guide can be found in the 
appendix (b). 
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I practised this over 40 interviews with actors in the West Midlands and North West regional 
assemblies, 21 in the former and 19 in the latter.  The regional assembly stakeholder members 
made up the majority of those interviewed, given the early focus on those actors almost 
exclusively.  The decisions of who to interview then were relatively straightforward – I 
needed to speak with those assembly members involved in the institutional development of 
the assembly, thus the assembly membership was my pool from which to pick and, whilst in 
the initial stages I aimed to interview quite generally across the assembly after prioritising the 
stakeholder members, I then aimed for those that had been involved for longer stretches of 
time (which I judged from annual reports and other interviewees‟ data and advice).  Whilst it 
could have been equally enlightening to speak to newer members of the assemblies, to gain 
perspectives that were closer to their first impressions of being involved and potentially 
having had histories recently relayed to them, the wider context (i.e. in relation to the 
publication and consequences of the 2007 Sub-National Review) meant that the assembly 
situations had been too precarious to invite new members into, so I had to concentrate on 
those already actively involved.  
 
On five occasions it was relevant to speak with non-assembly members, but this was because 
they were former members that had been involved in institutional development, rather than to 
satisfy any aim to gain a perspective from the outside.  This project was specifically about 
internal institutional design and change, to gain an understanding of how different (types of) 
actors came together to develop the practices that made up the regional assembly, rather than 
looking at the development of the body as a whole against other regional organisations such 
as the development agencies.  Of those actors on the inside, I found the Councillor component 
of the assembly membership particularly difficult to access and not particularly useful when I 
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did, being keen to focus on the idea of regionalism more generally rather than the specifics of 
internal development, though this was noted for being quite telling in itself.  Partly due to this 
frustration but mostly due to revelations in the data, I spread my net to assembly officers 
beyond those that had already come to be my lead contact for that region, which proved 
critical (as discussed in the following chapters).  I began with the ambitious aim of 
interviewing all the stakeholders, given the relatively small numbers involved in these 
relatively small organisations, but I revised this to include the range of assembly actors and 
stopped when the returns from the interviews ceased adding any further dimension to the 
body of data collected and when I judged that I had spent enough time attempting to reach 
those I had not yet had the opportunity to interview.   
  
I spent eighteen months on the fieldwork, conducting interviews during the period from 
February 2008 to August 2009 (though the time was not spent exclusively on this task – as 
discussed previously and further, there were no discrete stages of the project).  All bar twelve 
of them were conducted face-to-face, which was not a feasibility issue – I made myself fully 
available during this period in order to conduct as many of these interviews as possible face-
to-face, hence the relatively lengthy timeframe in which they occurred – but on these 
occasions, the interviewees simply did not want to be interviewed in person (perhaps as a way 
of keeping their contribution brief) and they could not be persuaded otherwise (though there 
was minimal attempt at persuasion per se, to respect the interviewees‟ preferences).  
Interviewees took place in a number of settings – from regional assembly premises, other 
organisational settings (personal offices, staffrooms, meeting rooms) and frequently in the 
interviewee‟s home.  Though they averaged to just under an hour, the interviews varied 
considerably in length, from one early on taking nearly two full hours to another lasting only 
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approximately an eighth of that time (over the telephone).  Whilst the content of this latter 
extreme example was not, and could not have been, useful, I was given the impression that it 
was quite a coup to have secured any of this interviewee‟s time at all, which itself fed into the 
data analysis and reflection in this case
15
.   
 
The interviews also varied in quality (by which I mean the usefulness of the data generated) 
though, to my surprise, this did not necessarily correlate with the length of the interview nor 
with whether the interview was conducted face-to-face or not.  Whilst I believed – and still 
believe – that the probability for a better interview is greater if conducted in person, to be 
better able to judge and respond to body language as well as to demonstrate how much I 
appreciated the interviewee‟s perspective and their time, I did manage to gain useful 
perspectives over the telephone.  From this I learned that it is quite difficult to predict how an 
interview will run and that the safest avenue to pursue is to allow the interviewee to lead on 
setting the conditions for the interview.  Getting a reluctant potential respondent to agree to be 
interviewed is challenging, but having to coax them at every turn simply made the process 
and invariably the data (if any) almost useless.  Nevertheless, whether face-to-face or on the 
telephone, all bar three of the interviews were digitally recorded; of these three, the first – 
indeed, my very first – was not recorded due to equipment failure and two others because the 
participants withheld consent.   
 
Consent to record was sought and obtained verbally at the start of each interview, though 
respondents were informed that I would be seeking this consent when the interview was 
                                                 
15
 Specifically, it was one of the moments that encouraged me to question the more harmonious stories I had 
been told in the North West region and it enabled me to understand better the frustration felt by many as the 
alternative stories were unearthed. 
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arranged.  At this stage, interviewees were also informed about the subject of the questioning, 
though to only quite a general extent – i.e. that I was seeking their knowledge and perspective 
of how the regional assembly had developed – so as not to structure their thinking too much 
in advance nor restrict myself from pursuing issues that may have been raised by interviews 
conducted in the interim.  And they were advised that their responses would be anonymized 
so that any quotations taken from their transcript would not be attributable to them.  
Verification or at least a chance to look over the transcript was not offered and was not once 
sought.  Indeed, there was a generally permissive attitude and my predetermined introduction 
concerning data issues were general waived through, perhaps because the subject of the 
questioning was generally seen, by all parties involved, to not pose any real threat to anyone 
concerned.  At the moment where concerns were raised, the interviewees invariably flagged 
the issues and gave the more sensitive information „off the record.‟   
 
Upon reflection, though, I probably took too informal an approach to ethical considerations in 
this project, attending less to risk assessment for the interviewee and focussing more on 
aspects relating to data protection, which I seek to rectify in future research.  However, in this 
project, the data were anonymized by simply categorising the audio files according to regional 
assembly and membership section (with the membership sections themselves constructed 
according to the particulars of the case), then assigning the interviewee a number based on the 
chronological order of interviews, so the first public sector member (i.e. either councillor or 
officer) interviewed in the West Midlands was referred to as WMRA_PS01 and the second 
stakeholder interviewed in the North West was referred to as NWRA_SEEP02, for example.  
All the interviews were transcribed and given a reference accordingly.   
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Throughout the following chapters, any data from the transcripts are only referred to by this 
code so as to respect the agreements made with the interviewees.  Through this, only their 
assembly section can be known as this was the only information that was deemed relevant, as 
against the specific organisation from which they were from or any biographical information 
as this would have rendered the interviewee identifiable given the small numbers and low 
turnover of the individuals involved in the assembly.  For example, if I had stated that 
WMRA_OSG10 was an Asian male, he would have been identifiable as there was only one 
person of that profile and, more importantly, it simply would not have been relevant.  Equally, 
if I had stated that NWRA_SEEP13 represented the Trades Union Congress, they would have 
been identifiable as their name against their organisation was publicly available information 
and this specific representational link was less relevant than the given link to the SEEP 
group
16
.  Extending this to the local government section makes the point even clearer: „white 
male‟ would have added little and specifying the council would have been as good as naming 
them.  A coded list of the interviews, detailing the interview dates and lengths as well as notes 
on whether they were conducted over the telephone and/or recorded, can be found in the 
appendix (c). 
 
Of data analysis 
I inevitably began reviewing the data as I was transcribing and, as soon as the transcriptions 
were ready, I attempted some early analysis using the qualitative data analysis computer 
software programme, NVivo.  This was my first post-training use of the computerised tool, 
which has clearly become the standard means of analysis for qualitative researchers.  
However, I soon felt that I was breaking up the data too much and learning little from the 
                                                 
16
 These two examples can be given because interviews WMRA_OSG10 and NWRA_SEEP13 do not exist.  
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nodes that I generated or even the collections of them that developed.  I, therefore, returned to 
a more manual approach, physically cutting up larger sections of data and piling them 
together where there were affinities in opinions and form, rather than the specific detail of the 
content, which began to appear as anecdotal evidence to support the opinion proffered.  Thus, 
whilst Nvivo was helpful for data storage and management, I needed a way to analyse whole 
chunks of the data before drawing conclusions that related directly to the analytical 
framework set out above.   
 
This reaffirmed the position stated above, that qualitative research and interpretive research  
are not the same thing; Nvivo may well be the key analytical tool for more straightforward 
qualitative researcher, but an interpretive analysis requires more meaning to be drawn from 
the data.  I, therefore, explored a number of concepts to serve as an analytical toolkit, 
returning first to the theorist whose conceptual work led to the problematisation of the 
assemblies as site of „institutional ambiguity‟ in the first instance.  Maarten Hajer‟s work 
(1993, 2003, 2006) can be pieced together and have its implications drawn out to project a 
scene in which there opens a fissure in a battle for hegemony between discourses – that is the 
institutional void or site of institutional ambiguity – where actors produce and reproduce 
discourses, with their corresponding institutions, through or with some reference to pre-
existing institutions (whilst, given the ambiguity, allowing for a degree of creativity or space 
for the ideational).   
 
In developing this framework, Hajer introduces a number of other concepts: „discourse 
coalitions‟ to delineate groups of people; and „story lines‟ to specify the discursive 
construction being generated.  This is quite a collection of terms.  And there is a degree of 
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confusion that arises from Hajer‟s seemingly frequent conflation of terms.  In his key piece on 
discourse coalitions, which uses the conceptualization of and response to acid rain in Britain 
as a case study, Hajer appears to refer to ecomodernism as both a discourse and a story line 
interchangeably (1993, in particular pg. 61).  Perhaps ecomodernism is intentionally both a 
discourse and a story line, but earlier Hajer states that the story line is an entity „in which 
elements of the various discourses are combined into a more or less coherent whole‟ (1993: 
47, emphasis added).  Thus it is difficult to comprehend how the two terms relate, and so their 
analytic value is lost.   
 
In a similar way, the terms „discourse‟ and „discourse coalition‟ are also used interchangeably.  
This is more readily understandable than the synonymy above, given that they closely 
correspond.  Hajer defines a discourse coalition quite simply as „a group of actors who share a 
social construct‟ (1993: 45).  This „social construct‟ that the actors share is effectively the 
discourse that they are collected around (1993: 47), so the association is such that the terms 
could be used interchangeable.  Hajer details very little else about the coalition group, such as 
how actors might act within and between groups or even how they come into being.  Hence 
the reference to the discourse coalitions adds little more than discourse but, despite this lack 
of analytical precision, the concept of a group and group positions is important.  
Unfortunately, however, further confusion arises with the introduction of the term „frame‟ 
which is effectively another label for the social construct that actors in any one group share, 
and so this, too, appears to be used synonymously with discourse and discourse coalition. 
 
The concept of the „frame‟ is arguably superfluous to need within Hajer‟s framework.  The 
idea of framing may be useful, since this is what different discourse coalitions do to situations 
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and/or problems, which effectively separates them into their different groups.  But this refers 
to a process, one that can be relatively neutrally depicted, rather than to the concept of the 
„frame‟ per se, which is generally accompanied by an amount of theoretical baggage.  Frame 
analysis deals most explicitly with the notion of subject positions – that different sets of 
people might have different worldviews and from their perspectives (or frames) they engage 
in a process of sense-making (or framing) of situations.  Furthermore, the key advocates of 
frame analysis in the discipline of public policy, Martin Rein and Donald Schön, highlight the 
idea that there are „multiple social realities created by conflicting frames‟ and so „the 
participants disagree both with one another and also about the nature of their disagreements‟ 
(1993: 145).  Rein and Schön state that they use frame analysis to „deal with policy 
controversies in the absence of an agreed-upon basis for resolving them‟ (1993: 145), which 
echoes Hajer‟s institutional void or site of ambiguity.  And examples of frame research have 
explored epistemological shifts in the academy as consequences of framing processes (e.g. 
Brandwein, 2006; Rein and Schön, 1993: 148), thus revealing ambitious levels or scale of 
inference and abstraction, beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
However, the aim here is not to adopt wholesale a package of analysis, not only because the 
analytical framework for this project has already been drawn from the theory of constructivist 
institutionalism, but also because those packages of analysis are developed out of and bring 
with them their own theoretical backgrounds.  The aim here is to adopt and employ a set of 
concepts that help navigate the data and speak to the theoretical framework, just as Blyth 
(2002) does with „crisis‟ and Bevir and Rhodes do with „tradition‟ (2002).  Recognising and 
acknowledging the previous use of terms, as well as some of the previous haziness or overlap 
between them, is the first step in attempting to co-ordinate the meanings and potential 
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application or these terms to this research.  Indeed, this is an opportunity to alleviate some of 
the restrictiveness that can be felt through wholesale adoption of theory and method packages 
as well as the restriction in theoretical and/or methodological progress that is born of simply 
adding yet another case study example to an established block of work.  Clarifying 
relationships between terms and mapping out that understanding allows a degree of creativity 
in the process of building a conceptual machinery and research design. 
 
To this aim, then, the notion of frames can be quite useful to this research because frames 
delineate groups partly by the nature of their disagreements, as mentioned above.  Thus, there 
is something of an epistemic quality about frames, as they have been used by Brandwein 
(2006) and Rein and Schön (1993).  The frames represent the bounded worldviews of actors 
and mark out what can be known about issues.  Actors may be able to sympathise with others 
beyond their frames, but this would still be through their own lenses, so they would be 
interpretations of interpretations.  In this sense, the actors under analysis are no different from 
the researcher, aside from scale, subject or situation.   In effect, the frames represent the 
ontology of the actors involved in this rule-making process; they represent how the world is 
for the actors, which simultaneously involves the positioning of the self, which also 
simultaneously involves positioning others.  Relating specifically to this project, then, this 
concept enables an exploration of the different groups of actors – the councillors and the 
stakeholders – and their meanings relating to their situations, their understandings of each 
other and thus any reasoning behind any attempts at institutional design or change.  
 
The concept of frames locates something more fixed from which institutional design and/or 
change is fashioned and, thus, the idea of frames better captures this fixity of position, from 
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which the negotiation in the processes of institutional design/change is framed, but I also 
require a concept that involves or represents movement to reflect any institutional 
development.  Bevir and Rhodes suggest „we account for actions, practices and institutions by 
telling a story‟ (2002: 134).  Maynard-Moody and Musheno would agree, having argued that 
„[S]tories are told deliberately to communicate meaning and points of view‟ and that stories 
„describe events and exist within a historical moment‟ (2006: 320). Indeed, even Hajer points 
to the concepts of stories, as mentioned above.  Taking frames and stories could usefully 
enable an exploration into, first, the separate group positions in the assemblies and then the 
perspectives on institutional development from those viewpoints.  
 
The frames, to a large extent, are a given in the case of the regional assemblies, but the 
identification of a story requires an appreciation of the elements it contains to make it quite a 
specific format.  Essentially, a story needs a plot – there has to be a story to tell.  This is its 
distinctive feature.  But there are two points to further elaborate from this.  Firstly, a good plot 
has a drama at the heart of it.  This is not necessarily true, in that a story can be fairly 
straightforward and simply describe a process or event, but a good story, one that is worthy of 
repetition and becomes something that is shared, contains a dramatic hook.  This hook may 
usually be at the start of the story to capture the audience but it may also be in the middle as a 
hook from which to hang, connect or make sense of the other parts of the story, and equally 
the element of drama could be in the finale, perhaps more normally in the form of a punch-
line or a moral lesson.   
 
Secondly, and as already hinted at above as well as already implicit in the meaning of „plot‟, 
stories are distinguished by their specific format composed of beginning, middle and end.  
  
  
   
  
144 
 
There is a sequential pattern to a story, or a standard and familiar rhythm.  A story may not be 
told in that order, but it does contain those parts.  A story could, for example, be told 
„backwards‟ (if beginning to middle to end is taken as the normal, forward direction) but it 
would still eventually cover the initial contextualisation probably given in a beginning and it 
would certainly reach what is effectively the „main event‟ that is typically given in the middle 
of a story.  It is bringing these elements together that makes a cohesive whole, that gives a 
narrative a structure and a point, and that therefore gives a story a persuasive quality.  This 
persuasive quality is of central significance.  Although discreet, the story is an argumentative 
form.  Stories bring together information and (opinioned) explanations into a cohesive, and 
thus logical and convincing, package so as to be understandable and digestible for others.   
 
In relating these points back to a constructivist institutionalist analysis of institutional 
design/change, an amount of academic literature can be drawn upon.  Firstly, recall Mark 
Blyth‟s work (section 3.2) which highlights the element of drama in, specifically, the process 
of institutional design/change. Whilst the wider concept of story is not employed, Blyth 
argues that crises are constructed effectively as a first stage to institutional change.  The crisis 
is the dramatic impetus that lays the foundation for institutional change.  Thus it is persuasive 
and, even more discreetly but perceptibly, it is a beginning of a process, for which there will 
be a middle and an end.  Thomas Kaplan makes a case for the persuasive quality of the 
beginning-middle-end sequencing, arguing that stories in this way „make sense of complex 
situations occurring within an environment of conflicting values‟ (1993: 775).  
 
In, for example, an institutional design/change process (and, in particular, in an ambiguous 
environment with multiple actors), then, stories are the (mutually constitutive) process and 
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product of actors‟ sense-making; stories help actors navigate the process and render it 
meaningful, whilst also justifying and thus enabling institutional change along the trajectory 
portrayed in the story.  To relate this much more specifically to the process of institutional 
design/change, a set of notions can be employed to mirror beginning-middle-end: complaint, 
justification and aspiration.  This set of terms provide a heuristic device that corresponds to 
change, effectively hypothesising that in an effort to instigate and implement institutional 
design/change, an actor or a group of actors would complain about an element of their current 
situation, aspire to another and justify a movement from the former to the latter in the process 
of arguing for and pushing through that institutional change.  Of course, these would still 
represent parts of a story, and so there would be drama and contextual detailing, as well as a 
degree of floridity.  Indeed, this is what would make it a story that was persuasive in a 
discreet, subconscious way, rather than simply being an analytical case put forward for 
institutional design/change.    
 
 
4.3 Limitations, complexity and ongoing debates  
 
The previous section has set out the methods used in this research within a critical appraisal of 
why and how their employment makes sense to this interpretivist project.  As well as 
discussing the advantages of these methods in justifying their selection, their limitations have 
also been raised with reference to the underlying ontological and epistemological position to 
bring out the methodological concerns.  This is now discussed further, in order to be 
transparent about the difficulties and limitations of the position adopted and the project as a 
whole.  The central issue here is the uneasiness experienced in the balancing of the 
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philosophical work that is critical to a doctorate against the „real time,‟ policy-relevant work 
required by the collaborative component of the studentship.  The introductory chapter gives a 
flavour of the complexity that stemmed from the empirical setting of this particular CASE 
partnership.  This complexity, though, was not a limitation; there were advantages gained, 
such as of privileged access (even if my link to the ERN inferred a position that could 
potentially be misconstrued), and there were lessons learned, such as of experiencing an 
alternative policy research career route.  Overall, any obstacles were not insurmountable, but 
the CASE work added a dimension to the methodological considerations in that it induced 
what felt like a constant conflict, with the research pulling in two different directions.  
 
The (very sparse) literature available on the CASE projects notes the dilemmas experienced 
by students simultaneously managing academic and non-academic aims (Bell and Read 1998, 
Macmillan and Scott 2003).  This is not, or not only, about the pressure of additional 
workload, but of agendas that are not necessarily harmonious.  The non-academic work may 
have a commercial or a political interest, some element that may compromise the neutrality of 
the academic work.  As an interpretivist, certainly this latter point does not present particular 
difficulties, since interpretivism brings to the fore the impossibility of being entirely neutral 
due to a researcher‟s own „positionality‟ (returned to below).  But the difficulty lies in the 
external party‟s invariable desire for solid, objective knowledge.  Here, I could bemoan the 
marketisation of higher education and mourn some „golden age‟ of academic freedom and 
artistry where „impact‟ was not a concern, as well as quietly grumble about a positivist 
researcher‟s ability to, in their minds at least, meet that standard of objective knowledge, but 
actually this defensiveness reveals a deeper anxiety about the purpose of academic, especially 
interpretivist and especially public policy, research.  How can my understanding of the 
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understandings of those actors engaged in the West Midlands and North West RAs impact 
upon policy and practice relating to the regional assemblies and their stakeholders in general? 
 
This line of questioning stems from the issues raised above concerning generalisability and 
the case study method.  As I attempt an interpretivist analysis, generating context-specific 
understandings from case studies, how can I use my findings to contribute towards the CASE 
work of this project?  In future research more generally, how can interpretivist work deliver 
the aim of „impact‟ that is seemingly now a priority in British higher education?  This is a 
discernible concern in shades of interpretivists, though rarely addressed in those terms – it 
refers back to an age-old epistemological battle, perhaps the central dividing point, of 
understanding „versus‟ explanation.  Yanow summarises that 
 
„[E]xplanation (erklaren in German) was posited to be the method of the natural 
and physical sciences, understood to entail a description of concepts or objects or 
processes in terms of their antecedent causes, thereby leading to the discovery of 
universal, predictive laws....By contrast, understanding (verstehen), posited as the 
method of the human sciences, was seen as entailing making clear people‟s 
interpretations of their own and others‟ experiences, leading to the discovery of 
context-specific meaning‟ 
                        (2006: 10).   
 
Whilst this appears as a neat division, Yanow adds that „[V]erstehen, then, concerns human 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity as both subjects of and explanations for human action‟ 
(2006: 10), making the point that explanations are not absent in interpretivism but are held 
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within the understandings of meaning generated from the research, thus need not (indeed, 
should not be as they cannot be) be abstracted out and away from the findings to speak of 
phenomena more generally. 
 
However, Bevir and Rhodes, stimulating debate with their particular brand of interpretivist 
political analysis go further, stating that „we can still explain social action: we can do so by 
pointing to the conditional and volitional links between beliefs, desires, intentions and 
actions‟ (2002: 134).  They point to stories that account for institutions – „about how they 
came to be as they are and [...] and about how they are preserved‟ – and they steadfastly state 
that this is explanation, that the narratives generated through conducting interpretive research 
„are thus to political studies what theories are to the natural sciences‟ (2002: 134).  The crucial 
but controversial (between interpretivists, at least) point in their perspective is the narrative‟s 
link to objective knowledge – Bevir and Rhodes, building on Bevir‟s earlier work (1999), 
employ what they call „an anthropological concept of objectivity based on criteria of 
comparison‟ (2002: 139).  They believe it is possible to „judge one narrative better than 
another because it best meets such criteria as: accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency and 
opening new avenues of enquiry.  Objectivity arises from criticising and comparing rival 
webs of interpretation about agreed facts‟ (2002: 142).   They employ the concept of 
„tradition‟ to collect narratives that provide a perspective on a phenomenon.  But they then 
add that  
 
„the content of any tradition will vary with what we want to explain.  We will 
identify traditions according to our purposes, selecting one from the many because 
it best explains the actions and beliefs of the individual we are studying. [...] 
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[S]cholars construct traditions to answer the questions that interest them.  We 
judge the usefulness of such a construction by the evidence marshalled to show 
the links between the ideas over time and the ability to explain how beliefs 
change‟  
              (2002: 148). 
 
This grossly summarises Bevir and Rhodes‟ extensive body of developmental work towards 
their position, but they offer it within a textbook chapter that aims to set out the diversity 
within the interpretivist perspective.  What it (perhaps inadvertently) demonstrates is the 
persistent hold of one idea that is inescapable in interpretivism: while Bevir and Rhodes admit 
the researcher‟s selection of elements (as above), they return the researcher to the centre of 
the work.  It is the researcher‟s interpretation that is offered as research findings.  Rather than 
some objective reality, the researcher can only present their interpretation of the interpretation 
they have generated from the subjects of their research.  This is the „double hermeneutic.‟  
Marsh and Furlong explain this most simply – „the world is interpreted by the actors (one 
hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second 
hermeneutic level)‟ (2002: 19).  Jackson spells out what the double hermeneutic means – that 
the researcher is „never simply revealing the world “the way that is really is”‟ (2006: 267) and 
thus „a thorny methodological problem remains‟ (2006: 266).   
 
The consequences of this are that the data are necessarily affected by the researcher, as 
exemplified by Bevir and Rhodes‟ construction of traditions as well as by, within this project, 
my sliding scale of interview questioning from the more general to the more specific over the 
data collection period and my construction of the story structure in the data analysis.  Post-
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positivist perspectives (i.e. feminist and critical positions alongside interpretivism, e.g. 
Grasswick 2011, Sultana 2007) bring attention to the researcher‟s positionality – their 
relationship to what is being researched and the conditions of their subjectivity, such as age, 
ethnicity and gender – in a way that forever scuppers the myth of the objectively derived fact.  
All researchers bring an angle to their research in the social sciences, whether they recognise 
it or not.  The interpretivist researcher, then, can but be aware, transparent and reflexive about 
this.  My own positionality is brought to the fore from the outset, in my selection of and 
application to this CASE studentship focussed on stakeholders that previous research had 
found to be generally of a profile similar to my own (Aulakh et al. 2005) and in my constant 
search for conspiracy born of the critical „anti-establishment‟ element of my political leaning.  
 
This issue is presented here because it enables me to be transparent about the difficulties and 
potential limitations of this project, as this section sets out to do, but it also enables me to fix a 
position in relation to the interpretive work with case studies as well as with the CASE 
partnership.  The two case studies become a strategy by which to ensure reflexivity.  Working 
with the two cases enables a tracking back and forth (Bevir and Rhodes 2002, Jackson 2006), 
which in turn enables a critical analysis that attempts to ensure that I am not simply seeing 
what I want to see from the data.  This is set out over the following chapters.   
 
My strategy for the CASE work, however, was to separate it to some extent from the 
academic research (or certainly the more philosophical considerations) and then to tune in to 
the purpose of the ERN‟s agenda, access the local knowledge there available and re-present or 
rearticulate this alongside previous academic work that functioned as evidence.  This was the 
predetermined approach for my second policy paper produced for the ERN, which is attached 
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in the appendix (d) to demonstrate my attempt at doing this. It is perhaps the most successful 
because it came closest to achieving neutrality.  The first paper (on „The Roles and 
Contribution of Stakeholders‟) was developed in the thick of the SNR and thus simply 
advocatory on behalf of the stakeholders for their continued inclusion.  And the final piece of 
research (which did not develop into a paper due to its timing) was undertaken in the SNR 
aftermath following organisational changes that saw WMRA become the CASE partner or, 
more precisely, the West Midlands Local Government Association, given the imminent 
disbandment of the assembly, and thus the intended research aim effectively advocated on 
behalf of the local government position to streamline and distance the stakeholders.  Upon 
reflection, the attempt to separate the CASE work out proved a hindrance and left the research 
susceptible to capture by others‟ objectives, but to have presented even the early findings on 
institutional development including stakeholders would have been pointless to the policy-
world where the agenda had long since moved on in „real time.‟ 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The methodological considerations presented in this chapter show a journey of striking 
balances.  On the one hand, it is the methodological section of a project that brings to the fore 
the oft-neglected philosophy of (social) science that is at the core of academic research.  And 
on the other, there is an imperative to move beyond philosophical musings to physically 
conduct a programme of research. Perhaps some would see the return to philosophical 
considerations an unnecessary preoccupation, but it is the foundation of research because it 
addresses what can be known, relating back further to what is (or not).  If it is understood, as 
it is under interpretivist, that the collective meaning-making that enacts an institution cannot 
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be solidly, fixedly or physically known, then a method used to capture and measure it as such 
is pointless.  To summarise the argument in this chapter, it is not what method is used, but the 
way that it is used that is important.  So, researchers across the spectrum of epistemological 
positions can employ case studies as a method, but how this method is used – what happens 
within the case study, what can be drawn away from the study in terms of conclusion – 
depends on that position.  The way a method is used depends on what it is being used for, 
what the purpose of it is, what it can tell the researcher, which is all determined by the 
ontological/epistemological position upon which the research is founded.  
 
These questions are perhaps particularly difficult for the interpretivist researcher engaged in 
outward-facing, purpose-driven research that is typical in applied social sciences.  Taking a 
„purist‟ interpretive approach to the project would have entailed a more ethnographic, 
anthropological study that would not have generated any level of applicability.  In this way, 
the CASE component of this project presented something of a competing agenda, in that it 
required output that had impact and applicability to the regional assemblies in general.  But it 
also enabled a thorough consideration of these questions that need not have been so 
problematic for a researcher engaged in a wholly interpretive project and environment.  I 
have, therefore, taken as critical a stance towards the interpretivist position that I have 
declared myself aligned to from the outset, in order to grapple with some enduring issues for 
the developing researcher.  And so the research programme designed is a transparent 
settlement that constructs a theoretical framework and admits an increasing degree of control 
in the data collection process as the analysis takes shape, but employs interpretive conceptual 
tools relatively loosely to navigate the data and encourage constant critical reflexivity through 
the case studies that follow. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the primary research undertaken with actors engaged in the rule-making 
processes of the West Midlands Regional Assembly, in the institutional design and 
development of WMRA.  Beginning with a broad understanding of the West Midlands region, 
the positions of the groups of actors involved in these processes are then specified and 
understood.  In the first section, I give a general background of the region in order not to 
privilege context as an explanatory factor nor to impart an assumption that actors were not 
creating new institutions (and were only modifying old ones), but to broadly situate the actors 
involved.  The West Midlands region has a history (as, indeed, the other regions have) that is 
known to the most of the actors involved, even if not explicitly stated and only implicitly 
understood.  Indeed, this may not be personal knowledge or memory but may be inherent in a 
collective such as at organisation-, group- or sector-level.  
 
The information given aims to be as neutral as possible – to provide the undeniable „facts‟ or 
the parts of the background story that can broadly be agreed upon by all those involved – and 
as brief as possible, so as to simply introduce factors that may later be drawn upon by those 
actors while expressing their frames.  It is these frames that are key.  As has been explicated 
and emphasised throughout the thesis thus far, it is specifically the actors‟ perceptions of their 
contexts as they are used in institutional processes that is of interest.  In this chapter I use 
information gathered from a range of sources, though I concentrate primarily and heavily on 
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the data generated through semi-structured interviews with the people involved in institutional 
development in order to construct the group frames.  These roughly collect together and 
delineate the actors into their representative blocs – to local government, business and other 
stakeholders, in the following two sections.  These frames are then further explored in the 
final section of this chapter to explore attempts at institutional creation and change.  
 
 
5.1 The West Midlands region 
 
The „heart of England,‟17 the West Midlands region of the UK, is home and namesake to the 
first regional assembly under analysis in this thesis.  As the regional tourist board‟s 
promotional label suggests, the West Midlands is in the centre of the country.  Much of the 
landscape is rural countryside, made up of the counties of Herefordshire, Shropshire, 
Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire, which roughly encircle a central urban area.  
This, the West Midlands conurbation, was an area famous for its early and heavy 
industrialisation, the pollution from which gave the „Black Country‟ its name and identity.  
The Black Country lies to the north and west of Birmingham, England‟s second city and the 
region‟s first.  These two together with a number of smaller urban areas (Coventry, Solihull, 
Stoke-on-Trent) make up the West Midlands conurbation, which has historically been the 
„heartland of British manufacturing‟ (Coulson 1999: 82) facilitated by a network of national 
transport links (canal, rail and road).  The following figure presents a map of the region, with 
information about population density (of the region‟s approximately 5.3 million people 
[Ayres et al. 2002: 63]) that serves to demonstrate the urban pattern here described. 
                                                 
17
 Commonly cited, but taken from the tourist board: http://www.visitheartofengland.com/Default.aspx  
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Figure 5.1 The West Midlands region, showing urban settlement (Source: ONS 2011b)  
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The relatively simple and undisputed geography of the region is often recognised as a key 
explanatory factor in what is described as a long-standing tradition of collaborative working 
here (e.g. Ayres et al. 2002; Coulson 1999).  The region‟s principal city, Birmingham, has no 
competitor to its status and the region‟s administrative boundaries are equally obvious and 
entrenched.  Any tension tends to be focused on the rural-urban rivalry in the region, or rather 
on the greater attention the WM conurbation appears to receive over the rural hinterland in 
region-wide matters (a point revealed in interview data, below), though the careful 
management of its surroundings is arguably as strong an impetus for collaborative working as 
the region‟s driving economic hub.  For example, inter-authority relationships began to 
develop in the immediate post-war period to channel population overspill into towns rather 
than the „green belt‟ surrounding the WM conurbation (Mawson and Skelcher 1980) and, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, there was a renewed need to mediate the growing urban-rural disparities 
caused by a shift from secondary to tertiary industry and its subsequent effect on employment 
(and hence general population) patterns (Ayres et al. 2002). 
 
This gives some insight into the changing economic circumstances of the West Midlands 
region in relatively recent history.  As described earlier in this thesis, this story is typical of 
the national picture in that such changes raised enough concern over the increasingly 
noticeable disparities between and within regions so as to elicit a reaction from central 
Government in the form of Regional Economic Planning Boards (REPBs) and corresponding 
REP Councils.  In the West Midlands, there was an analogous local response, arguably in part 
to counter any excessive centralism in regional planning work, which thus saw the 
establishment of the West Midlands Planning Authorities Conference (WMPAC) in 1968 
(Painter 1972; Mawson and Skelcher 1980).  By 1981, WMPAC had met its demise and was 
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replaced by the West Midlands Forum of County Councils, which included the recently 
established West Midlands Metropolitan County Council following the local government 
reorganisation of 1974, and later included the region‟s district councils, becoming the WM 
Forum of Local Authorities (both versions referred to as WMRF) (Ayres et al. 2002).   
 
Other initiatives were then developed, namely the West Midlands Regional Economic 
Consortium (WMREC) and the West Midlands Industrial Development Association 
(WMIDA).  This brings a number of points to light.  Firstly, that regional economic 
stakeholders were part of and encouraged to participate in these organisations: representatives 
from the regional Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Trade Union Congress (TUC) and 
Chambers of Commerce were part of WMREC.  Individuals from such organisations had 
been members of the WM Economic Planning Council before WMREC, though these were 
appointed by central Government, rather than having been called to action locally (Lindley 
1982). For WMREC, it was the Forum that took the lead on stakeholder engagement, and this 
was reflected in the organisational set-up with WMRF‟s Director becoming Executive 
Director of WMREC, too (BERR 2009).  Also, these WM initiatives, from WMPAC through 
to WMREC, were supported by a locally-resourced team of officers.  This core, the West 
Midlands Regional Study (WMRS), provided a foundation to regional work through reporting 
research and developing strategy (Ayers et al. 2002). 
 
Clearly, the local authorities in this region had developed a practice of collaborating with each 
other as well as with stakeholders.  And these moves were locally led, since the Conservative 
Government in control during the 1980s was particularly and openly negative about regional 
strategic planning (Hall 2007: 22; Wannop 1995: 19).  As such, the metropolitan county 
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councils that had been introduced by the previous Labour Government were abolished in 
1986, and the regionalist agenda had followed Labour into opposition, where it was 
developed and resurfaced in the late 1990s.  In the West Midlands, though the conurbation‟s 
county council was one of those dismantled, the nascent regional structures that had become 
established organically continued to develop (WMRF and WMREC) and regional work here 
persevered to a considerable extent.  
 
It is from this point that the primary research of this thesis becomes significant.  It is the 
period of, or second wave of, regionalism in the late 1990s with its establishment of the 
regional development agencies and assemblies that is of concern here, indeed even more 
specifically the latter bodies.  There is, of course, a significant amount of literature on this 
period, on the assemblies in general and on the prospect of them being a route or step towards 
directly elected regional government but there is, it must be acknowledged, an amount of 
research on specifically the West Midlands region in this period.  The work here tends to be 
region-wide, exploring the legacy of metropolitan governance or different regional 
organisations
18
 and their relationships (e.g. Norris 2001; Whitehead 2003), or policy-focused 
(e.g. Ayres and Pearce 2004 on transport).  This thesis, however, requires research focused 
not on the region as a whole but closer to one component part and further inside that part, so 
not on the regional organisations nor the regional assembly but on the rule-making inside the 
assembly.  This thesis takes advantage of this formative period of RA-building as an 
opportunity to explore how rules are made between partners.  Setting the scene with an 
organisational chart (in the following figure), the primary data provide the detail of the set-up. 
                                                 
18
 I.e. mainly the West Midlands Regional Development Agency (WMRDA, called Advantage West Midlands 
(AWM)), the Government Office West Midlands (GOWM, part of the network of offices set up for the 
government departments‟ presence in the region) and the West Midlands Regional Assembly (WMRA). 
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Figure 5.2 WMRA organisational chart (Source: author‟s primary research) 
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5.2 Local government‟s association: natural home and host 
 
The local government section or „house‟ (as the groupings are commonly referred to in the 
West Midlands) of the regional assembly, perhaps more than any other, has to be understood 
with direct and frequent reference to its temporal and geographical context.  As the inclusion 
of the preceding section of this chapter serves to indicate, the development of the regional 
assembly is inextricably linked to the (ongoing changes) in local government in the decades 
before.  To a large extent this connection is obvious, however it need not have been.  Looking 
at the regionalist project in isolation, there is nothing necessarily to link regional assembly 
members to local government councillors; if the projected end goal of directly elected 
regional assemblies were to have materialised, it was merely supposed that some (perhaps the 
younger, more careerist) local councillors would have put themselves up for election to 
assembly seats.  The detail of this was never finalised because the aim was always not to 
prescribe the assemblies, but to allow for them as each region wished.  
 
Specifically in the West Midlands, the desire for directly elected status was never advocated 
by more than a handful of devotees , thus the West Midlands was on „track 1‟ of the 
regionalism project, i.e. with no plans for neither directly elected status nor even a referendum 
on the issue (Ayres and Pearce 2004: 232).  It is in these circumstances that the construction 
of the regional assembly was quickly taken on board by local government in the very early 
stages of development.  It was widely accepted (within this section) that „...as there was no 
other particularly strong regional organisation at the time in the West Midlands, it really did 
fall to the LGA to get things going‟ (WMRA_PS02) and that  
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„the LGA was probably the only organisation that could have done this, other than 
the Government Office, but I don‟t think they were keen to do it, although they 
were involved obviously in the process on behalf of government, so the LGA, I 
think, was a natural body to do the consultations and to actually provide the home 
for the Assembly‟ 
(WMRA_PS03). 
 
As the latter quotation makes clear, local government was seen as the only and obvious choice 
from which to conduct the business of recruiting other participants to the newly capacitated 
regional policy-making process. It was perceived and described as an established unit, both by 
itself and others, and perpetuated that view.  The term „natural‟ was a repeated descriptor in 
these interviews, clearly as an attempt to justify the local government‟s prominent position, 
for example „local government was acknowledged as the key area of interest; it was 
considered natural that local government would be the primary interest group in the new 
arrangement‟ (WMRA_PS03).  As one respondent explained, 
 „it was the natural home, because we had very quickly established a coherent 
voice into central government, but I have to say that central government itself 
chose to liaise with local authorities in the main, as there was a very obvious 
democratic link back to the population‟  
(WMRA_PS06), 
 and as another justified,  
„the LGA was the host, I think is the right way of describing it, the host 
organisation for the regional assembly, which obviously didn‟t have any 
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government funding in the first instance, so obviously any support that was 
provided in terms of secretariat and costs had to be through the LGA‟  
(WMRA_PS03). 
 
From this series of extracts a number of things are of note.  Firstly, the local government 
section‟s link to democracy became an obvious theme and a repeated justification in these 
interviews, and something that was also brought up by other (stakeholder) interviewees, 
although frequently with critical reflection that pointed out the tenuity of the link (which will 
be further detailed in the sections below).  Secondly, it is by now clear that participants used 
interchangeably references to local government with the LGA – the local government 
association.  The LGA was a relatively young body, having been set up over the two years 
preceding the set up of the regional assembly, but its establishment symbolically formalised 
years of collaboration that had already been taking place between the individual councils. 
And, arguably, it was an evolutionary product of wider-scale local government working that 
had occurred in the region under the remit of the West Midlands County Council before its 
abolition as well as in the guise of the West Midlands Regional Economic Consortium. 
 
Local government, therefore, positioned itself as the lead in constructing the regional 
assembly, with a kind of parental authority: „...it was the LGA that actually bank rolled the 
Assembly, because there was no government funding at all, so it was very much seen as 
almost a sub set of the regional LGA‟ (WMRA_PS03).  Indeed, funding aside, it was simply 
understood as a duty: recounting it as general history, a respondent said that „one of the first 
major jobs of the regional LGA was to steer the process of creating the assembly‟ 
(WMRA_PS03); and another described how „the LGA constructed this thing...because it was 
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our role – this government gave us the job.  It didn‟t dictate how we should do it.  They said 
come together in your own way‟ (WMRA_PS04).  This latter quotation clearly demonstrates 
the lack of time spent questioning who would undertake the role of constructing the assembly, 
which was considered obvious in relation to the question of how this would be done. 
 
The „how‟ question was less straightforward.  And this directs us back to the third point of 
note revealed in the early set of quotations given above: an interviewee attributed the almost 
automatic or unconscious acceptability of the local government lead to the fact that it had 
„quickly established a coherent voice‟ (WMRA_PS06, emphasis here added), thereby 
indicating that this position not only had to be forged but also that it was not naturally 
coherent at the outset.  As the LGA established itself as an umbrella body for the local 
councils in the regional area, the diversity of local government came to the fore.  It had to 
manage this diversity in constructing workable governance structures, and this process was 
reflected in and transferred across to deliberation over the nascent regional assembly.  Thus, 
local government had to be reconceptualized as the constituency from which representatives 
had to be drawn, which brought up issues of representativeness, parity and weighted voting.  
 
One interviewee prompted a reminder of the party political dimension of the project:  
„You've also got to remember, we brought into that process, as local government, 
our own stresses and strains, because you had a direct political position on some 
of these things: Labour, for instance, incredibly enthusiastic; the Conservatives, 
initially quite hostile; and the Lib Dems critical but supportive‟ 
(WMRA_PS06). 
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This is perhaps an obvious potential point of contention, bearing in mind the lack of direct 
vote to the assembly, and highlights the settlements that had to be arranged:   
„We said that they should send delegates based upon or representatives based 
upon the political strengths, so you know, Labour might have 8 and Conservative 
6 and the Liberal Democrats 2, so you didn‟t take... – there was a tradition in the 
past of the governing party taking everything, but we said, no, this is, what we 
want is consensus all the way through and that's the way it operated‟  
     (WMRA_PS04). 
 
There were yet more balances to be achieved, relating to population size as well as council 
type given the existence of two tiers of local government in parts of the region, as the 
following interview extract explains: 
„There is a perception of the West Midlands from those outside that the West 
Midlands is Birmingham-plus and, obviously, the region is much more diverse 
than that both in terms of rural and urban mix, but its context was to create a 
coherent voice representing, in a sense, the diversity of, say, Birmingham city 
with over a million population and right at the other end of the scale, Bridgnorth 
District Council, with a population of around 34,000, which again, put in context, 
is less people than Birmingham employs and obviously is a much more rural 
based agenda‟ 
(WMRA_PS06).   
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Bringing all these dimensions together with the physical, numerical considerations of the 
regional assembly, the difficulties rising from this key issue of balance that local government 
faced can be appreciated: 
„Okay, if we‟re setting the assembly up and 70% of the members are going to be 
local government – well, what does that mean?  We have, had 38 local authorities 
at the time, some of them are tiny, and then we‟ve got the largest local authority in 
Europe in Birmingham.  So, when the LGA was set up, it had to find some sort of 
voting structure that accommodated big Birmingham and tiny Bridgnorth, which 
it did through proportional voting-, weighted voting, as they call it and that work 
that was done then, to set up the voting and the governance for the LGA just, sort 
of, transferred into the assembly, if you like.  Through a bit of, sort of, jiggery 
pokery, we got the 38 local authorities to become, what was it, I think it was 
something like-, I don‟t think they actually got 100 on the assembly, I think we 
were round about 70 odd with 70% of those numbers made up of local 
government.  There was some clever template established for how local 
government was able to be represented in the assembly‟ 
(WMRA_PS02). 
 
However despite constructing a fairly sophisticated voting system, the local government 
section was keen to stress that it rarely had need of it, that issues came to a vote as a last resort 
and that it is actually „not necessary, but the politicians want the comfort of having a system 
in place...interestingly enough, the politics of the region – I‟ve seen it swing from absolutely 
Labour dominated to now Conservative dominated – and there‟s never really been political 
fall-outs at all‟ (WMRA_PS02).  It was a common observation of councillors that „when they 
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work on regional levels, they manage to put their politics aside‟ (WMRA_PS02).  Instead, 
„it‟s us against the world or London or the South East, or whatever, you know – there‟s a 
unity around the West Midlands issues that brings them together and party politics just don‟t 
seem to count‟ (WMRA_PS02).  And this sentiment was repeated: that „the idea was to give a 
coherent voice, both towards London...and also into Europe‟ (WMRA_PS06); and that „your 
first and foremost priority is the good of your region, and that‟s what it‟s about‟ 
(WMRA_PS04). 
 
Following this, the next major issue or task the local government section faced was to 
separate as much as possible the identities of the LGA and the regional assembly.  The fact 
that the LGA financed the regional assembly in the early stages is a point that is regularly 
mentioned, as some of the data already presented above serve to demonstrate, but it is 
important to note that these bodies also shared accommodation and staff, therefore making the 
two virtually indistinguishable.  Thus, there ensued what was described as a „philosophical 
discussion‟ (WMRA_PS03) about whether and to what extent to separate the assembly from 
the LGA, which related back to and, for some, revived considerations about the purpose and 
the end-point of the regionalism project.  Given that in the West Midlands there were but a 
few, a „core group‟ (WMRA_PS03), of councillors that advocated a separate, formalised 
governmental body for the region, a „co-ordinated overlap model‟ (WMRA_PS03) won out. 
 
What is of greater import here, however, is not the end-point but rather the observation that 
the WM secretariat acted as the „engine room‟ (WMRA_PS06) for this and the above 
consultative processes. Interview data highlight the significant role of staff alongside the „core 
group‟ councillors in the deciphering the detail of what transpired from discussions, which 
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effectively contributed towards institutional design.  Particularly in relation to the allocation 
of numbers of seats, the relative haziness of recollections from most peoples‟ perspectives 
(for example, the „jiggery pokery‟ referred to above that led to „some clever template‟ 
[WMRA_PS02]) indicates that this was seen as something of a technocratic issue, which was 
largely left to certain, albeit the more senior, professionals to realise.  Specific individuals 
were regularly named and credited for recruiting representatives and arranging their seating 
allocations, for example one was described as having „a very friendly, open, Cockney barrow 
boy style about him‟ (WMRA_PS02), and was  
„able to have all sorts of conversations in corridors to get people on board and 
help them to get over any difficulties they might have in terms of being part of the 
assembly, bringing them on and making them see the real importance of the 
assembly.  He was a real charmer, which was very useful for the LGA at that 
point in time...very, very useful‟ 
(WMRA_PS02). 
 
The engineering theme stretched into the organisation of stakeholders which were to sit 
alongside local government.  Or, as one interviewee corrected, they „had to earn that kind of 
trust that we were the brokers of something, rather than the engineers‟ (WMRA_PS06).  
Whether they were engineers or brokers adds little to the main point here, that the local 
government respondents inadvertently reported playing a significant role in the construction 
of the other sections of the regional assembly‟s composition when asked to describe those 
other sections from their perspective.  There is a notable repetition of the phrase „the right 
kind of people‟ when describing the consultation process, or what was effectively a 
recruitment drive.  For example, one interviewee brought up governmental agencies: 
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„the Highways Agency was miffed it was never involved or never invited to be 
involved, but it just couldn‟t be, and the Environmental Agency as well.  They 
saw themselves as being experts on environmental issues and were very peeved 
really that the NGO environmental groups were involved‟ 
(WMRA_PS02). 
Explaining the choice, the same interviewee said „they weren‟t the right organisation, they 
were already connected,‟ and such organisations were channelled into the thematic 
partnerships that later developed. 
 
In a similar vein, as part of that consultation process, the LGA helped to position the social 
and environmental partners, broadly the „third sector,‟ or the other stakeholder group (OSG) 
as it was known in the West Midlands.  Summarising the situation, one interviewee described 
how  
„getting the third sector to come together was, in itself, quite a task, because again, 
they were a very disparate group, but again, I think one of the strengths of the 
Assembly was that it actually was one of the drivers that actually brought them 
together and helped to create that concept of the third sector, whereas prior to that, 
there‟d been lots of little organisations that were, sort of, competing with one 
another‟  
(WMRA_PS04). 
 
Those key „engineers‟ „asked local government to provide us with all the organisations they 
do business with‟ and generated „a list of usual suspects,‟ then they „sat down as local 
government‟ to undertake the „massive project‟ involving „many hours of painstaking 
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analysis‟ (WMRA_PS06).  The local government house (or, rather, those specific individuals) 
„had to ask some difficult questions about who was marginalised in terms of a voice in 
regional activity‟ because „what we didn‟t want to do was to set right into a process of 
backsides on...or of seats of boards‟ (WMRA_PS06). 
 
One interviewee‟s reflection on the sector and the process of organising it provides an insight 
into the difficulties faced: 
„My analysis is it‟s not a sector, it‟s a whole disparate group of people, some 
involved in single issue matters and some covering a much broader range. Then 
you have areas like the police services, because they‟re not part of the local 
government function; you have some obvious candidates like public health, which 
does have a connectivity in some areas with local government; you have a very 
strange range of education...so there are a whole series of groups, but people like 
parish councils – do they belong in the local government strategy? They certainly 
didn‟t belong to the West Mids LGA, because ours was based on local authority 
boundaries, but they are part of a community interest...and so there are a whole 
group of organisations going back to this great big organisation known as the 
voluntary sector...‟ 
(WMRA_PS06). 
 
Thus, local government seemed to play the role of a (sometimes exasperated) parent to the 
OSG.  It perceived itself as nurturing the sector, coaxing it into being, and in charge by 
default rather than purposefully exerting its dominance.  Indeed, it was keen to assert that „the 
key, for us, was to emphasise that we were trying to build an organisation not from the top 
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down, but from the bottom up‟ (WMRA_PS06).  Indeed, they „wanted to challenge some old 
concepts and so it was a painstaking process of finding how...who were the players‟ 
(WMRA_PS06).  But within these statements there is a degree of irony, particularly given 
that local government also asserted, with increasing regularity throughout the life (and the 
death) of the regional assembly, that the sector „requires structural change...[and] also requires 
a mindset change‟ (WMRA_PS06), thereby reaffirming its authority.  
 
In comparison, local government saw the business stakeholder group as more established, 
better organised and, implicitly, more effective.  One interviewee attributed this, in part, to the 
relatively long-standing relationship between local government and business in the region: 
„I think it‟s always been, there was a history in this region, I‟m just trying to 
think...When [there was] a Regional Forum of Local Authorities, which was one 
of the bodies that was in existence before the LGA and Assemblies were created, 
they used to have a body called the Regional Economic Consortium, which I 
think, you know, if you look at it, was a very, although much more limited, it was 
a very early version of the Regional Chamber, because it was obviously to do with 
the Forum of Local Authorities, it met with the Director of Government Office, 
the TUC regional body and business interest, so there was a, kind of, history of 
business being involved in some regional policy discussions.  There were very 
concerned with, mainly concerned with obviously transport and economic 
planning and so forth, so I think business has always had in the West Midlands, 
well not always, but for quite a long time, business has had a, kind of, regional 
role, involvement, which in the Assembly, if you transfer that into the Assembly, 
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business interests wouldn‟t see themselves as part of a wider other stakeholder 
group‟ 
(WMRA_PS03).  
 
Other interviewees‟ accounts from the local government frame concurred with this, although 
the infrequency of this story, particularly given the industrial dominance in the history of the 
region, is of note.  As is the perceptible hesitancy with which this extract is delivered.  The 
final clause of the quotation provides a clue to the reticence: the involvement of business is 
being positioned against the other stakeholder group, revealing the relative strength of the 
business group, drawn from a longer history of collaborative working (which perhaps became 
a source of embarrassment during an interview that asked about both sets of stakeholder 
groups and their involvement). 
 
A point of evidence the local government section appeared to give more eagerly concerned 
the business section‟s relatively recent history, surrounding the development of the Regional 
Development Agency and its business engagement (or lack thereof).  As explained: 
„...whilst the RDAs have always been presented as the business organisations in 
the region, to get onto them you had to be appointed.  You couldn‟t just nominate 
yourself or [have] somebody nominate you. So, in actual fact, the business 
organisations didn‟t feel properly part of AWM but they felt that they could get 
into the assembly and yield some influence there‟ 
(WMRA_PS02). 
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This highlights local government‟s perception of the business group‟s attitude – that business 
organised itself to become a significant player in the regional policy-making process, 
regrouped and strengthened after an initial snub by the RDA.  And, in making such points, 
comparisons with the OSG continued: 
„The business community were always reasonably well co-ordinated in arguing 
for their seats on the assembly.  They were, you know, almost pitching in at the 
very early stages to make sure they got a voice, whereas the other stakeholders, 
we had to round them up a bit and you, know, persuade some of them of the 
virtues of the assembly and their role in taking part‟ 
(WMRA_PS02). 
 
The local government section‟s comparisons of the business group and the OSG positions 
extended into an appraisal of their resource differential; or rather the relative weakness of the 
OSG was implicated by an understanding of the business group advantage.  It was recognised 
that the business section was able to raise its own funds through members‟ subscriptions, in 
addition to the financial support it received from AWM (whereas, by contrast, whilst the OSG 
received support from WMRA, it could not supplement this with subscriptions from its 
sector).  The business sector also benefitted from the relative luxury of time, with local 
government noting that „the representatives that came through into the [West Midlands 
Business] Council...tended to be retired businessmen, who did have a bit more time to offer‟ 
(WMRA_PS02), again in contrast to the OSG‟s already stretched members. 
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5.3 The business stakeholders...and the others 
 
Turning directly to the stakeholders, the business section agreed that it had a relative 
advantage.  Indeed, it was instrumental in promoting this view of its position and concealing, 
or at least downplaying, its weaknesses.  Although only rarely mentioned in passing, the 
business section recognised (and „recognised‟ because initially observed in non-business 
interviews) that „actually making sure [we] had enough people to fill our seats was [our] 
biggest issue‟ (WMRA_BG05).  Quizzed on the matter, respondents pointed out, for example, 
that „it‟s very difficult for businesses to turn up to a monthly meeting that lasts all day during 
the day and they‟ve got a business to operate, you know, who‟s going to look after the shop?‟ 
(WMRA_BG04).  Pressed further, one interviewee revealed the implications of this on the 
business group composition: 
„...they‟ve always got other things to do...they‟re only doing it out of a sense of 
social commitment, no financial benefit, and when they‟re not here [i.e. their 
place of work], they‟re not making money for their business...so you get retired 
people who would play that role...but active business people, which is what we 
desperately need, they don‟t function well in that arena‟  
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
Probing the matter, it became clearer that there was an underlying, hushed opinion that the 
RDA board was the more coveted position for the „cream of the crop‟ of the business 
community to be in.  As one business interviewee tried to explain, business „thought the RDA 
was going to be far more powerful and influential‟ and a few loaded but evasive sentences 
later that same interviewee admitted: 
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„I mean, the mission at one point was to get somebody, one of us from 
[organisation‟s name]... onto the first board of the RDA.  We got very close, but 
we came down to 13, and they needed 12, and they had to get the balance, so...it 
was between me and a politician, and the politician was also a business person, so 
they appointed him, rather than me‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
The points in this and the above quotation are rarely made explicit, but they are fundamental 
in understanding the position of the business group because it is from these early losses that 
business built its defence. 
 
As the business group developed its position, it emphasised its worth and its democratic 
credentials initially against the RDA, for example: 
„Now the Government says, well, you know, AWM is the business led 
organisation.  Well, ummm, yes.  Yes, it‟s true that the board of Advantage West 
Midlands are people that are business people by and large, but they‟re always 
taken on as individuals – they never seem to take on business organisation 
representatives.  I think there‟s a reason for that and it‟s probably in the way that 
their constitution is drafted or whatever...‟ 
(WMRA_BG04). 
 
The frustration is clear from this almost childish argumentation, in which the interviewee 
seemingly brushes aside the common knowledge that the RDAs were intended to be 
populated by individual business representatives (rather than business organisation 
representatives) with „or whatever.‟  And the relative hostility continues when the RDA‟s 
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funding of the business group‟s secretariat organisation, the West Midlands Business Council, 
comes under question: 
„...with the fact that [some] saw the Business Council as 80% funded by AWM – 
it must be AWM‟s poodle, it‟s not democratic, it‟s not this, that and the other.  
Now, I would say it‟s actually as democratic as any business organisation can be 
that brings together any forum for a lot of groups, because every member on the 
board of the Business Council is elected by their members that are part of it.  It is 
true that 80% of the funding comes from Advantage West Midlands, but if you 
look back at the consultations and the submission from the Business Council, they 
pull no punches where AWM is.  If they‟re criticising them, they criticise them‟ 
(WMRA_BG04). 
 
 
The same respondent reiterates only moments later that „...there is an element of democracy 
there, in as much as the representatives that are sent are chosen by the organisations that they 
represent.  There‟s no shoe-ins, there‟s no automatics‟ (WMRA_BG04).  Here, the focus has 
shifted from the business group‟s standing with regards to the development agency to the 
business group‟s standing with regards to the regional assembly.  Another interviewee, in a 
similar tone to that above, highlights the opinion that the business group was even more 
democratic than the local government section due to its stronger link back to its constituency: 
„local authority people are only there to govern the people – they‟re not there to 
tell us what to think and if business, who are employing all these people, are 
saying this is our views on this issue and we‟ve taken the trouble to consult, which 
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is more than they have, they don‟t consult, they sit there with their prejudices 
from their different political streams, whereas we were consultants‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
The business section developed its position, promoting its strengths and presenting itself as 
playing an essential part of the regional policy-making structure.  Whilst listing organisations 
involved in the Business Council, one stakeholder used the Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors to give a tangible example of the value of such engagement in decision-making 
processes relating specifically to the planning aspect of the regional assembly‟s work, 
describing it as:  
„...really useful when you‟re responding to things like [...] the Spatial Strategy, 
because so much of what those organisations do are highly connected with 
housing issues, which makes the Business Council very strong because they can 
pull on that expertise.  We can draw out things to do with the house building 
figures when we‟re been lobbying against those and supporting many of our 
Councils in their stance too, because we‟ve got connections to the ceramics 
industry, the aggregates industries and things like that [...] I mean, they know how 
much you can dig out of the ground and where you can get your bricks from...‟ 
(WMRA_BG04). 
 
Further emphasising the value of this engagement by relating it specifically to what became a 
fairly controversial issue in the West Midlands, the interviewee added: 
„The big, sort of, fly in everybody‟s ointment on the policy with the housing 
numbers is that we‟ve never ever built the numbers per year, even in the big house 
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building years of the fifties and sixties, that the Government want us to build now 
and the aggregates industries are just not geared up.  They‟ve actually – brick 
factories across the UK are actually closing because of the down-turn in the 
construction industry at the moment.  So when it picks up again and they want to 
suddenly start rebuilding all these houses again, there‟s going to be a shortage of 
bricks that‟s going to push prices up.  They‟re going to have to import them and, 
you know – it‟s these sorts of policies that just haven‟t been considered and the 
Business Council is very good for bringing in those trade expertise‟ 
(WMRA_BG04).  
 
The data from the business section are full of, if not such detailed and demonstrative 
examples, regular assertions of the benefit of business inclusion.  And what is also apparent, 
in the quotation presented above as well as in others, is the frequency of references to the 
Business Council, rather than to the business group or business section or house of the 
Assembly.  Identifying themselves in this way effectively allowed the business stakeholders 
to be a collective before reaching the assembly, rather than being brought together due to their 
relative affinity within the assembly.  In this way business presented itself, whether 
consciously or not, as a cohesive whole.   
 
This was perhaps not too difficult given the common understanding or assumption that all 
business would have a generally capitalist agenda.  Yet, these stakeholders were keen to point 
out the diversity within their sector in the region:  
„If you look at Shropshire, Hereford and Worcestershire, it‟s mostly rural 
businesses, not entirely, but predominantly. If look at Warwickshire and 
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Coventry, I would say there‟s a significantly high proportion of professional 
services, the creatives, the marketing people, the business consultants, the IT 
specialists and things like that and then for Staffs and West Mids, then it‟s 
manufacturing‟ 
(WMRA_BG04).  
Alongside points like this, there are remarks in the data about the different scales of business, 
and the potential differences in perspective that this can cause, for example this interviewee 
opined „as a general rule, I tend to say that what actually works for small business usually 
works for big business [...].  It doesn‟t go the other way round‟ (WMRA_BG04).  Thus, 
business seemed to want to emphasise the variety of positions within this section. 
 
These internal differences are perhaps exaggerated, particularly compared to the other houses 
of the regional assembly composition.  But it is through highlighting its diversity that business 
built a stronger case for its inclusion and its value.  The business group accentuated its 
potential difficulties (i.e. as could have arisen from their differences) and then praised itself 
for having overcome them, for having learned to be more effective by speaking with a unified 
voice in the regional process and structure despite the internal differences.  The business data 
is littered with comments about the coming together of these stakeholders and their becoming 
organised, and they are explicit about this point, for example one respondent stated simply: 
„we would have pre-meetings and we made sure people were briefed; we‟d understand what 
our position was and we would then be far more effective in our performance at the Regional 
Assembly‟ (WMRA_BG05).  And organising under or as the Business Council was a 
significant factor in creating that unity, as is made clear by the following quotation:  
  
  
   
  
179 
 
„I think we do find some obvious areas of common ground.  We will never agree 
100% on the finer details.  I think that, you know, would be understandable – you 
could never get any group of people, no matter what they were doing, to agree 
100% of the time, but [that‟s] what the Business Council does – it looks at those 
broader areas‟ 
(WMRA_BG01). 
Therefore, what developed was a position that came to be described as „a business-type view 
– a very pragmatic one‟ (WMRA_BG01).  
 
Indeed, there were instances in the data from the business section which demonstrated that 
some of these stakeholders perceived business to have a greater influence in assembly 
proceedings than the local government section.  Comparative reflections often began with a 
fairly hostile view of local government, predictably attempting to deflect or counter 
arguments regarding democracy, for example one business member gave a flurried and 
incensed complaint about how „the local authority people tend not to...because they say, 
where‟s our electorate, where‟s our, you know, they‟ve been elected, we haven‟t, we‟re 
unelected people trying to influence policy...‟ (WMRA_BG05).  And, in a similar tone, the 
same interviewee implied that business undoubtedly occupied the privileged position in their 
collective hierarchy, with „...well, business won‟t turn up unless it thinks it‟s going to get 
some influence.  Why would you do that? You‟d rather play golf‟ (WMRA_BG05).  
 
This view, however, did gradually become more moderated, even within a single stream of 
response, such as in the following extract: 
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„We were far more effective than local government because we focussed.  So I 
think we were really quite effective, because local authority were not as organised 
as us.  We gained a huge amount of respect from the local authority by being 
prepared to engage, because previously businesses only really sniped at local 
authorities.  Business is really good at complaining but it‟s not so good about 
stepping up and trying to help and actually, I mean, local authorities are desperate 
to have involvement from business people, so we gained a huge amount of respect 
from them...‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
Mellowing yet further and arriving at a stance that became the typical business opinion of the 
regional assembly over the years, the same interviewee added „councillors are prepared to 
listen to business people. [...] Now we‟re in dialogue, instead of fighting each other through 
the newspapers...‟ (WMRA_BG05).  Though there remains a slight bias, overall the position 
is one of mutual respect.  Or rather, business believed that the local government section 
viewed business with mutual respect.  There is, unconsciously, a degree of ambivalence here, 
because business felt triumphant for having persuaded local government of its value (thereby 
holding its own position in higher regard), and yet that triumph felt in having earned such 
respect effectively means that business at the same time privileged the local government 
position over its own. 
 
With regards to its relationship with the other stakeholder group, the business section‟s 
perspective is much more straightforward.  The perhaps surprising point of interest here is the 
relative kinship business felt towards the OSG.  A number of business stakeholders drew 
  
  
   
  
181 
 
attention to the social or community aspects of their work.  For example, one interviewee 
described how they perceived themselves to be  
„almost the bridging gap between social community and the big hard-nosed, big 
multi-national corporate because, you know, a small business is at the heart very 
often of a community.  If you don‟t have a shop that sells your milk and your eggs 
and your bread, you know, those places end up being very soulless.  You need 
pubs, you need your local tradesmen, not least because they often provide jobs for 
people as well, but again...  It‟s like the post offices – if you haven‟t actually got a 
post office in a village or in a particular urban area, the soul goes out of it very 
often, you‟ve got no focal point, no centre and you‟ve got no practical way of 
getting a level of services to happen in the community‟ 
(WMRA_BG04). 
It was this kind of sentiment that was behind such passing comments as „there‟s never a 
conflict with me with the third sector – they would see me as a friend, absolutely would‟ 
(WMRA_BG05) and „I had very good links with the third sector because, you know, they 
actually see me as part of them‟ (WMRA_BG02). 
 
This empathy, however, did invariably turn into frustration and distanced the two groups 
when business drew comparisons and contrasted the different stakeholders‟ engagement in 
assembly business.  The following respondent, for example, begins with some degree of 
understanding, reflecting that  
„it‟s very hard to know what the third sector is [...] because they would not allow 
anybody really in the third sector to speak on their behalf, because they‟ve got too 
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many voices, whereas business were prepare to accept, in a business type sense, 
that we would distil all the points of view and focus on the key issues‟ 
(WMRA_BG05), 
but this interviewee then concluded that business people „don‟t have the time for all the fluffy 
stuff‟ (WMRA_BG05).  The following quotation explains the position more fully: 
„Regional Action West Midlands at the time had one or two strong players, but 
they would constantly say we can‟t give a view because our membership isn‟t as 
one on these things.  I think the idea was right for them, but... [...]  They‟re not as 
organised as business, it‟s not their way of doing things, they‟re far more 
consensual.  Whereas there are times [...] where we had to make it clear – this is 
what matters to us, so we‟ll play on your agenda, as long as you‟ll support us on 
ours and, as long as you‟re clear, then you have a chance of getting something.  
You can‟t just say we‟d like peace and light for everybody.  What we want to say 
is, we want our top transport priorities focussed into your plans please and if not, 
we want to understand why, because if our transport priorities aren‟t your 
transport priorities, durr, what‟s going on here...? [...] But you have to be clear 
what you‟re going in to do for them and be clear what areas you can influence on 
and focus on most.  If you go across the whole, you just get ignored.  They‟ll 
listen to you and then they move onto the next.  You get a bit in the minutes, but 
you won‟t change anything and I‟ve learnt that and business is good at that‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
Two key points about the OSG position have been here revealed, and indeed have already 
been touched upon briefly or at least implied in other data given earlier from the local 
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government and business section perspectives.  The first point is that the OSG house was 
especially diverse.  Despite claims from the local government and business sections about 
their own, often overlooked, internal diversity, this was generally coupled with some, if 
subdued, recognition that the OSG section faced a much more complex and potentially 
problematic issue around diversity.  Secondly, and arising from the first point, the OSG did 
not speak with one voice (and whether they would not or could not is a matter of perspective).  
These two issues are inextricably linked and dominate the OSG frame.   
 
To a large extent, the OSG house was bound to have to tackle the issue of how its individual 
members would come together and behave in the assembly, just as the other sections had to.  
But it was also bound to face a greater challenge in bringing together the range of actors 
involved, because it was, as one stakeholder described, „a sort of rag bag...when you‟ve taken 
out local government and business, then you‟ve got rather an assorted rag bag of, you know, 
health, environment, faith groups, third sector...‟ (WMRA_OSG09).  Even their labels reveal 
the difficulties involved: despite their internal differences, the other sections could still be 
united under their respective labels of „local government‟ and „business,‟ whereas the rest 
came under the ambiguous label of merely the „other stakeholder group.‟  And this was noted, 
for example one interviewee revealed that they were „a bit, kind of, pissed off, really with the 
idea that the other stakeholders group is a, kind of, odds and sods group, basically.  I mean, it 
almost works in terms of acronyms of odds and sods group.  I think I called it that once in a 
speech‟ (WMRA_OSG07).  But evidently there was understanding of the difficulty of naming 
the group: 
„it did sound as if you, you know...it‟s a bit like the third sector, isn‟t it? If 
somebody defines your, yes, other stakeholders, well it doesn‟t mean anything, 
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does it?  It doesn‟t tell anybody what you are, but then I don‟t know – it‟s not a 
particularly good term, but how would you describe that group of organisations?‟  
(WMRA_OSG09). 
 
Coupled with the internal diversity that arose from the range of interests that had to be 
accommodated in the OSG house, there was also a duty towards the equalities agenda.  This 
was not treated as an entirely separate issue or interest for which representative seats could be 
allocated (partly because of what was reported as a lack of organisations that had a regional 
remit around equality) but rather the OSG attempted to field people into positions that would 
at the same time satisfy requirements around balance.  A respondent involved in the very 
early stages of the assembly recognised that what was emerging was a „chamber group that 
was 95% white male‟ and also that there was „a danger about tokenism here‟ but hesitantly 
admitted that „we, as a steering group for the development of a regional infrastructure, were 
approached...to say...well, could we nominate a representative and there was...a, sort of, hint 
about their concern about imbalance of in terms of gender and ethnicity and so on‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).  Such a statement implies that the OSG were forced to take on this duty, 
but it was also a responsibility felt by many members of this house.  One stakeholder, in 
claiming to be a „committed equality campaigner,‟ added that  
 
„lots of the people on the OSG have a similar commitment as well.  I think part of 
that comes from the fact of being clear about the need to make our voices heard 
and if you‟re in the position of trying to make your voice heard, then I think you, 
kind of, understand about how groups that are marginalised need to make their 
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voice heard.  I think that gives you a bit more of a feel around equality as well and 
the need to push‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
This starts to depict the OSG identity and position that developed.  The OSG saw itself as 
championing the needs of the marginalised, of making multiple voices heard and of 
channelling this multiplicity of views into assembly business.  Initially, there was an amount 
of in-fighting regarding the allocation and weighting of the OSG seats but, as one interviewee 
reported, „that debate was virtually stopped in its tracks because in a sense it became futile.  I 
mean, you were [...] comparing oranges with bananas and it was silly nonsense‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).  The analogy is perhaps a little obscure, but the sense of frustration and 
exasperation is clear.  And this seemed to incite a moment of reflection after which the OSG 
became firmer in purpose and adopted its strategy of concentrating on creating avenues for 
the whole range of stakeholder voices.  Granted, these two points are not necessarily 
connected – indeed, the battles over seating arrangements and numbers remains in the 
memory of but a few interviewees (partly through the natural loss of former members and 
partly through natural decay of the memory, but perhaps also partly through some degree of 
forced erosion of an uncomfortable story) – but there is a chronology between them, arguably 
demonstrating the maturation of the OSG perspective. 
 
Regardless of how it evolved, the OSG position, once established, was unequivocal and 
unswerving: they 
„worked with local government to try and get as inclusive an Assembly as 
possible and to encourage them to use us to enable voices to come through that 
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would not find their way through the political process, so gender, ethnicity, 
disability, you know [...] [It] was one of the things that we contributed to the 
Assembly, was that we never set out to try and we couldn‟t set out to try and 
articulate a voice.  A lot of the time what we were doing was articulating the need 
for those voices to come through‟ 
(WMRA_OSG09). 
 
The point was repeatedly made, that the aim was not to arrive at a single voice but to present 
several.  In the words of another: 
„all the way through the life of the OSG, it was important to say that OSG did not 
take a collective view on housing or whatever.  The reason was because it was 
made up of a very disparate range of dimensions of civil society. [...] It would 
have been, not only inappropriate, but actually impossible to have reached the 
same view for all the different constituencies‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08). 
 
And such a statement of the OSG position was regularly followed by what clearly became a 
favourite example for describing the difficulty of marrying various OSG opinions, using 
specifically the environmental groups and the trade unions, for instance: 
„It‟s part of our core value – accountability – if we‟re just there to represent our 
own individual thoughts, then we‟ve got some real problems.  It does raise some 
difficult issues sometimes, because the OSG rarely tried to have a collective view 
on very much, because if you think about the fact that there are some 
environmental groups on there... I mean, let‟s pick something like, there could be 
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a proposal to have a new runway at Coventry or Birmingham airport.  Now, the 
trade union movement within OSG might sympathise with some of the 
environmental issues around that, but it brings jobs [...] and many of our members 
are going to be looking to support that, but that wouldn‟t necessarily go down 
very well with the environmental groups, so it is very rare [...] to try and have a 
collective OSG view on very much at all‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
 
5.3 Relationships framed, and institutional change? 
 
The frequency of the claims against reaching a unified position perhaps belied the OSG‟s 
confidence.  It revealed that the OSG was aware that being able to speak with one voice was, 
if not more powerful, certainly preferred by its local government and business counterparts.  
But, as one stakeholder confessed, they „took a strategic decision that that was worth it for us, 
because it assisted in terms of influence. Not power – the OSG didn‟t have power, it had 
influence‟ (WMRA_OSG08).  The OSG took what, it discerned, was probably perceived as a 
weakness and articulated it as the OSG‟s contribution.  It became defiant about its position, 
defending its role as broker of relationships between the assembly‟s component parts and the 
wider sector and adding value by adding voices to the regional policy-making structure and 
process.  And it felt that its value was recognised, that it had challenged the popular 
conception of the sector from „a load of sandaled, Liberal do-gooders to community 
organisations who would engage in serious decision-making‟ (WMRA_OSG09). 
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Furthermore, the OSG linked this lack of united voice to democracy: it celebrated the fact that 
its voice was not whipped like the political one would be.  From the OSG perspective, „that‟s 
what a perfect democracy is like – it‟s a whole range of views‟ (WMRA_OSG08).  It was 
„more pluralistic‟ and „look[ed] at the way they do things in a more critical way‟ 
(WMRA_OSG09).  Like the business stakeholders, the OSG built a defence around its 
democratic credentials.  It faced similar challenges from the local government house early on, 
but took a different, perhaps more mature, approach in its response.  Rather than competing 
on the same standards, the other stakeholders discussed changing concepts of democracy.  For 
example, the following extract succinctly captures the OSG attitude and its recognition of the 
wider significance of this debate arising from assembly business: 
„local government had always been suspicious of [the] non-elected – it‟s one of 
the tensions that the third sector has always had to deal with – our legitimacy is 
often challenged. [...] I still think there is a very special legitimacy that comes 
from being directly elected, but I also think that directly elected politicians 
underplay the role that participatory democracy can play, you know, enhancing 
and complimenting the representation [...] and that actually one of the reasons 
why our democracy is in trouble at the moment is because that connection 
between collective organisations that are non-party political is not working 
properly‟ 
(WMRA_OSG09). 
 
The OSG inadvertently acknowledged that their otherness, or more specifically the way they 
tried to re-present this rather than to forge unity, entailed a loss of power, as is demonstrated 
in the following extract: 
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„We‟re pretty vociferous.  You can imagine.  We don‟t get ignored.  I mean, they 
can take their decisions, if they wish, you know, local government could boss the 
decision on anything if they wanted to, but generally, because of the way that it‟s 
all set up and the way that it operates, they don‟t ignore us.  I genuinely think that 
partnership in this region is more than just the, kind of, buzz word‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
Evidently the stakeholder speaking is attempting to promote the OSG position, but then 
reveals that local government retains power.  More explicitly linking this belief with the lack 
of single voice and also exposing an underlying attitude about all-things-government, one 
interviewee said „they weren‟t going to get that ever...  I mean, central government has all 
sorts of, you know, one‟s consulted to death, but at the end of the day, they reach a view 
which isn‟t going to meet everybody‟s agreement, because they have to make the decision‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).  The OSG even developed a strategic response to this, mentioning a 
number of times that these stakeholders could always resort to public enquiries over the more 
important and controversial matters.  This outlook seemingly surrenders any power the other 
stakeholders could have had within the assembly and demotes them to in-house consultees.  
But, overall, these data lay bare the OSG‟s understanding of the context it was operating in, as 
well as the degree of ambivalence in its conception of its own power. 
 
Accordingly, when these stakeholders‟ perceptions of the local government section were 
specifically explored, responses commonly included the word „dominant.‟  These responses 
were often expressed with anger and/or frustration, but the tone was almost always moderated 
by the conclusion.  The following extract exemplifies such a response: 
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„I think it‟s entirely disproportionate how many numbers local government have 
got.  I‟ve got no problem with them having the majority view because that‟s the 
way that it‟s set up – it‟s about bringing local government together with other 
partners, then fine, but [...] it‟s one thing being local government led, to being 
local government dominated. [...] I think you can have your Chair and your 
leadership and all of that coming from local government around the assembly and 
building in the fact that the rest of us can‟t out-vote them – I haven‟t got a 
problem in terms of doing that, but having such a domination of the room, I‟m not 
sure that‟s entirely necessary.  I have to say, it doesn‟t stop us and the Business 
Council from saying our piece.  It doesn‟t stop us at all and, actually, when you 
look at how many times there‟s really a vote at the Assembly, it‟s very rare...‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
This extract also hints at the OSG‟s perception of and relationship with the business 
stakeholders: there is a, perhaps surprising, degree of camaraderie and kinship.  It is not 
expressed quite as keenly as the business group‟s sympathies, but there were instances in this 
section‟s data stating that the OSG and business did „talk to each other and were pretty much 
on the same wavelength‟ (WMRA_OSG07), for example.  In addition, the OSG were more 
likely to be defensive (in a supportive way) than critical of the business position, repeating 
stories such as:  
„the AWM is business led and business dominated – that‟s a legitimate voice for 
business – they‟re individuals who are coming forward and who have gone 
through, admittedly, a rigorous appointment process, but they‟re individuals.  
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They don‟t represent a constituency, and people on the Business Council represent 
a constituency, as I represent a constituency on OSG‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
If critical comparisons were drawn, they more often recognised that business was in a better 
position for being „a bit slicker‟ (WMRA_OSG08) and that local government were „very wary 
of pissing business off [...] – more concerned about pissing business off than they would 
about pissing OSG off‟ (WMRA_OSG07). 
 
Evidently, what is raised from constructing these frames, particularly with regards to the 
critical element in them that demonstrates the relationships or hierarchies between the actors, 
is a question around the potential for institutional change and the source of its instigation.  It 
is noteworthy, firstly, that there was institutional change.  There were changes in the rules 
regarding stakeholder organisation and representation.  Moreover, there were successes in 
attempts at stakeholder rule change from the stakeholders‟ perspectives.  This is significant 
because the data presented in the frames, certainly from the OSG perspective, show that the 
local government section dominated proceedings, thereby implying a lack of capacity for the 
others to act or respond to what was effectively set by local government.  That said, these 
successes, yet again, do need to be understood in context. 
 
There are two relatively straightforward instances of change, specifically of two separate 
stakeholder organisations moving from the other stakeholder group to the business group.  
The first of these was so uncontroversial that only the stakeholder concerned mentioned it, 
and even then told the story in a fairly subdued manner:  
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„They placed, in the sort of the analysis of who went where, the [stakeholder 
organisation] in the third sector, which was my first challenge, to get it moved 
from that sector into business.  Although we do have affinity with the third sector, 
we are a business and a very large business.  So, my first job was to get it moved, 
so I started off in the third sector and while I made noises about getting us moved 
across, we actually got a place, an extra place for the [stakeholder] as part of the 
third sector, partly because of the gender balance.  So we put a woman forward 
who represented the [stakeholder] in third sector as a holding position and then 
subsequently, I got us transferred into business‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
Likewise, the other transfer was also straightforward, in the sense that it was simply a move 
from the OSG to business without much debate or resistance.  However, in this instance there 
is a degree of mystery regarding the initiation, and thus regarding the benefactor as well as the 
beneficiary, of the move.  From the OSG perspective, it was reported that 
„there was a point at which, where the [stakeholder], which had been in the other 
stakeholders‟ group, decided to move across to the Business Council or business 
sector.  It wasn‟t an issue or a particular problem, other than they hadn‟t actually 
done their homework with the business sector, who didn‟t know they‟d made the 
decision and that took quite a lot of sorting out, though we were, kind of, 
sympathetic friends I think, rather than anything else‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).   
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This quotation demonstrates that the OSG took a back seat in the process.  This is not wholly 
unpredictable given the range of interests that it had to accommodate, but a stakeholder in 
such a position as to be able to move to the business section was presumably a potential asset 
to the OSG. Surprisingly, it seems as if the OSG did not even think to question the move.  Nor 
did local government – the LG group also adopted the role of bystander, although this is 
perhaps more understandable given the specific stakes involved.  The data from local 
government corroborates the OSG‟s story, for example one public sector interviewee recalled: 
„interestingly, the [stakeholder], I think, they were originally part of the other 
stakeholder group but I don‟t think they were comfortable with being part of that 
[...] and they argued that they had a, you know, critical role in the economy, they 
had good links with businesses around, sort of, R&D stuff, so they were quite 
happily and readily adopted by the Business Council.  They‟re a member of the 
Business Council now‟  
(WMRA_PS02). 
 
Evidently there are discrepancies about how the stakeholder in question was received by the 
business section, but generally the story is the same – it is generally understood by the 
majority of assembly members that this stakeholder instigated and pursued the move.  The 
story becomes interesting, however, when the actual stakeholder responds to questions about 
the move:  
„to start with, I was a member of the other stakeholders group, but for reasons that 
are, kind of, a bit unfathomable, the business group did a deal with the other 
stakeholders group, I think because they thought that I was closer to their interests 
than the other stakeholders and so they were quite interested in having the 
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[stakeholder] representative as part of their group and because it was well known 
that there were, you know, lots of other people queuing up-, well, lots of other 
stakeholders, so there‟d be no difficulty in finding a substitute and that transfer 
happened‟ 
(WMRA_BG02).  
 
Quizzed more specifically on the details, this stakeholder confirmed that 
„it happened with my knowledge, but it happened in response to an approach from 
the Business Group [...]  An approach was made to the Vice Chairman from the 
other stakeholders group to see whether they would be willing to the exchange 
taking place.  Well, it ended up as being in everyone‟s interest, because the 
Business Group wanted the [stakeholder] and the other stakeholders group were 
always under pressure to take other people‟ 
(WMRA_BG02).  
Thus it appears that all the actors involved distanced themselves from this move.  This could, 
of course, simply be due to its relative insignificance in the history of regional development 
but it is interesting that it is not hailed by the business section as an example of their force for 
change, of their strategic capacities, in short of their power.  
 
In contrast, the other stakeholder group was enthusiastic in highlighting, or indeed 
accentuating, its attempts at change.  For example, one stakeholder turned almost boisterous 
whilst reporting a dispute over the chairperson position of the scrutiny panel shortly following 
the publication of the Sub-National Review: 
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„local government seemed to think that they should take over scrutiny straight 
away and hadn‟t bothered to tell me about it, so we were there at the annual 
meeting of the assembly, taking nominations and my nomination had gone in and 
somebody had just decided to ignore my nomination for Chair of scrutiny and just 
nominated the local government person, so I kicked up a fuss about it in the 
middle of the meeting and made it clear that no discussions had taken place with 
me and the Chair [of the Assembly] was really embarrassed and I made sure 
everybody was embarrassed, particularly the person who did it.  So, they dropped 
that idea and decided in the end that I would be a good Chair of scrutiny‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
Whilst the local government section was presumably making changes seen as eventually 
necessary, this stakeholder believed the move was much more conspiratorial.  The story 
continued with allegations against specific people (therefore will not be reproduced here) and 
heightened emotions demonstrated through phrases such as „I just had to stamp my foot‟ and 
„I was being stitched up,‟ which contribute to an understanding of this stakeholder‟s level of 
effort in making riposting changes or, rather, in blocking an attempt at rule change from local 
government (WMRA_OSG07).  
 
This was perhaps a minor event, even from the perspective of OSG.  Certainly when asked 
about issues surrounding design and change, many more interviewees promoted the 
establishment of the Equality and Diversity Strategic Partnership of the assembly as their 
major success story.  As has been evidenced above through the explication of the OSG frame, 
these stakeholders already had a clear interest in equality and diversity.  And taking this 
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through to the scrutiny function of the assembly, which was in any case dominated by the 
stakeholders rather than local government, a piece of work was undertaken to explore issues 
around equality and diversity.  One stakeholder that was particularly vocal on the subject 
proudly added that this work was „across the piece, so it wasn‟t only a scrutiny of the RDA 
but it was a scrutiny of local government, business, OSG, loads of different players, around 
equality and diversity‟ (WMRA_OSG04).  And, in a similar vein, another OSG member 
opined that their „commitment wasn‟t just talking about it within OSG, it was actually trying 
to hold to account and get other partners within the region to do something around equality 
and diversity and so we‟ve continued to play an active and, I think, leading role in it‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07).  The outcome of these efforts was the establishment of the specialised 
strategic partnership. 
 
The pride and the ownership of this move is perhaps better appreciated when it is understood 
against an earlier, failed attempt at something similar.  An OSG member revealed that 
„prior to that, in sort of, 2002, 2003, there had been the development of a Social 
Inclusion Forum for the Assembly, which we were, kind of, leading players in.  It 
never worked.  Part of that was it wasn‟t given any priority by the Assembly, 
either in terms of in principle or actually in terms of resources.  There were no 
resources, so there was a little bit of somebody‟s time for a few hours a week and 
that became completely impossible‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08). 
 
But this also reveals that the assembly, which here either refers to the whole bloc that was 
everything but the OSG or to the local government forces more particularly, retained the 
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ability to control developments and to impede any such unwanted changes.  Indeed, a later 
revelation from the same interviewee brings the OSG‟s capacities into question yet further – 
the stakeholder wondered aloud 
„in fact the Equality and Diversity Strategic Partnership was from a secondment...  
I don‟t know whether [they are] there now but there was, I think, there was a 
secondment, I think from the Home Office, for two or three years, I can‟t even 
remember [their] name... a secondment to the Assembly with a particular 
responsibility to resource the operation of the Equality and Diversity Strategic 
Partnership‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).   
 
It is debatable, then, whether the OSG instigated this development or whether the Equality 
and Diversity Partnership came into being due to other forces.  Indeed, it is debatable whether 
this is even decipherable at all.  What is apparent, however, is that the OSG perceived it and 
claimed it as their opus and, unsurprisingly, there is little mention of this development from 
other perspectives, thus little data available with which to better understand the dynamics of 
this situation.  It is as if the OSG were allowed this glory and seized it, thereby enabling this 
story of an OSG success within the boundaries of what was possible to be collectively 
projected and accepted.  It was not corrected or reigned in, and instead became a West 
Midlands Regional Assembly truth, however minor. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has progressed from a general context of the West Midlands region and a general 
history of the West Midlands Regional Assembly to a more specific one, or rather to more 
specific ones, specified according to the groups of actors involved in the assembly.  This is 
because what is important to this thesis is not (or is less) the general but the perceived context, 
not the textbook history but the meanings and related stories of the insiders, or perhaps 
would-be protagonists, in the story of regional development.  I have detailed those 
personalised (or, rather, group) contexts and I illustrated, or indeed built, the local 
government, business and other stakeholder frames.  These frames were made up of the 
actors‟ perceptions of themselves, which was partly revealed through an understanding of the 
issues they faced, as well as of the other groups of actors.   
 
As set out in the theory and methods chapters, it is from the frames that the processes of 
institutional design and change are to be explored.  The frames go some way to dictate the 
changes made. Or rather, they serve to illustrate the mental maps of the actors, to represent 
their judgements of their landscape, and to point to the options perceived as available for 
design/change.  Thus they serve as a background to an analysis of institutional change, or 
indeed non-change, as they uncover the perceived needs and wants of the groups of actors, 
which in turn, and with the frames in concert, generate an understanding of the degree of 
effort put towards instigating change (or, indeed, allowing and accepting non-change).   
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CHAPTER 6: REFLECTIONS AND REVISION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this relatively short chapter, I map out my process of reflection, questioning and revising 
my approach to enable an alternative reading of the data.  Whereas the previous chapter 
concentrated on the groups of actors and their discursive delineation through frames, this 
chapter will now take a wider perspective of the assembly as a whole.  Here, I break from the 
confines of the frames to consider institutional change in its entirety, hence to consider the 
meaning behind the lack of change or of the stakeholders‟ apparent acquiescence towards the 
maintenance of the status quo.  From this wider perspective, the overall story of the West 
Midlands Regional Assembly‟s development is one of stasis, much aided by the stakeholders‟ 
lack of attempts at change, which in turn was partly dictated by their understanding of the 
context they were working in.  Thus their (perceptions of their) context affected their conduct, 
which affected their context, in the sense that they effectively allowed that status quo to be or, 
indeed, actively maintained it.  
 
The first section of this chapter considers three instances in which the stakeholders do not 
challenge institutional developments that could be seen, by the critical researcher, to leave 
them at a disadvantage.  Firstly, I probe the inclusion of town and parish councils in the OSG, 
rather than in the local government section, because they are effectively taking up the 
precious few seats available to the stakeholders.  Secondly, I question the interpretation of 
central government guidance regarding sector proportions for the lack of challenge.  And 
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finally, I explore the share of seats between the stakeholders – between the business and the 
others – on the grounds that it effectively privileged the business component.  The second 
section of the chapter forces a reconsideration of the critical reflex, showing it to be rather 
more conspiratorial, given the wealth of data that pointed towards the overwhelming sense of 
consensus rather than collusion.   
 
 
6.1 Collusion in the West Midlands Regional Assembly 
 
In response to questions about the position of the town and parish councils in the assembly‟s 
houses, one interviewee reported 
„there‟s a widespread ambivalence about whether parish councils are part of local 
government or not.  I mean, yes they are, in one sense, but they‟re not in another 
sense and I don‟t think anybody chose to have that debate at regional level.  There 
was a, kind of, willingness to ensure that they had a seat via the other stakeholders 
group and they were satisfied that they got there‟ 
(WMRA_BG02). 
This is delivered in the tone of an objective observer, yet the source is a stakeholder – one that 
moved from the OSG to the business group, so someone in a position to initiate such a debate, 
rather than simply playing party to a general willingness and the town and parish councils‟ 
strategic effort to be involved somewhere in the structure.  Another stakeholder was even 
nonchalant about the issue, indeed only just acknowledging it as an issue – „parish councils 
[are] also on there, strangely, although there‟s an argument that says that they should be in 
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with local government, but for some reason it‟s historic – it‟s never been explained to me, 
they‟re just part of the other stakeholders group‟ (WMRA_OSG07). 
 
Questions attempting to gain an understanding from these stakeholders as to why the town 
and parish councils were part of the OSG section rather than the local government section did 
not elicit a more enlightening response, for example 
„I think it‟s because they‟re not members of the West Midlands Local 
Government Association, for whatever reason.  I don‟t know why they‟re not 
members, but if they‟re not members of that and that‟s the constituent body, then 
they need to go somewhere else.  They‟re not a business, so that means they come 
to us, I suppose‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
This passivity was apparently widespread, as many failed to grasp the critical point of this 
questioning, though I did have to be discreet.  Responses were often unembellished one-
liners, such as „because local government were never going to accept them‟ and „because they 
were like rats in a sack with local government‟ (WMRA_OSG08).  Apparently no further 
explanation was necessary.  The local government response was equally short, but that was 
because the foundation of their position on the town and parish councils was accordingly 
straightforward, for example one local government interviewee said it was „because grown up 
local government didn‟t want them.  As simple as that.  They‟d only be amateurs as far as 
proper local government [was] concerned‟ (WMRA_PS02).  
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Eventually, a clue emerged from the OSG section.  One stakeholder stated that „if the town 
and parish council people want to play an active role, then that‟s great as far as I‟m 
concerned‟ (WMRA_OSG07).  This reveals something of a strategic mindset.  Given the deal 
the OSG were dealt, in that these members did not believe they could change very much, they 
had to learn to strategise within their perceived context.  And welcoming the town and parish 
councils into the OSG may well have been a part of that.  Of course, this may well be simply 
a story the stakeholders told themselves in order to make their lack of power more bearable 
(or, indeed, just this stakeholder).  Unfortunately, there is not enough data on this point, or 
any similar example, to turn the supposition into a fair judgement, if such an issue could be 
conclusive at all.  Indeed, it is most likely that both are „true,‟ but what is undeniable is the 
dominance of local government. 
 
It could be argued that the local government section was bound to be the dominant element of 
the regional assembly composition, simply because of the balance of numbers given by 
central government.  Now, it is important to recall that these proportions were suggested in 
central government guidance, thus not strictly enforceable law, and was worded in such a way 
as to set a minimum allocation for stakeholders of 30%.  The regional assemblies, therefore, 
were able to opt for higher proportions of stakeholders and were free to determine their 
stakeholders as their regional circumstances required.  Commenting on the proportions in the 
guidance from a local government perspective, one interviewee said 
„it wasn't taken as law, I don't think it was taken as law, but it was taken as most 
guidance is taken, that this is a suggested right balance, that there should be at 
least 30% non-local government representation on the Chamber Assembly.  Now, 
nobody questioned whether the 30% was too high, but I think there was a general 
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feeling that it certainly shouldn‟t be any higher, but there wasn't a massive debate 
about it, it was, you know, government advice tends to be, you know, taken as 
fairly, sort of, influential.  You only object if it‟s really completely unacceptable 
and 70:30, I think, was accepted as, you know, if there is to be a body that is a 
partnership of interests, business, local government and other social economic 
interest groups, then 70:30 was an acceptable balance to local government‟ 
(WMRA_PS03). 
 
The quotation above possesses some recognition that the proportions could have been 
adjusted, whereas in the stakeholders‟ sections there is much less knowledge about this.  „It 
was handed down to us from Government, I think, really‟ (WMRA_OSG4) is a line that 
typifies the response from most stakeholders when asked about the proportions, or slightly 
more exacting attempts included „the Enabling Bill into the establishment of the chambers 
required local government to have a 66% stake, two thirds per cent stake, in the process‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08).  Sometimes the local government perspective on the difficulties it faced in 
organising its share was parroted as some sort of excuse for the local government size, for 
example a business respondent pre-emptively batted away the issue of its own minority 
position to concentrate on the lack of majority power of local government as assembly work 
actually transpired with –   
„you see 70%, they‟re not a, they‟re not some kind of amorphous mass out there 
that all agree with each other.  They absolutely do not and if you watch the way 
local authorities can disagree with each other, particularly if there are political 
differences, you know, between Labour and Tory, or even between rural and 
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urban, their agendas are different, so they could not guarantee they would have 
70% of the votes, they just didn‟t move like that‟ 
(WMRA_BG05). 
 
Just as the quotation above demonstrates how the issue was quickly turned away from the 
actual numbers and towards the realities of power (or lack of, in this instance), the following 
quotation turns the issue of the proportions in yet another direction: 
„the two thirds local government was set out in the Enabling legislation, they 
couldn‟t vary it, so there was always going to be two thirds.  The issue was about 
what the size of the total assembly would be.  You know, would it be 30 or would 
it be 200 or would it be 100 or whatever, so in a sense there was an agreement that 
local government would take two thirds because that was a given really.  So the 
only question was, well, how do you divvy the other third of seats, while it was an 
agreement which wasn‟t terribly difficult because OSG had developed one and 
took half of those remaining seats and then the Business Forum, which became 
the Business Council, took the other half‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08). 
Obviously, the stakeholders can take their responses in different directions as they wish, 
particularly under a semi-structured interviewing technique, but what is interesting is that 
regardless of the direction taken, the starting point is not questioned; rather than having an 
understanding that the stakeholders were allowed at least 30% of assembly seats, the 
stakeholders invariably spoke of local government‟s 70% or two thirds share. 
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Only two interviewees stated that they might, given the opportunity, adjust the proportions.  
One seemed to reach such a conclusion within the interview: 
„actually, no.  No, I‟d revise all of that actually, because the more I think about it, 
there‟s actually no reason at all why it shouldn‟t be a third, a third, a third.  There 
is no reason why.  [...] Especially given the consensus way that we actually 
operate.  It would never happen, because the local government would never, kind 
of, wear that, because it would actually give the majority to somebody other than-, 
to groupings other than local government, if you did that, so two thirds would 
belong outside the local government‟ 
(WMRA_OSG07). 
 
Another apparently had already given the matter some consideration –  
„whatever size was chosen for the assembly, I would have argued for, would want 
to see, a different kind of balance between local government and the rest.  I mean, 
I‟m happy to see local government have 50%, though an ideal might be a further 
third, but 50% and 25% business, 25% other stakeholders and then, against that 
background, a style of doing business which was rather different‟ 
(WMRA_BG02). 
This interviewee claimed to have had „major reservations about the predominance of local 
government in the Regional Assembly‟ but also that „it became clear that it was not open to 
question‟ (WMRA_BG02).  The point was repeated with „well, those that had done the 
detailed design, essentially local government, were not prepared to discuss the balance 
between the groupings‟ and „there was quite a lot of discontent, but it wasn't a subject for 
discussion,‟ thus revealing the constraint and frustration that was felt. 
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Perhaps more malleable would have been the proportions between the stakeholders i.e. some 
negotiation of the division between the business stakeholders and the rest, particularly given 
that business could relatively easily act as a single interest whereas the OSG had quite a range 
of interests to accommodate and also that most of the other regional assemblies operated with 
a single stakeholder group (referred to collectively as the social, economic and environmental 
partners, or SEEP).  For obvious reasons, the business stakeholders in the West Midlands did 
not question their relative advantage, with one stating simply „I didn‟t question it because I 
thought it was appropriate‟ (WMRA_BG05).  Interestingly, one interviewee from the local 
government section recalled that „there was, early on, there was probably the odd discussion 
about whether the balance between business and other stakeholders was right, you know, 
whether the business had enough places,‟ adding that „it just seemed to be natural, yes, that 
business interests would want their own defined group‟ (WMRA_PS03), as if this was reason 
enough to grant them their own group.  Thus, business had a clear, and supported, dominance 
over the other stakeholders. 
 
However, with greater reflection, the local government section did put forward a plausibly 
thought through story about having, or indeed maintaining, a division between the business 
and other stakeholders: 
„what we set out to do was make sure that we had some form of proportionality of 
representation and obviously, I say obviously, from local government‟s point of 
view, that would be the dominant partner, but I hate that terminology, but that's 
the terminology that others used of us and my guess is that it‟s a leap too far too 
early to lump everybody into, I mean, the danger of, I think, some other regions is 
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what you create is a ruling group and an opposition group and our intention was to 
try and blur groupings as much as possible‟ 
(WMRA_PS06). 
Thus the point was to create a more collaborative style of working, to move away from the 
adversarial style of politics that was seen to dominate British politics.  The members of this 
section recognised that they were „not doing Labour-Tory politics here‟ but were „trying to 
blur that process of tight groupings and creating an outward voice that said this is the voice of 
a very wide range of people, rather than organisations, to central government‟ 
(WMRA_PS06). 
 
The OSG position on this point mimicked that of local government.  In passing, it commented 
that there was a division between business and themselves because business would have 
wanted to retain their specific voice and therefore would have wanted a separate group, and 
the OSG also sympathetically parroted that the business group was more diverse than it 
appeared and therefore did not necessarily have an easy advantage.  Thus, the OSG seemingly 
acquiesced to the business position that was supported by local government.  They pointed 
out, however, that they co-operated with the business group on occasions when the need arose 
(describing how they would meet ahead of main assembly meetings, though without specific 
examples) and they also added their specifically OSG spin on the matter by suggesting that 
their voice would be subsumed by business interests if all the stakeholders were in one group 
together.   
 
In the main, though, the OSG emphasised the point that the assembly and its rules regarding 
member composition and organisation were designed (or being designed) to encourage and 
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reflect a more consensual style of working.  For example, one member of the OSG described 
how 
„the formal Assembly meetings were three, four a year and I think we had a role 
in making sure that they weren't modelled on local government, you know, we 
tried to model them on other things.  They were more participative and a lot of 
time was spent really brokering the opportunities [for] the stakeholders to 
contribute, but we used to meet, you know, a week before the main Assembly, a 
week or so before, when the papers had come out and we‟d talk through the 
agenda‟ 
(WMRA_OSG09). 
What this quotation inadvertently reveals, however, is the practice of a traditionally local 
government practice – that of pre-meetings. 
 
The local government section claimed not to have such pre-meetings, linking this to a 
different kind of working specifically for assembly business, for example one member stated 
„we didn‟t have [political party] Group meetings ahead of our Chamber meetings because 
we‟d, we took the view that we were going there representing the region, not representing 
particular strands of policy‟ (WMRA_PS04).  But that interviewee later revealed that 
councillors met „not for anything ideologically, I mean, but when they did actually, I think 
they did have, from time to time, they did meet with each other to discuss mutually interesting 
things, but again, we discouraged in those early days, any sort of suggestion of groupings‟ 
(WMRA_PS04) and another conceded that they met „not in the early days.  I think, as time 
went on, I think in recent years, there has been more breaking down of that degree of 
consensus‟ (WMRA_PS05). 
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The group-meetings themselves are not an issue.  The point is that, despite efforts to avoid 
such, assembly proceedings became like local government.  It was reported that as time went 
on, a local government culture took hold: 
„There were discussions-, there have been discussions from time to time, about the 
style of business, you know, style of working, inside an assembly meeting, though 
I am not conscious that that has happened for a long time and the examples I can 
think of the assembly adopting a different style and working in a more discursive 
way, go back to the early days of the assembly, rather than now, which suggests to 
me that the assembly has settled into a way of working which has, in a sense, gone 
unchallenged, as so many organisations have done‟ 
(WMRA_BG02). 
This particularly reflective stakeholder did point out that this was not by „malicious decision, 
but simply because that was the way in which people were used to doing business‟ and adding 
that „it was more the actors involved, though for the most part, staff that had been involved 
are the people who‟ve handed local government back, I would say.  Again, I‟m not suggesting 
a malicious conspiracy, but, you know, an intuitive collusion‟ (WMRA_BG02). 
 
 
6.2 Collusion or consensus? 
 
Overall, then, the data from the West Midlands Regional Assembly clearly point to the 
predominance of local government control and a prevalent local government culture, as well 
as acquiescence to this by the business and other stakeholders, perhaps as some mark of 
gratitude for having some influence in the regional policy-making process or simply so as not 
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to risk losing that influence.  This, on the surface of it, sounds negative.  It is presented as a 
criticism of the structural system, as a suppressed complaint that has been revealed, and 
accordingly plays into, indeed, plays up the idea of „collusion.‟  But it must be recognised and 
acknowledged that it is presented as such.  
 
It has become evident over the data collection and analysis processes that the researcher‟s (i.e. 
my) role is essential to the project, not just in its direction and execution, as is obvious to a 
large extent and reflected upon earlier, but also in the assumptions made about the responses 
given and their critical meaning.  My role as an interpretive interviewer requires that I lead the 
responses as little as possible, only asking broad questions about broad topics, thus effectively 
guiding a monologue.  And whilst I have tried and trained myself to stay loyal to that 
technique, it is undeniable that I am looking for certain things.  Herein lies the fundamental 
and inevitable „problem‟ with the more interpretive, deductive approach: there is a theory-
dependence of observation i.e. a researcher, even ones without explicitly worked-out theory, 
brings to its research processes embedded assumptions.  The interpretive philosophy, at least, 
allows for this „human error‟ (though it does not label it as such), since it recognises that what 
is reported as findings are interpretations of interpretations (labelled the hermeneutic circle, 
detailed earlier), thereby admitting a degree of personality into the process.  Herein also lies 
the advantage of this specific research design: simultaneously undertaking another case study 
enabled comparisons that questioned afresh at each iteration the assumptions that may have 
been impacting upon the analysis of the data. 
 
This was specifically the reasoning behind adopting another conceptual tool for data analysis.  
It was clear that the concept of frames served as a tool from which to hang the data relating to 
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actors positions, but the developmental journey required a format that incorporated, or at least 
allowed for, some degree of dynamism in these case studies of institutional design and 
change.  At the same time, the dual analysis served as a critical reflex, forcing me to address 
the data that did not fit in the discursive form that I assumed would be present in each case.  
In this case, I was looking for the interviewee‟s context and conduct, based on their sense of 
self and others, on their position and their relationships.  I was obviously looking for the data 
to say something, moreover to show something different or revealing about the actors‟ 
relative positions; I was almost hunting for conspiracy.  And in that process my positionality 
comes to the fore – my interpretation of the data is based on my identity as a researcher (itself 
an institutionalised notion), hence my desire to critically analyse as well as my general profile 
(in terms of race, gender etc.), which, as acknowledged earlier, is aligned closer to the 
stakeholder group (Aulakh et al. 2005).  This serves, however subconsciously, to skew favour 
towards the OSG, perhaps promoting the opinion that the stakeholders would have been 
stronger in a single group and privileging the idea that there is collusion. 
 
It must be recalled that the interviewee who offered the term „collusion‟ did so with a caveat 
of understanding: the assembly did not end up mimicking local government by malicious 
design.  Indeed, the interviewee‟s very point is that there was no conspiracy towards 
collusion, which, given that it was volunteered, inadvertently admits that such a conclusion 
could be easily reached, but this stakeholder ultimately disagrees that that was the case.  The 
overall message from the stakeholders was that they did feel empowered, that they did gain 
voice and that they were able to contribute.  They may not have been able to make drastic 
changes, but it is questionable whether they wanted to make such changes.  „We fought on the 
things that we thought were worthwhile‟ (WMRA_BG05) is a sound bite that typifies views 
  
  
   
  
212 
 
about institutional change from the stakeholders.  These stakeholders could be regarded not as 
pacifists accepting their lot, but as strategists picking their battles.  
 
It could be argued further that these stakeholders were part of the collusion, rather than being 
colluded against.  A business stakeholder involved from the outset recalled that Birmingham 
had a „fixer‟ who organised 
„one of these, sort of, smoke-filled room things that everybody denies takes place, 
but clearly they do. [...] People were invited to the meeting and you wouldn‟t 
know why you were invited, except you got round a table and you knew all the 
names – you might have read them in the Birmingham Post or whatever – it was a 
very, sort of, close group. [...] I could probably have figured out why the others 
were there as well, but it‟s not an open invitation‟ 
(WMRA_BG05).  
 
The OSG relating their start-up is not quite as dramatic, but it similarly echoes some degree of 
elitism:        
„It was [named individual] and I, because we‟d done some work on, I think it was 
New Deal for Communities or something like that, or Welfare to Work, whatever 
it was, in the Black Country, so we put our heads together and identified –, we 
selected a group of about ten people who reflected different communities but our 
judgement was that they would not be parochial and we‟d both had conversations 
with different players...‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08). 
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This offers a different perspective to the more technical and democratic officer-led process of 
consultation and recruitment given earlier. The interviewee quickly added that there were also 
„major consultations‟ and that the selection „was actually tested very heavily over two years‟ 
(WMRA_OSG08) but that the initial stages of stakeholder engagement might have worked in 
this more closed way is, to a large extent, unsurprising and understandable, and it 
demonstrates that there were a chosen few with scope for the „usual suspects‟ to come to the 
fore. 
 
There is, then, an amount of ambivalence.  From the stakeholders‟ perspective there is 
evidence of disappointment with the local government dominance alongside understanding 
and acquiescence.  From the local government house, too, there is a degree of discomfort in 
focussing on their controlling share of seats and attention is directed away from the idea of 
control towards the idea of consensus.  Indeed, consensus is a running theme.  The term itself 
has been used a number of times in the data already presented above, and furthermore the 
wider idea is even more obvious – participants talk of a more collaborative, consensual style 
of working, that is a shared aspiration if not something fully and consistently implemented.  
They regularly promoted the idea that there was never a need to vote, that the numerical 
system had been designed as simply a safeguard and that the focus for everyone was the good 
of the region.  One meandering quotation from a key local government official sums up a 
number of common sentiments: 
„Yes, there were changes.  I mean, if you set an organisation up from scratch and 
you try to embed that in granite, it would be a mistake and so the organisation had 
to evolve and had to develop and it did do and one of the things that made that 
easier was the trust started to generate itself, because people had work to do.  I 
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mean, one of the great things about the backsides-on-seats debate is no-one‟s 
actually got any work to do and the end game is to get the representation.  Once 
you have work to do around the process of securing a deal for the West Midlands, 
then you have to adapt the structure and people evolved...‟ 
(WMRA_OSG06). 
 
Overall, then, the same data are presented to represent two different sides of the same shared 
story.  There is at once collusion and consensus.  Both „truths‟ are simultaneously true and are 
both undercurrents to each other‟s story, or are both the same story framed differently at 
different times.  In the case of the West Midlands, the separate group frames have been 
explored and, in the process of exploring institutional design and change from these frames, it 
has emerged that there is a story that is shared across the groups, and this justifies not change 
but non-change.  Or perhaps, more specifically, it justifies the maintenance of a gradual pace 
of evolution towards consensual working, or perhaps it tells a story of an attempt to instigate 
consensual working and an eventual shift, or return, to a local government culture.  It could be 
argued, too, that the consensus story is one constructed to contain differences between the 
groups or to blur divisions, itself an act of creating consensus.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
What now begins to emerge is the concurrent theoretical and methodological development 
that occurred over the course of the fieldwork phase of the project.  Continuous reflection 
enabled me to both question my assumptions and my selection of the data and to use the 
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initial findings and analysis of the (following) North West case study to think about what was 
happening beyond the group level and to look at the wider story of the assembly.  As the 
preceding chapters set out, this project aimed to explore intersubjective institutional design 
and so I needed to pay greater attention to what was shared between the groups of designers, 
looking to what was constructed together, which was this story of consensus that was or 
became the foundation for the assembly institutions – the representational divisions and their 
proportionality – to be perpetuated as they were.  This brought the concept of stories into the 
research design, acknowledging the need to relate the two concepts together, even if in 
simulated stages, if these were to function as tools for analysis. 
 
This chapter is transparent about the research process because it reflects the discovery of the 
subjects‟ processes of moving from separately grouped positions to an intersubjective 
perspective on institutional design.  The different groups were differently able to affect the 
institutional development process, though this was due to their own understandings and 
subsequent strategising about the wider design process.  Specifically, the local government 
actors took the lead in organising the representational links of the stakeholders (both in terms 
of the separation and the proportions of the stakeholder groups, and even with the 
development of the secretariat for the „other‟ stakeholders).  And the stakeholders generally 
saw this as fitting or not worth fighting for risk of losing the gains that had been made.  Thus, 
a collective story of consensus came to support the institutional design of an assembly that 
numerically maintained the representational strength of the inherited hierarchies (i.e. both 
with local government „in charge‟ as well as the business stakeholders relatively „better off‟ 
than the disparate collection of others that remained), though there, of course, was never a 
need to resort to activate this relative weighting through voting, since consensus was 
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paramount and prevalent.  Probing issues of imbalance revealed some disquiet, which further 
pointed to the strategising on the part of those relatively weaker members.  Thus, the 
construction and selection of ideas and elements of the context by the designers demonstrated 
the interplay between structure and agency, as held by the theory of constructivist 
institutionalism, in this instance of institutional design/change or, indeed, of adoption and 
perpetuation of power balances from previous partnership working.    
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CHAPTER 7: THE NORTH WEST REGIONAL ASSEMBLY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out the second of the two case studies that constitute the empirical 
component of this research project.  I focus on the process of institutional design and, perhaps 
more accurately here, on the institutional change that is demonstrated in the course of the 
North West Regional Assembly‟s development.  Actors here changed the rule of councillor 
representation from being based on the region‟s local authority areas to being based on its five 
sub-regions.  This chapter sets the scene of the region, relates the stories that form the 
discursive part of the institutional reconstruction process, and finally presents an analysis of 
those stories. 
 
The first section of this chapter provides a general background of the North West, to 
contextualise the development of regional apparatus in this region.  I aim to convey the 
character of the region – its relatively fragmented geography and its party-political history, 
building up its identity and distinctiveness.  Following this, this first section goes on to detail 
the recent history of regional development – the North West regional assembly‟s „pre-
history.‟  This refreshes the general development in the regions from the establishment of the 
Regional Economic Planning Boards and Councils (REPBs and REPCs) in the 1960s up to 
the establishment of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 that, returning to this 
specific case, launched the NWRA.  The final part of this section presents an overview of the 
NWRA‟s lifespan.  It charts the evolution of this organisation – the internal or structural 
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changes, events in local government that contributed to these changes, and central 
government‟s policy and guidance en route – over the approximate ten-year period that this 
executive body in the region was known as the NWRA.  This aims to be a „factual‟ account, 
which may seem dissonant with the ontological foundations of this thesis, but it should be 
understood as the parts of the story that can be agreed upon and that can be evidenced.  Where 
there are conflicting claims and chronological haziness, these, too, are reported in a neutral 
manner.   
 
The overview of NWRA‟s history given in the first section provides a point of departure for 
the first stage of analysis presented in section two.  In this section I scrutinise and synthesise 
the primary data from interviews to communicate the stories that run throughout the collective 
general account.  It is necessary to separate this from the factual account given in the first 
section because this looks specifically at the discursive constructions of the actors involved 
i.e. what these actors tell themselves, each other and outsiders about the NWRA‟s 
development in the process of and contributing towards that development.  The points that are 
referred to in short-hand by the interviewees, that are common knowledge for them, can be 
understood and could become common knowledge, or at least something of a shared 
understanding, for the reader if the general factual overview is given before the stories are 
drawn out.  Therefore, the stories of institutional reconstruction, that build up towards and 
justify councillor representation on a sub-regional basis, are drawn out and presented 
separately in this second section. 
 
The third section presents a shift in direction of the analysis.  I take the stories of institutional 
reconstruction and break them down into the component parts set out in the research design 
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on story analysis to build a beginning-middle-end patter relevant to institutional 
design/change, i.e. I examine the stories for constructions of complaint, aspiration and 
justification in an effort to uncover the ideational and material elements that are central to the 
theory of constructivist institutionalism explored in this thesis.   
 
 
7.1 The busy background of the NWRA development 
 
Taking up the story of the North West region‟s particular trajectory of regional development 
from the national overview given in the chapter 2, perhaps the watershed of recent 
development is marked by the 1972 creation of two large metropolitan county councils: 
Greater Manchester and Merseyside.  This, and the North West‟s local government history 
more generally, is a crucial element in the general understanding of the region‟s development.  
These two metropolitan county council areas, or rather the subsequent lack of them (see 
below), continuously impacts upon the stories towards institutional (re)construction at the 
regional level. 
 
During the 1980s, Lancashire County Council stood at the vanguard of institutional and 
organisational development (Burch and Holliday 1993).  It set up an office in Brussels, 
Belgium, in order to respond to the growing imperative of European Union funding.  The two 
metropolitan county councils also grew in significance, but eventually wielded too much 
power in the perspective of central government and were abolished in 1986.  Immediately 
following this, however, the local authorities of Greater Manchester collectively established a 
local government association – the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) – 
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co-terminus with the former metropolitan county council area, thereby consolidating the 
continuing influence of the Greater Manchester sub-region. 
 
At this time – the late 1980s – the business community were also responding to European 
Union developments, by recognising the strength to be gained in organising a collective and 
lobbying as an interest group.  Accordingly, the North West Business Leadership Team 
(BLT) was set up in 1988.  And by 1992, the BLT and the forty-six local authorities in the 
North West region came together to form the North West Regional Association (which 
changed its name to the North West Partnership in 1995). 
 
The legislation that paved the way for the establishment of regional assemblies was 
enthusiastically welcomed in the North West.  Indeed, it was seen as having almost originated 
here because of the Labour Party‟s keen observation of partnership working in the region as it 
prepared its position on regionalism whilst in opposition.  Labour leader John Smith and 
regional enthusiast John Prescott regularly visited the region, attending and addressing 
meetings and conferences in the mid-1990s.  And, as one interviewee boasted „one of our 
Business Leadership Team, who was working with John Prescott, then played a very major 
role in writing the Regional Development Agencies Act‟ (NWRA_SEEP02).  
 
But, despite their relatively advanced start, actors in the North West did not and could not 
simply rebrand the North West Partnership that was in operation as the new North West 
Regional Assembly.  Indeed, interviewees were divided in whether they viewed the NW 
Partnership as a predecessor to the NWRA or not.  The guidance that quickly followed the 
RDA Act 1998 made stipulations about the composition of the new bodies – bringing in the 
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70:30 local government to stakeholder representation ratio – so in this and other ways, actors 
had to formalise what had until then been a relatively informal set of collaborative working 
arrangements.   
 
There followed a period of reflection and rearrangement.  Over the next few years, local 
authorities came together at the regional level to an unprecedented degree.  This region, 
unlike others, had previously not been able to form a region-wide local government 
association, mainly due to the long-standing friction between the cities of Liverpool and 
Manchester, as well as the relatively fragmented nature of the region (with Cumbria and 
Merseyside having only been subsumed into what became the North West region as it is 
known today a few years earlier) (Pearce and Ayres, 2007: 702; Sandford, 2002: 51).  But on 
the 26
th
 September 2001 Liverpool and Manchester signed a Joint City Concordat, and by 
2002 local government actors had agreed a format for the NWRA resembling a region-wide 
LGA in that it was comprised of a representative from each of the 46 local authorities in the 
region, as well as 10 other local government representatives co-opted to achieve political 
balance in the assembly. 
 
Alongside these local government representatives sat the social, economic and environmental 
partners.  Taking together the 70:30 local government to partner ratio with the agreed 56 local 
government representatives, these partners now filled 24 assembly seats, bringing the total 
membership to 80 actors.  However, this stakeholder component also suffered some friction.  
Despite allowing for 24 partners, interviewees recalled the participation of only 6 or 7 
representatives that held all 24 votes due to the 70:30 weighting.  It is difficult to pinpoint 
exactly who these 6 or 7 active stakeholders were.  Interviewees‟ recollections of this period 
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are hazy; they lack detail and sequences are often mixed.  But it is clear that a number of high 
profile business partners – the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Federation of 
Small Businesses (FSB) and the Institute of Directors (IoD) – all left the assembly together in 
March 2002 allegedly due to disputes about the way the assembly was being run.  And the 
remaining actors worked to expand the stakeholder group to the optimal 24, which was almost 
complete by mid-2003, as evidenced by the NWRA Annual Report 2002 – 2003 which lists 
22 stakeholder members representing 13 organisations. 
 
The year 2002 was an important year for the NWRA and, indeed, the regional assembly 
project in general.  The Labour Government, having concentrated on the devolution processes 
to the Celtic nations and London during its first term, now entered its second term and turned 
its attention to „double devolution‟ to the (other) eight English regions.  In May 2002, the 
Government published the White Paper Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English 
Regions, which set out more officially than ever before its intentions for the regional 
assemblies and, importantly and as its title suggests, it allowed for regions to choose whether 
or not they wanted to formalize their regional bodies into directly elected units of government.  
This 111-page long document detailed issues such as the democratic ideal behind the regional 
assemblies, their proposed functions and funding, and also the implementation process that 
would include a review of local government (two-tier) structures. 
 
There followed a „soundings exercise‟ between December 2002 and May 2003, which was 
designed to establish which of the regions were likely to move in favour of directly elected 
status.  And May 2003 also saw the publication of the Regional Assemblies (Preparations) 
Act that provided for the referenda and local government reviews.  By June 2003 it was 
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openly known that the North West region would hold a referendum about the NWRA‟s 
directly elected status as well as any related local government changes in autumn 2004.  
 
The NWRA‟s annual report for the year 2002 – 2003 presents a scene of relatively stability, 
having overcome the period of turbulence with the stakeholders as mentioned above.  In the 
report, the then leader concentrates on this progress, stating that 
 
„the high point of the past year has seen the Assembly‟s relationships with our 
stakeholders come of age, particularly with our Economic and Social Partners.  
During the past year we have put behind us what were, in reality, limited 
disagreements with some business organisations and instead put in place a new 
era of co-operation which has led to both a massive expansion of stakeholder 
activity and their full involvement and influence of the growing regional agenda‟ 
 
         (NWRA 2003: 4). 
 
The report goes on to detail the NWRA‟s work and achievements over the year through the 
directorates and the „key priority groups‟ (KPGs) that had gradually developed.  It presents a 
staff structure and it also provides some information on the NWRA‟s executive board 
(through a list of KPG chairs) and its accounts, which taken all together demonstrates how the 
assembly was maturing as an organisation.  However, there is also evidence of the significant 
problems with in the local government sector of the assembly‟s membership.  Lancashire 
County Council‟s three assembly seats are all listed as vacant.  Each of the seats reserved for 
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Ellesmere Port and Neston Borough Council, Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council and 
Salford City Council are also vacant, as well as three of the local government co-opted seats. 
 
Lancashire County Council had historically been a fervent supporter of the regionalism, 
demonstrated by its early venture into Europe and its frontline position in the development of 
the North West Regional Association detailed above, but the particular course steered by the 
Labour Party in its development of the regional agenda to the ultimate directly elected 
position would have, it became clear, necessarily entailed the fragmentation of this large 
county council.  In early 2003, Lancashire County Council formally resigned from the 
assembly, but it cited as its reason the misuse of funds; it claimed that local authorities‟ 
subscription fees were being used to promote the idea of a directly elected assembly and that 
it was opposed to this in principle, that this was „crossing the line between “informing” the 
public and “campaigning” for a political objective‟ (Tomaney et al. 2003: 14).  A small 
number of other councils, too, either threatened to or actually did resign, or simply did not 
send representatives. 
 
Between August 2003 and May 2004, the much feared local government review was 
conducted by the Boundary Committee.  The results of this proposed a variety of options 
based around retaining a two tier system of local government or abolishing the Cheshire and 
Lancashire county councils to make way for a number of single tier authorities instead.  
Meanwhile, 2004 could be described as a landmark year for central government developments 
in relation to the regional assemblies.  In May 2004, the Government published the 
Compulsory Planning and Purchases Act, which granted the regional assembly planning 
powers and designated them the Regional Planning Boards (RPBs).  Two months later, the 
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draft Regional Assemblies Bill was ready, but in that same month, the Government 
announced the postponement of the planned referendum in the North West (as well as 
Yorkshire and the Humber, the third and final region selected for referendum).  Some claim 
that this was a response to a perceptible strengthening of the „“no” campaign‟ in the region, 
but the official Government line cited concerns over the postal voting system that had recently 
(- a month previously, in June 2004) experienced problems during the European Parliament 
elections (Pearce and Ayres 2007). 
 
On the 5
th
 November 2004, voters in the North East region returned a resounding „no‟ vote to 
the proposal of a directly elected regional assembly.  The regionalist project subsequently 
stalled and central government appeared to turn its attention away from the regional 
assemblies (and towards the forthcoming general election).  But, having closely witnessed this 
event in their neighbouring region, actors in the North West rather than turning away from the 
assembly, which technically had no reason not to continue, entered another period of 
reflection and rearrangement. 
 
Little tangible happened over the next year, apart from the negotiation of ideas between actors 
in the region and the exploration of interests between tiers of government and the region.  One 
not insignificant but rather mysterious event marked 2005 in the North West: the then chief 
executive officer left the assembly.  It was relayed through the interview data that this officer 
was suspended on full pay pending an inquiry into their use of funds, although this was 
neither confirmed nor denied by the assembly.  But some interviewees suggest this officer 
was encouraged to resign due to their inability to manage co-operation between assembly 
members.  The year 2006, too, was marked by an abrupt departure, this time by Trafford 
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Metropolitan Borough Council.  This local council had recently turned into a Conservative 
majority and, as an onlooker (a local authority colleague) reflected „[it was] a new 
administration, with a young, ambitious leader looking to toe the party line...  Basically, there 
was no specific reason...but it was big picture politics‟ (NWRA_LG06). 
 
However, in the meantime, Lancashire County Council returned to the NWRA.  And by the 
end of the assembly year 2005 – 2006, the annual report presented a new executive board 
structure based on the North West region‟s five sub-regions – Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside.  Three councillors from each of these regions and 
six social, economic and environmental partners now made up the executive board.  The full 
assembly i.e. members from each of the local authorities and the wider stakeholder group 
remained in place, although as a lower tier, and actors were in the process of working out 
procedures to mitigate against any disconnect between the two tiers (certainly with regard to 
the stakeholders, who were continuously trying to develop their mechanisms of 
communication, or accountability, between groups and layers) when the Government 
published the Sub-National Review in July 2007.  As is now famous in this thesis, the SNR 
called for the discontinuation of the regional assemblies in their (then) current form and 
function.  Thus, during the following consultation process that was framed in terms favouring 
more streamlined collaborative working arrangements in the regions, the NWRA effectively 
dropped the lower (full assembly) tier and rebranded the executive board as the new regional 
executive body (or „Leaders‟ Board,‟ by its technical title).  This, known as „4NW‟ (said „For 
North West‟), held its inaugural meeting on the 15th July 2008, effectively rendering the 
NWRA officially defunct. 
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The following table (7.1) summarises the events in the region, while the figure following that 
(7.2) goes some way to demonstrate the complexity of local government relations in the 
region, as it shows how the population in the region was and is concentrated in and around the 
large cities in the south of the region, giving these relative weight in the local government 
balances of power, despite the relatively small size of the individual units of local government 
(as at 2009).  Figure 7.1 below, however, shows the sub-regions that were predominant in this 
region‟s story. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The North West‟s sub-regions (Source: NWRA website) 
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Table 7.1 The changing North West region 
 
Phase: Time period Government output General structure of RA RA events Other events 
I: 1998 – 2002  Regional Development 
Agencies Act (Nov) 1998 
The NWRA receives 
designated status as the 
region‟s „chamber‟.  
Working arrangements are 
fairly informal.  
All of the region‟s 46 local 
authorities are involved.   
The NWRA‟s stakeholder 
component expands from 
6/7 to 22. 
  
   
  June 2001 UK general 
election; the Labour 
Party wins a second 
term 
 
 
Your Region, Your Choice: 
Revitalising the English 
Regions (White Paper) 
(May 2002) 
 Sep ‟01 Liverpool and 
Manchester sign a Joint 
City Concordat 
 
 
 Mar ‟02 The „walk-out‟ 
 
 
2002 Manchester hosts 
the Commonwealth 
Games 
II: 2002 – 2005  Regional Assemblies 
(Preparations) Act (May) 
2003 
The structure is formalised: 
56 local government seats 
(all 46 local authorities and 
10 co-opted from local 
government for political 
party balance) and 24 
social, economic and 
environmental votes. Total 
membership is 80, although 
not all seats are filled. 
 
 
 Dec ‟02 – May ‟03 
Soundings exercise; NW to 
hold referendum 
 Mar ‟03 Lancashire CC 
resigns 
 
Compulsory Planning and 
Purchases Act (May) 2004 
 Aug ‟03 – May ‟04 Local 
government review by the 
Boundary Committee 
 
June 2004 European 
Parliament elections 
(regional; postal) 
Regional Assemblies Bill 
(July 2004) 
 Jul ‟04 NW referendum 
postponed 
 Nov ‟04 NE referendum 
“no‟ vote‟ 
 
 
 
May 2005 UK general 
election; the Labour 
Party wins a third term 
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III: 2005 – 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2009) 
 An Executive Board with 
three local government 
representatives from each of 
the five sub-regions, plus 
six SEEPs forms an upper 
tier to the full assembly. 
The KPGs are then 
streamlined. 
 
 
The full assembly becomes 
defunct, the Executive 
Board becomes the region‟s 
“Leaders‟ Forum‟ and the 
NWRA is discontinued. 
 Mar ‟05 NWRA Chief 
Executive officer leaves 
 
  Mar ‟06 Trafford 
Metropolitan Borough 
Council resigns 
 
Review of Sub-National 
Economic Development and 
Regeneration (part of HM 
Treasury‟s Comprehensive 
Spending Review) (July 
2007) 
Prosperous Places: Taking 
Forward the Review of Sub-
National Economic 
Development and 
Regeneration (consultation 
document) (March 08) 
 
Local Democracy, 
Economic Development and 
Construction Act (Nov) 
2009 
 (indefinite) Lancashire 
County Council returns 
 
 
 
 
 Mar ‟08 – Jun ‟08 SNR 
consultation process  
 
 
 
 Jul ‟08 „4NW‟ launched 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 Liverpool is 
European Capital of 
Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
(Apr‟ 09 Manchester 
selected as a „City-
Region‟ pilot 
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Figure 7.2 The North West region, showing population concentration (Source: ONS 2001a) 
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7.2 Stories supporting institutional development 
 
Having gained an overview of the general development of the North West region and its 
assembly from the previous section, attention can now be focussed on the issue of 
institutional design/change.  This does not mean that the account given above will now be 
translated into academic prose in constructivist institutionalist terms because, as explained in 
previous chapters, the new institutionalist understanding of „institution‟ does not translate to, 
in this case, the regional assembly as a whole or as an entity (like it may have done under the 
„old‟ paradigm of institutionalism, but would here be distinguished as an organisation rather 
than an institution).  It refers to a rule – a regulated pattern of behaviour that helps to realise 
and maintain the assembly.  In the case of the NWRA, whilst there are examples of actors 
altering the assembly structure (for example most clearly with the creation of the Executive 
Board), this research is explicitly and primarily concerned with the clear example of 
institutional design/change that underpinned that organisational change, of how the pattern of 
representation was modified from the wider assembly to that executive board.   
 
In the NWRA, actors took the rule regarding councillor representation that was based on the 
standard principle of „one man, one vote‟ – which would have been translated into the 
regional context as „one council, one vote‟ – and changed this so that three councillors would 
represent a sub-region.  Likewise, the councillors‟ stakeholder counterparts had to be 
streamlined from the wider SEEP group to fit with the executive board.  There is little 
information available about how this was decided upon – the account above indicates a 
whirlwind of activity in the assembly year 2005-6 but there remains numerous unanswered 
questions about how this change happened.  It is this process of institutional design/change 
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that will now be focussed upon, by drawing out interviewees‟ stories that helped to realise 
that institutional design/change.  
 
The North West „was always‟ five sub-regions   
In order to create a rule which stipulated that councillors must represent the North West on a 
sub-regional basis, the sub-regions themselves had to be created, or rather, they had to be 
reconstructed or remembered.  Thus, interviewees, whilst reporting on the rule change, told a 
story about the pre-existence of the five sub-regions.  And it is always specifically a pre-
existence i.e. it is always told in a reverse order.  The (crudely distilled) forwards plot of this 
story would be set in a scene of five sub-regions, which (one day) attempted to work together 
on a region-wide basis and, having then experienced problems, returned to the more than 
adequate, indeed better, sub-regional pattern of collaborative working.  But the story is never 
told in this order – the sub-regions are not mentioned at the outset but referred back to as if it 
is common knowledge or generally accepted that they were always there. 
 
This story appeals to the past which, although not quite looked upon as some „golden age‟ of 
sub-national government, was constructed as comfortably familiar.  The notion of the sub-
region was perceptibly, to those involved, a rehashing of the former metropolitan county 
councils of Greater Manchester and Merseyside (which had been abolished in 1986) and also 
a confirmation to those county councils still intact – particularly the audibly fearful 
Lancashire County Council – that they would in effect remain so.  Indeed, the „sub-region‟ 
label can be understood as a new term that is effectively synonymous with the county – many 
councillor respondents used the two interchangeably.  Maintaining that the North West had 
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always been five sub-regions in this way allowed the process of institutional development to 
be more palatable than introducing some threatening, additional layer of bureaucracy. 
 
Interviewees lean on the point that the chair of the board had always (or at least as long as 
there was a chair with the board in its former, pre-executive guise) rotated around the five 
sub-regions.  And, to assert the relatively long-standing tendency towards sub-regional 
identification, they recall that attempts to organise any local government association were 
more successful along county lines than for the wider region, even as the NWRA started to 
take shape: 
 
„There were attempts to set one up and in fact, the Assembly tried to, sort of, act 
as a midwife and set up a North West local government association and we got to 
the point really of having someone to Chair it and we appointed a lead authority 
and there were a number of things that were set up on that basis, but there never 
seemed to be any impetus behind it‟ 
(NWRA_LG05). 
Another councillor admitted „I was Chair of it [the NWLGA] for 12 months and I don‟t think 
we ever met‟ (NWRA_LG06). 
 
Whilst interviewees (particularly councillors) direct attention to these sub-regional LGAs, it 
quickly becomes clear that it is only the Greater Manchester sub-region‟s association – the 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) – that has a significant impact.  
Merseyside‟s attempt to form a local government association did not take hold like it did in 
Greater Manchester, however Merseyside is still said to identify at the sub-regional level due 
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to its particularly poor socio-economic circumstances during the 1980s and 90s that led to it 
having its own (regional) Government Office until 1998 (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007).  
Indeed, Merseyside, as well as Cumbria, had only relatively recently been forged into the 
North West region.  The Cumbrian sub-region has historically and culturally had greater links 
further northwards and eastwards.  And, finally, the sub-regions of Cheshire and Lancashire 
had long clung to their status and identity as large counties.   
 
These features all play a significant part in commentators‟ views that the North West is one of 
England‟s most fragmented regions (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007; Pearce & Ayres 2007), 
and thus into the notion that it has „always been‟ an area of five sub-regions.  Hence, if the 
development of a sense of regional identity had been hampered by the predominance of the 
city (and county) identities (Dimitriou and Thompson 2007), this move to rally around the 
sub-regions helped to move towards a regional identity by appealing to, or at least not 
threatening, the identities that were already present whilst simultaneously appealing to, or 
rather promoting, something unique to the North West.   
 
The sub-regions story also appeared to solve the problems that the NWRA had been suffering, 
namely the rather intertwined issues of party politics and localism here.  The hindrance to 
region-wide collaborative working caused by party politics and localism was the central 
complaint in this story.  The assembly arena had thus far been used by a number of politicians 
to play out national party political battles over the point and principle of regional assemblies 
in general, and many councillors, needing to be seen to be working on behalf of their locality 
for the sake of renewing votes, were struggling to „make the leap‟ in representing the region.  
  
  
   
  
235 
 
One interviewee observed how some „politicians used to come for a button fight – to have a 
nice political row and to go home and forget about it‟ (NWRA_LG02).   
 
A stakeholder involved in the meetings described how the assembly 
 
„went through a whole period and intensified as the question of moving towards 
democratically elected regional government came up the political agenda – those 
that were opposed to that utilised the existing assembly as a means of kind of 
pursuing that agenda.  So, I mean, we had some fairly, kind of, not uncomfortable, 
but I mean really unproductive sort of meetings where we were kind of, you 
know-, one of the Conservatives would turn up [...] and you know, it was just 
constantly a kind of a-, anything on the agenda, no matter how distant from the 
question of the future of regional government, it was always the occasion for a 
speech, you know, attacking regional government.  I have to say, they always 
used to go when the BBC cameras left, like, so there was always this kind of, you 
know, the fairly sterile politics of it around the time of the-, particularly at the 
height when we were in the regional government debates‟  
(NWRA_SEEP03). 
 
True to the adversarial nature of British politics, the Conservative councillors probably took 
this approach because of the dominance of Labour Party representatives at the regional level.  
The institutional development of representation on a sub-regional executive board format was 
constructed as the solution:  
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„The reasons why the Executive Board is different: it‟s sub-regionally based – the 
sub-regions decide their own membership and that takes the politics away 
instantly because people are thinking geographically rather than party politically.  
You all of a sudden build a position of trust with politicians that aren‟t Labour led, 
because they all of a sudden are in a forum that listens to them so you don‟t have 
that suspicion‟  
(NWRA_LG02). 
 
This interviewee was heavily involved in this process of institutional reconstruction and 
talked about the attempt to steer councillors‟ thinking away from re-election locally towards 
re-election (sub-)regionally, thus towards thinking almost regionally more generally: 
 
„...the opportunity to spend lots – in our region it was £1.3 billion of regional 
funding allocation on local authorities‟ projects for transport… Great! But how do 
you build regional consensus around that?  Well, you certainly don‟t do it in a 
party political way. So how do you take party politics out of it? You base it 
geographically, you get politicians thinking about what they care about as much 
as, more than even, you know, the prospects for re-election.  If you‟re a politician 
and you can say because of your involvement in this Executive Board, you know, 
the collective view of the Executive Board has delivered your transport project 
[...] you can say through your involvement you steered through a major 
infrastructure investment which is going to affect your area positively, the 
prospect of getting re-elected is quite high, and that‟s what politicians care about 
most.  But what they care about next most is their locality because the media lives 
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in locality rather than in region. And what they care about next most is then the 
party politics.  So if you can tap into their locality interest and their own personal 
political interest in getting re-elected and having a say over large sums of money – 
[that‟s] a regional function that was meaningful‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
  
Developing an „effective‟ and „efficient‟ streamlined NWRA   
Running concurrently with the story that looked back to move forward is a story of how 
actors faced frontwards, attempting to construct a way of working that would be effective and 
efficient.  This story concentrates on the benefits of streamlining the assembly towards the 
executive board, thus it aspires towards that end.  In doing so, it constructs the (then) current 
assembly as in a state of chaos, riddled by walkouts and threats of more. 
 
With regards to the local government component, the first big blow came from Lancashire 
County Council: 
 
„Lancashire left, biggest authority, well, one of the biggest authorities in the 
region […]  Now, they left with something specific […] – they left because they 
saw that we were promoting directly elected regional government, right, which 
they vehemently disagreed with because it meant the demise of Lancashire 
because a prerequisite of directly elected regional government was single tier local 
government, as it was in Wales and Scotland.  So they left, they came back in and 
I was the person stood at the door to greet [named individual]‟ 
(NWRA_LG06). 
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This excerpt from the transcript of a local authority colleague of the NWRA member in 
question demonstrates, particularly in the last sentence, the brevity of the Lancashire‟s 
episode but it also, therefore, points to the precariousness of the times.  
 
Besides Lancashire County Council, there were threats of yet more walkouts: 
 
„What happened – and you go back now to the 2005 general election – Michael 
Howard, the then leader of the Tories said, when we get elected, we will abolish 
Regional Assemblies, because they‟ve took power from local authorities.  
Trafford, being a new administration, with a leader that‟s extremely politically 
ambitious, a friend of mine, as it happens, said, right, it‟s a waste of money and 
we‟re going to leave.  Now, the theory was that a lot of other Tory authorities 
would do the same.  They never did, right?  So, it was a touch of, you know, we‟ll 
lead the charge‟ 
(NWRA_LG06). 
  
There was as much, if not more, volatility with regards to the assembly stakeholders, too:  
 
„The NWRA had run into a period where it was not-, it wasn't running its affairs 
very well.  It was trying to do too much.  It was driven, I think, by a desire to 
show that the regional development agency didn‟t hold all the strings and that the, 
you know, the assembly needed to have a say on all sorts of different, you know, 
pretty well the whole gamut of everything that was going on in the region.  As a 
result, it didn‟t really do anything very well and it lost its credibility.  Its meetings 
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were badly run, very contentious and people from groups like the CBI and the 
Institute of Directors and the Federation of Small Businesses, those sort of 
organisations which had been part of the assembly, just walked away.  They 
actually walked out of a meeting and they tried to suggest that we should walk out 
as well‟ 
(NWRA_SEEP02). 
 
A particularly dramatic account was given by an interviewee who described the stakeholder 
group as a „small cabal‟ led by a particular individual (who the interviewee referred to by 
name).  The following extract gives a flavour of the chaos constructed around the issue:  
 
„Our SEEP group was totally dysfunctional […].  They were essentially a group 
of about 6 or 7 people, who carried 24 votes with them, around with them in their 
pockets.  They had pulled the drawbridge, they‟d closed themselves off, they were 
totally undemocratic and unrepresentative, and they left out vast swathes of what 
was coming to be the work of the assembly.  And in a sense it wasn‟t their fault 
because they‟d been led to this place because basically all that we had wanted 
from the SEEP group was to say that we had a SEEP group, to tick that box and to 
carry on with the important business, which was to get ourselves to a place where 
we could put ourselves in the running for elected status‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
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It is from this basis that the executive board structure could quite easily be promoted.  
Interviewees highlighted the efficiency and effectiveness of the executive board structure by 
comparing and contrasting the added value of participation in this than the assembly in its 
previous guise.  For example, one interviewee emphasised the apolitical or technocratic nature 
of this streamlined format, describing it as „only a decision-making body‟ and adding  
 
„we don‟t present papers to them for information.  We present papers to the 
advisory groups for information and then they form advice to present advice to the 
Executive Board for decision.  The Executive Board is made up of local authority 
leaders, of leaders of political groups from local authorities.  So it‟s got that kind 
of high-level representation, which is important because it‟s, you know, if you‟re 
forcing all the decision-making element to them, you have to have people who are 
used to making decisions‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
 
These interview extracts demonstrate that in the process of institutional reconstruction there is 
much promotion of this new operating procedure as a way of giving councillors the 
opportunity to have a greater impact through sub-regional working and so to gain much more 
from their participation.  But the novelty of it is somewhat played down; this effective and 
efficient executive board model is presented as the logical or obvious choice: 
 
„It all mitigates towards this model.  Well, how do you do that? You get it 
regionally based. Sub-regionally based with 80 members?  Well, no, that‟s 
ridiculous. So you whittle it down.  So, what do you replace? What was the 
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problem? The old Policy Group was a forum of bedlam, a mass of arguments – it 
really was a group which people walked out of on a regular basis.  You replace 
that with a board.  You give that board decision making powers, because you 
can‟t have people at higher, you know, you bring on people at higher level – it‟s 
just not rocket science‟ 
  (NWRA_LG02). 
 
The crisis of the „North East “no” vote‟ 
As chapter 2 details, the referendum in the North East region on the issue of directly elected 
status for the assemblies was a significant event for regionalism generally.  In the North West, 
it was critical.  Interviewees recollect a preoccupation in the North West with potentially 
gaining directly elected status and so hastily designing a structure towards that aim.  
Following the referendum in the North East region, in which the idea failed to gain public 
support, the referendum planned in the North West was postponed indefinitely and assembly 
actors faced an uncertain situation.  This became an appropriate time for a shake-up.  The 
North East referendum became the hook to hang (or sometimes to blame) change.  The „“no” 
vote‟ was constructed into a crisis to which the NWRA had to respond.  This crisis preface, 
and the tempo in which it was told, galvanised the necessity of a pre-emptive strike – the 
North West had to seize this opportunity.   
 
The NWRA actors had to be strategic with their choices – they had to use their insider 
knowledge and they had to discern and appeal to the central government mood at the time so 
as to ensure that a their proposals would be accepted.  Thus, the NWRA echoed the 
buzzwords of „impact,‟ „effective‟ and, most significantly, „streamlined,‟ and reflected these 
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in the development of the executive board structure.  Changing the way that councillors 
performed their function of representing the region (i.e. with fewer representatives, justified 
by the new sub-regional format) was a necessary part of creating an innovative, streamlined 
assembly.  Here, an interviewee describes the perception of necessity: 
 
„If we‟d have been a Regional Assembly directly elected, I wish, right, we would 
have had statutory powers.  We would have been there, we would have been, you 
know, a reality, where we were almost an abstract reality, if that's not bad 
grammar, because we were there, you know, voluntarily, kind of recognised by 
government, you know and once we weren't going to have directly elected 
regional government anywhere, it became kind of, it had to be smaller, it had to be 
fit for purpose, you know, it had to be more focussed and the obvious way to do 
that was to be more sub-regional‟ 
(NWRA_LG06). 
 
One interviewee describes    
 
„one set of arguments-, I mean the point at which we were creating this new 
executive board was, this was the answer to the question of, what on earth do we 
do now the North East referendum has gone down.  What‟s plan B?  It was clear 
that government opposition, social partners, you know, the kind of the assembly 
in the format it was at the time of the North East referendum wasn‟t sustainable.  
[…] There was a sense of policy draft nationally.  I mean, the argument was that, 
unless we get our act together, one of two things will happen: either the whole 
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project just collapses and there isn‟t a regional voice and we‟re back to this, kind 
of, we‟ll lose out because other regions will be better organised, or that central 
government will come up with some kind of plan B.  It might not be what we 
want. […] So the argument was, if we can come up with a set of propositions that 
says, we‟ve brought together in a streamlined and effective way, you know, a 
body that reflects all the key interests in the region that can take decisions on 
behalf of the region, that can respond to things like the regional funding 
allocations exercise in a mature and blah de blah de blah.  That‟s a potential 
model because we know the government is still looking for a plan B.  This is it‟ 
(NWRA_SEEP03). 
 
 
This extended excerpt includes a number of elements from the other stories and so 
demonstrates how they cut across each other.  This story constructs the North East „“no” vote‟ 
as a crisis, as a reason to revise some of the aspects of regional working that had, quite 
simply, not been working.  It connects to and draws upon the other stories by complaining 
about the previous chaos with regards to local authority and stakeholder walkouts and threats 
(as in the „streamline‟ story) as well as by pointing to the logic of working on a sub-regional 
basis (as in the story of the sub-regions, presented first above).  It justifies the move by 
referring to the wider national context, specifically the North East and central government.  
Actors in the North West faced, and perhaps resented or feared, having a central government 
model eventually and suddenly imposed upon them.  Therefore, they took the lead in revising 
their institutional arrangements. 
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This move is given a positive spin.  It is not just reactionary.  It is logical and pragmatic.  
Indeed, it is not just logical and pragmatic but it is something to aspire towards for the good 
of the NWRA. As one interviewee put it  
 
„what we‟re putting in place is something that‟s pragmatic, that‟s been shown to 
work, that‟s adaptable to most of the foreseeable changes to the new regional 
landscape and it ensures that the people out there know that there‟s a plan and that 
their jobs are safe, and that it should be a smooth transition‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
 
This quotation demonstrates the instinct for survival that is drawn out in the story.  The North 
East „“no” vote‟ story, in this sense, presents the overall picture.  Indeed, it points to the 
overall picture of the national scene.  The story effectively unites the actors involved in the 
assembly together behind the common cause of the North West, aspiring to create something 
for the North West that would endure through the period of uncertainty.  In so doing, there 
were relatively clear undertones of the tensions between the central-local/regional (or, here, 
sub-regional) relations, pointing to the different group positions involved in this process of 
institutional design/change.  
 
 
7.3 The Stories Reframed 
 
The previous section filters out and presents the main events, the main stories in the overall 
history of institutional development, across the North West data.  In doing so, what is also 
  
  
   
  
245 
 
revealed is the difficulty in putting these together.  Stories are more or less naturally present in 
the data but can be given in varying degrees of cohesiveness, sometimes choppily fragmented 
over a transcript and sometimes given in large chunks.   The analytical toolkit employed to 
detect and arrange the stories – that conceptual framework of complaint, justification and 
aspiration – is helpful, but it becomes obvious that the data need to be placed into those 
categories.  As an overall pattern, they are present, but they are broken up and confused by 
parts of each other.  The original narratives are a medley of cross-cutting stories and, whilst 
they can be distilled into separate streams, their degree of artificiality comes to the fore. 
 
It becomes obvious that the stories could not stand alone and, intuitively, it seems that 
something is missing.  Given that the stories charted are those told in and for the process of 
institutional design/change, it follows that they are necessarily success stories towards that 
end.  They tell the implicitly agreed version of events that help to justify the decisions made 
in the process.  Thus, they can be understood to be the „public relations‟ versions – those that 
tell the „good bits‟ and gloss over the grievances and disagreements.  But these reveal 
themselves during the process of data collection: as the researcher learns more from each 
successive interview, the questions posed are reframed to probe further into some of the more 
controversial parts of the stories.  This represents the process of building rigour into the 
analysis – the constant critical reflection affords attention to the ambivalence detected in 
building the stories.  There is more than stories overlapping and intertwining with each other 
– there are instances of hesitance and evidence of conflict, though these are quickly brushed 
over.   
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In a sense, this is not surprising because, as stated above, the stories are designed – they are 
constructed, they are discursively selected – and their sharing is effectively implemented as a 
way of quietening and/or overcoming conflict for the process of institutional design/change.  
But for rigorous analysis, this has to be brought into the research process.  To this end, it is 
necessary for an additional part to the analysis.  And for this, the concept of frames again, or 
more precisely the process of reframing anew, becomes useful.  Whilst there is an agreed 
version of events, there are also moments of tension represented in the data as instances when 
interviewees seemingly drift in and out of shallow and deep focus.  Here they are reframing 
stories, telling (or, indeed, not telling) the stories from a different angle, almost as if 
convincing themselves of the argument or the plot they are giving.  What is uncovered in the 
process of probing this reframing is the original frame or group perspective/position (as those 
explored in the West Midlands case study) from which the story is told.  It effectively undoes 
the stories to an extent at the fragile seams and thus demonstrates how the story was woven 
together by the actors.   
 
This brings the two parts of the analysis together – the frames and the stories – with the 
process of reframing being the mechanism that demonstrates their link.  This act of reframing 
also demonstrates, more widely to the thesis, what actors discursively do to overcome 
differences and tensions in processes of institutional design/change.  They share stories that 
reframe their original positions and, in the process, they design and change together 
institutions in sites where there is ambiguity over pre-existing institutions.  This section takes 
the stories presented in the previous section and reanalyses the data from a different angle in 
an attempt to unearth the original group positions.  It must be noted, however, that this is not 
an attempt to distil the „truth‟ – it is not assumed that the versions presented here are the „real‟ 
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stories that have been smothered in some conspiratorial act.  Instead, the analytical process of 
reframing the stories enables an appreciation of how these resultant intersubjective products 
(the shared assembly stories) might have been discursively selected and put together in the 
first or earlier instance.   
 
The NWRA or Greater AGMA? 
The first story, in building up the idea of the sub-regions, draws on the pre-existing guises of 
those sub-regions in the form of the (then) current as well as the former county council areas.  
The former Greater Manchester and Merseyside metropolitan county councils as well as the 
undeniably distinct and vast areas of Cheshire, Cumbria and Lancashire are discursively 
constructed as having always existed as fairly separate sub-regions.  The relative strength and 
autonomy of the Greater Manchester and Lancashire sub-regions, in particular, are recognised 
as is the successful longevity of the Greater Manchester sub-region‟s local government 
association – the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA).  It is noted in the 
second story that Lancashire County Council was not insignificantly disruptive to the regional 
assembly project, but Greater Manchester via AGMA is generally portrayed as a constructive 
lead. 
 
However, probing this „constructive lead‟ further, it appears that AGMA was viewed by some 
as almost in full control of the institutional design/change of the NWRA, hence the 
description of the NWRA as a „greater AGMA‟ at times.  Within one interview, the power of 
AGMA is gradually revealed, beginning with the statement that „AGMA is massively 
powerful…it‟s not as united as it used to be, simply because Labour‟s lost councils, but it‟s 
still massively powerful‟ and developing into a seemingly neutral though nervous report that 
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„they‟ve been likened to gangsters and the mafia and all the rest of it, but they are all powerful 
and they‟re also, even now, with different parties taking control of certain things, they‟re still 
very powerful‟ (NWRA_LG06).  Finally, a specific individual is named in the transcript as 
someone with whom the interviewee dealt with „quite extensively to do with the 
reorganisation and it was very much the model that [named individual] wanted and developed 
through AGMA and then through to the region‟ (NWRA_LG06). 
 
This demonstrates how AGMA was viewed as having played a significant role in the 
development of the particular sub-regional model of the NWRA that transpired. However, 
some went further and to suggest that the whole sub-regional, streamlining and executive 
board effort was almost entirely driven by AGMA‟s lead.  The following interviewee 
condenses the whole process from the wider NWRA to the current „Leaders‟ Board‟ structure 
via AGMA:  
 
„The Regional Assembly was, in effect, telescoped into what is now the For North 
West, but it was set up with a Regional Assembly meeting, say, once a year, but 
with an Executive, North West Regional Executive that was very much affirming 
the sub-regional structure of the North West, so that a board was set up with equal 
numbers from each of the five sub-regions, but with voting power, not accorded to 
Councils, but according to each sub-region, so obviously AGMA would have the 
biggest percentage of the vote and so on, even though each of the sub-regions had 
three members, so that would make three fives are fifteen, there was then the 
question of, what about the Economic and Social Partners, they then came in with, 
I think they have nine members now, so that became For North West with a Chair, 
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they set up and the Chair has always been someone from AGMA, so it was 
[named individual] until last year, now it‟s [named individual].  I mean, that 
signifies the dominance, if you like, of AGMA in the region and they set up then a 
system of committees for transport, housing, economic development, audit and 
they were, sort of, balanced proportionately according to the sub-regions and 
that's where we are today and there is a tripartite agreement between Government 
Office, the Development Agency and For North West, as it‟s now become, to 
take, which is called the Regional Partnership, to take forward things like 
agreements on the regional funding allocations and so on‟ 
(NWRA_LG07). 
 
It is certainly a lengthy extract, but this is because it locates both the wider and longer-term 
trajectory of institutional design/change for the region in the hands of AGMA.  Taking the 
data here presented together demonstrates that the sub-regions were not quite „always there‟ 
as much as would be reasonably assumed from the regular repetition of this idea by the 
interviewees.  The data here does not exactly „disprove‟ this notion, indeed it demonstrates 
that the sub-regions were entrenched to varying degrees, but what it draws out is the 
dominance of one sub-region in particular.  What is therefore implicated is the idea that „there 
were always five sub-regions in the North West‟ was discursively selected and strategically 
promoted as a story, persuading the actors involved who were both listeners and then tellers 
of the story, and that this thus allowed AGMA to entrench its dominance.  This actor was able 
to strategically use its context to construct and argue for a material reality in the form of the 
executive board with its streamlined representation.  The elements are mutually constitutive, 
reinforcing each other.  And it is the work of a powerful actor – of AGMA – which was 
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arguably empowered by the pre-existing institutional context, though this too was constructed 
and reinforced by the perception (an ideational element) of empowerment.  
 
What is also emerging is the lack of analytical clarity about the actor involved.  It is usually 
AGMA as a bloc that is described as the almighty, hence the description in the previous 
paragraph of AGMA as a single actor.  However, data presented earlier in this section points 
to named individuals.  The analysis follows the data; on occasions AGMA as a single unit is 
demarcated and solidified against others and on other occasions AGMA can be penetrated to 
decipher certain individuals that make it so.  The following extract demonstrates the 
oscillation between the two: 
 
„In AGMA, throughout all of the period that we‟re talking about, there has been 
one Chairman [...].  There has been one leader of Manchester City Council [...] 
and together, they have taken the other eight authorities along with them.  Now, 
that‟s never occurred, no disrespect to the powers that be at Liverpool City 
Council, but there's never been a situation where there's been anyone at Liverpool 
who has been able to, sort of, bring the leadership to bear, to get everybody 
behind the common cause and I think that's a, plus the fact, I mean, once we 
moved, I mean, once the Regional Assembly was set up in Wigan, which was in 
Greater Manchester and in fact was the shared building, which was the home of 
AGMA, the secretariat of AGMA was across the corridor from the officers of the 
Assembly and it was geographically impossible for the Assembly not to take into 
account, very much so, the views of AGMA on everything‟ 
(NWRA_LG07). 
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This extract also touches upon AGMA‟s rivalry with Merseyside, or more specifically the 
rivalry between Manchester and Liverpool that is taken as accepted common knowledge in 
the region (or with reference to the competing airports for those not au fait).  There is also a 
degree of rivalry, or perhaps only a slightly competitive mutual respect, between Greater 
Manchester and Lancashire, which has been demonstrated as another sub-regional force to be 
reckoned with.  Thus, there are a number of frames within the local government component of 
the assembly with varying degrees of strength or relevance to the institutional design/change 
process.  
 
A regional elite? 
In the second story regarding the streamlining of the wider assembly into an executive board 
structure with representation from the sub-regions and a smaller stakeholder component, the 
original group positions were significantly easier to decipher.  A number of reasons could 
account for this.  Firstly, the task of arranging the stakeholder component around and for the 
new executive board structure was still being finalised at the time of data collection, hence for 
some the wounds were still raw and the fissures between groupings visible (relative to the 
contained conflicts between sub-regions within the local government part of the NWRA).  
Secondly, the rationale in this story did not have as long or as established a back-story as the 
sub-regions story could draw upon (which, on a more theoretical level, points to the role of 
persuasion and argumentation implicit in the stories).  Finally, despite the previous point 
about specific points of history that can be drawn upon, it is of note that the chronology is 
often hazy with specific regard to the streamlining of stakeholders.  The critical „walk-out‟ 
that is drawn upon happened significantly earlier and was, for many stakeholders at least, 
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understood as resolved.  That it was brought up in this story demonstrates that for others it 
was not resolved, and it also provides a clear example of discursive selection. 
 
By now it is clear that there was a leader in the local government section of the assembly.  
The following quotation offers an account of how AGMA came to assert itself and, 
significantly, it points out towards other actors on the region scene (wider than the assembly):   
 
„Well, after the vote was lost and after the campaign for regional government, 
after that failed, it was quite a deflated really and there was a question of what are 
we about and that lent credence to those who said that it‟s got behind its remit and 
the need to be a cut back and it came to a head, in a small way really, in budget 
discussions, cut backs were forced upon [the Chief Executive] who came under 
great pressure and I think that's where AGMA started to flex its muscles in terms 
of saying, well, look, unless the Regional Assembly sorts itself out and takes 
notice of us, we‟ll do our own thing and that was the writing on the wall, I think, 
plus the fact that the Development Agencies then went from strength to strength, 
no risk to their position and probably a feeling that they weren't as accountable as 
they had been previously‟ 
(NWRA_LG07). 
 
This sets the tone that for the reframing of this second story so as to include other actors in the 
region.  In the development of the streamlined executive board structure and its concomitant 
institutional design/change, there was a secondary but significant aim to create an entity that 
would be enduring (i.e. would withstand criticism from and even meet the approval of central 
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government in the first instance).  This was taken to necessitate the inclusion of „big business‟ 
in line with what was heard as the Government‟s likely wish at that point in time.  Thus, the 
earlier departure of high-profile business stakeholders was made to be significant again in 
order, firstly, to tempt such figures back and, secondly, to convince the others of their 
necessity.  
 
Given the (very small) amount of people involved in this process, it is difficult to reproduce 
data that demonstrates the divisions between groupings on this matter but that does not 
expressly names those individuals or make frequent reference to their business „constituency‟ 
(or lack thereof) thus rendering them identifiable.  The following quotation, however, 
summarises the situation and the feeling of the SEEP perspective:  
 
‟The Executive Board, in terms of stakeholder representation, was selected by the 
Board.  Now, the original three stakeholders they had on board were 
representatives of very large business interests in the region […], which is quite 
legitimate for them to want people with that level of business experience to be on 
board.  […] The other point about this – the three stakeholder representatives on 
the Executive Board that were initially co-opted were not members of the SEEP 
group, the stakeholder group, on the assembly and had no contact with that group.  
They were just, kind of, they were business men drafted in from outside, who had 
no other engagement with the business of the assembly.  I think you can probably 
imagine – we were dashed cross and continued being very cross…‟ 
(NWRA_SEEP05). 
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Unsurprisingly, there are more instances of softer tones when recounting this episode.  One 
local government interviewee, while attempting to direct attention away from the issue, put it 
quite simply – „there was a feeling that we didn‟t have any proper capitalists, right?‟ 
(NWRA_LG06).  Another stakeholder expressed a fair degree of understanding, attaching 
importance to the expected central government perspective:  
 
„So there was pressure on to produce an Executive Board that had, you know, 
kind of, the leading local authority leaders on plus individuals that would be 
clearly seen by central government as, you know, kind of key private sector 
people.  You wouldn‟t necessarily have got that if you‟d have simply gone 
through an electoral college process of the existing Social and Economic Partners 
Group because you still had the problem with [named individual] being outside, 
so on and so forth.  I can well see there‟ll be some interest groups that will see 
that senior politicians have wanted to pick and choose who […] came to the table 
and people will question various motives.  I think the motive to it was very much 
a kind of, we need to demonstrate to central government that we‟ve got […] 
leading figures from the private sector‟  
(NWRA_SEEP03).   
 
The story of central-regional relations 
There is a clear undercurrent to all the collected interview data that draws attention to the 
relationship between the region and the thing – the force or entity – with which it constantly 
works.  The North East „“no” vote‟ story makes clear reference to central government, as do 
most mentions of the executive board structure and the necessary streamlining that was 
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entailed in this development.  However, it is the tone of the reference that alters somewhat 
depending on how the situation is being framed.  At times this is expressed as the Labour 
Party or specific named individuals within it who are particularly sympathetic to the 
regionalist project, generating mutually beneficial engagement, and at other times this is 
expressed with relative hostility, as a tale of „us-and-them‟ in which the region is jostling 
against central government variously labelled „Westminster,‟ „London‟ or „Down South.‟   
 
The process of framing and reframing the story plays on the geography of region.  Its distance 
from the location of central government, where decisions about it are made and instructions 
for it are given, can be used to create a common enemy of central government behind which 
the NWRA members can pull together.  But more frequently interviewees describe the 
relationship in a more neutral manner, using the distance as a factor that relates to and helps to 
justify the very existence of the NWRA as well as the whole regionalisation project.  This is 
obviously the collectively developed version.  Eager to convince outsiders of the value of 
their work, assembly members are accustomed to and even anxious to repeat this point when 
questioned about any and every aspect of assembly business.   
 
In the collective North East „“no” vote‟ story, the development of the executive board story is 
presented as something that was desired – the actors here were doing this because they wanted 
to – and the approval of central government was a supplementary „tick box‟ exercise that was 
mentioned in passing.  Probing this matter and this relationship further, however, reveals an 
attitude more aligned with a sense of duty – the actors were doing this because they had to.  
This demonstrates the nested or embedded quality of the institutional design/change process.  
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Despite the autonomy that was granted to the regional institutional design/change process, the 
actors perceived themselves to be part of a system that requires central government approval.   
 
This is undeniably true, or it demonstrates that the widespread perception of the necessity of 
central government approval made this true.  It is still a discursively selected understanding 
that is acted upon, which is brought to light by the positive spin that can be put on the 
relationship.  The distance and difference of the North West from London (and its other 
labels) is occasionally used to promote the potential leadership of the NWRA in the 
development of regional institutions and structures and thus the value of a degree of 
autonomy for the region.  Reconstructing the rule of councillor representation on a sub-
regional basis and forming an executive board makes the North West the „model‟ region.  
 
Data on this point are peppered throughout the transcripts because actors regularly frame the 
relationship from these two different angles described above.  However, more substantial 
portions of interview transcripts relating to the (then) latest central government agenda can 
demonstrate the different stances on the relationship.  On that central government agenda at 
the time of data collection was the HM Treasury‟s Review of Sub-National Economic 
Development and Regeneration, which called for a re-evaluation of working relationships 
between the regional bodies and for a reprioritisation of assembly core functions.  Actors in 
the North West region felt that they were already doing this, as one interviewee details:  
 
„In a sense the SNR plays just into our hands in that.  It‟s perhaps not the way we 
would have liked it to come about – it could have been a lot better and more 
supportive a document, but actually the single strategy we buy into completely.  It 
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makes sense to us the RDA having delivery powers if we have the power of 
strategic direction.  Any model that puts bureaucrats as politicians is 
unsustainable.  So the politicians that we bring to the table through our Executive 
Board, they will always make sure that they have the power to sign off and they 
will always make sure they have the power to influence strategic direction in the 
region‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
 
Interviewees draw comparisons with other regions, emphasising their own forward thinking, 
for example 
 
„I don‟t know what RDAs in other regions, the attitude they‟re taking, whether 
they‟re being triumphal, I do not know.  But in our region, our RDA is being a lot 
more realistic that this is about LAs, the powers LAs have.  SNR is all about LAs 
in my view and it‟s more effective and it makes life easier for the RDA in this 
region if they can talk to the LAs collectively through an Executive Board 
structure, which has already been shown to work, than individually‟ 
(NWRA_SEEP02). 
 
Always returning to the omnipresence of central government, many interviews conclude with 
some recognition that the North West region‟s proposals require a seal of approval, for 
example:  
 
  
  
   
  
258 
 
„So long as government don‟t shoot us down, this will continue.  And all the 
indications we have [...] we‟ve consistently, the message we‟ve got has been we 
like the North West model and we think the regions should have the freedom to 
come up with solutions that work in their own region – then I don‟t see any reason 
why that should not be approved… And the civil service also – although my own 
view is that it was the civil service that wrote the stakeholders out of the SNR and 
that it‟s they who have least appetite for stakeholder engagement, you know, even 
they accept the strengths of the new model‟ 
(NWRA_LG02). 
 
This quotation reveals the mixture of hope and expectancy.  Interviewees audibly try to tell 
the tales with enthusiasm and pride, as the new format not only promoted the criteria of 
impact with efficiency but it also foresaw and withstood the effect of the Government‟s 
agenda that shortly after decreed the discontinuation of the regional assemblies in their 
contemporaneous form.  The NWRA had become defunct but the newly branded „4NW‟ lived 
on. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the data generated from the North West Regional Assembly case 
study.  In it, I have distilled the data into story formats that were as close as possible to the 
format in which they were offered by the interviewees in the first instance.  There are three 
significant stories identified, the first of which centres around the long-standing and enduring 
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presence of five sub-regions in the North West.  Another story deals with the streamlining of 
the NWRA into a more effective and efficient format, working towards the institutionalisation 
of an executive board structure.  And a final story constructs a crisis of the negative North 
East referendum result. 
 
With reflection of this case study alongside the previous, it became necessary to probe deeper 
into those stories presented to ask questions about the groups of actors involved in 
constructing and sharing the stories.  Through this process of reframing the stories, I 
discovered the dominance of a particular actor in the region (AGMA).  This raised questions 
about who was effectively in control of the institutional design and change processes here, 
eventually distilling an elite set of actors in the region (AGMA included) that promoted the 
conveniently streamlined executive board.  And finally, the reframing of the North East „“no” 
vote‟ story confirms the inter- and intra-sectoral groupings present, but brings actors together 
for the aim of regional institutional development as against the region‟s common foe of 
central government.  
 
This chapter moves notably faster than the previous two, because it was no longer necessary 
to demonstrate the methodological (as well as theoretical, though to a lesser extent) 
development that accompanied the data analysis.  But this chapter still demonstrates the 
movement back and forth between the concepts, and the light this sheds on the data.  
Essentially, what is demonstrated is another layer of complexity in the institutional 
development story.  Here, it is less a battle between the local government actors and the 
stakeholders for greater influence as in the West Midlands assembly, but between particular 
units of local government and between particular stakeholders in the region for control of the 
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design process.  The construction of stories that can resonate with actors wider than the 
particular actor or set of actors vying for power is key, creating an inclusiveness that 
effectively contributes towards the design and sustenance of a representational format that 
would endure through the foreseeable move to discontinue the assemblies but retain a 
streamlined board in its place.  
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CHAPTER 8: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Thus far, I have presented the case studies of this thesis alongside the significant 
methodological development that has become a central part of this thesis.  I have attempted to 
demonstrate this as it speaks to the theoretical projections set out earlier in this thesis.  
However, I have perhaps done so to the detriment of the findings specifically as they relate to 
constructivist institutionalism.  This chapter attempts to redress this imbalance, demonstrating 
the strategic-relational behaviour of the actors and highlighting the selection behind their 
discursive offerings.  It is a relatively short chapter, mirroring the pause for reflection 
presented in chapter 6.  In a similar vein and format, it refreshes and clarifies the key findings 
of the preceding data chapters (through their interview data and repetition of regional 
assembly stories).  As such, it retains the detail of the findings, before more general 
conclusions can be drawn out in the following chapter.  
 
What is brought to the fore in this chapter is the role that comparing the case findings en route 
played in getting to the intersubjectivity of the cases i.e. to the discursive constructions that 
became shared and perpetuated understandings of the organisational divisions of 
representation in the assemblies, thus supporting their specific design.  This, to a large extent, 
resolves the dilemma described earlier about the ability to make comparisons and then draw 
general conclusions for the assemblies – the role of comparisons across case studies was not 
to explain institutional design and change processes in all the regional assemblies, but to instil 
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a critical reflex, more aligned to that of a more practiced researcher who can tacitly draw upon 
previous experiences of handling a wealth of primary data.  
 
 
8.1 Forming frames in the West Midlands Regional Assembly 
 
The case study of the West Midlands Regional Assembly, beginning in chapter 5, 
concentrates on the different groups of actors involved in the regional policy-making process 
and constructs their discursive constructions, or here their frames.  It details the local 
government, business stakeholder and other stakeholder group positions through distilling the 
interviewees‟ perceptions of their situation and their perceptions of themselves as well as their 
others, holding these together as their frames.  In this WMRA case, even the early, informally 
gathered data pointed to the significance of separate positioning of the actors, thereby 
enabling a conception and construction of frames as that web of references to the actor‟s 
perception of their situation, themselves and their others.   
  
According to local government interviewees, which included local government association 
employees who played a significant role on behalf of the local councillors, it was „natural‟ for 
local government to lead the institutional development of the WMRA.  Whilst there were a 
number of balances to be achieved internally in this sector, there was a clear goal and, 
effectively, a democratic mandate to work together for the greater good of the region.  Their 
relationship with the business sector had to be formalised and with the third sector had to be 
nurtured, and then the assembly would develop an identity apart from the LGA.  The business 
sector frame was marked by a cohesiveness born of similarity and practised collaboration as 
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well as a defensiveness born of an initial „snub‟ for some from the RDA.  The third sector had 
to manage their diversity and maintain their multiplicity of voice whilst forging an identity as 
the „other stakeholder group‟ that was distinct for its „otherness.‟ 
 
It is from the construction of these frames that instances of institutional design/change begin 
to emerge.  The local government example is quite straightforward.  The local government 
section describes itself as the „natural home and host‟ and from this takes the lead in the 
assembly‟s organisation.  The idea of „natural home and host‟ is a discursive selection and 
demonstrates strategic-relational behaviour.  It uses the commonly acknowledged and widely 
accepted „fact‟ that local government is a unit of „proper‟ formal government to assert a 
leading role for local government in this arena.  And „fact‟ is presented here in inverted 
commas because it is not incontestable in this context; it did not have to be a relevant piece of 
information here, but it was an idea that was discursively constructed as a fact of context.  The 
actors that voice this are relating their position to the pre-existing institutional context, taking 
(and creating) the understanding that sub-national government is (or should be) embedded in 
the wider system of government, and from this they are developing an idea of the 
appropriateness of their formal lead in a governmental arena.  This is their strategy to create a 
norm, hardened into a rule about councillor representation standing at a 70% proportion, 
which is then formalised further in the embodiment of the assembly‟s organisational structure 
via seat allocation.  This becomes institutionalised and would affect any subsequent attempts 
at design, having empowered the local government actors as lead designers.   
 
This presents a good example of strategic-relational and discursively generated institutional 
design/change in a site of institutional ambiguity.  This example demonstrates strategy 
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because the perception of local government as „natural home and host‟ helps to pursue an 
interest for local government, that is to gain (or as they saw it, „retain‟) a larger proportion of 
seats relative to the other actors involved.  It is relational because it draws on the surrounding 
context and its pre-existing institutions, in that it locates the regional assembly within the 
system of British government (rather than some novel form of voluntary tripartite 
governance).  It is strategic-relational because it draws authority from, and is therefore 
convincing because, it makes demands against that governmental backdrop.  It is strategic-
relational also because this was a matter of discursive selection, of choice.  This has already 
been revealed to some extent through this section‟s interpretation of government rather than 
governance, but recall that the WMRA never had to be as it was, indeed it never had to take 
any particular form or even exist at all because the institutional design for the RAs was a 
decision for the region (and hence its qualification, in part, as a site of institutional 
ambiguity).  Thus, the development of the 70% norm or rule was the result of uncontested 
discursive selection. 
 
The analysis above presents an example of strategic-relational and discursively generated 
institutional design/change in a site of institutional ambiguity, but it does not deal adequately 
with the intersubjectivity that is an explicit part of this research.  Arguably, there is already 
some degree of intersubjectivity involved in constructing the frames, because these are the 
group positions that have been formed and therefore represent a collection of different 
peoples‟ – the subjects – perspectives and opinions moulded into a single whole – the 
intersubjective.  This occurs not only by myself as the author of this research but also by the 
interview respondents as they answer questions about their involvement in the assembly, 
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particularly as relative to others.  This act itself could potentially contribute towards the 
discursive construction of that group collectivity and the strengthening of that group identity.   
 
This sectoral group identification and formation could be seen as a „first round‟ of 
intersubjectivity in institutional design/change, but, because the research was focussed on the 
institutional design/change of the regional assembly, there is not the data to support this 
claim.  More significantly, this data did not reveal itself, which suggests that the groupings 
did not become successfully institutionalised.  Indeed, the data pointed towards the lack of or 
the erosion of group divides in the process of and realising institutional design/change.  This 
begins to point to the intersubjectivity between groups, where the group is the subject and the 
intersubjective relates to the wider assembly that brings the groups together.  From this 
perspective, it could be seen that this tag-line of a „natural home and host‟ is an 
intersubjective product because it was not contested but accepted, thus becoming a WMRA 
truth.  This, in part, created a case for taking a different (story-based) approach to the next 
case study.  But, before that, the other sections of the WMRA case also pointed towards the 
revision of the concept of frames for analysing institutional design/change. 
 
Analysing attempts at institutional design/change from the business and other stakeholder 
groups was much more challenging, but there were a number of revelations of discursive 
selection and strategic-relational action.  In constructing the frames, the interviewees were 
probed about the relationships between the sectoral groupings and this induced reflections that 
compared as well as empathised with other positions (alongside answers that more closely 
fitted the questioning about roles and relationships).  From this position framing, the other 
stakeholder group, in particular, asserted their difference and defended their „inability‟ (as 
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they rightly supposed the local government section would probably see it) to speak with a 
single voice.  This revealed a good example of discursive selection by some of the OSG by 
their use of the idea of „participatory democracy‟ to justify and promote their internal 
diversity.  
 
What is less clear in this instance, however, is the strategic-relational action towards 
institutional design/change that results from or is supported by this discursive construction.  It 
is difficult to decipher because it is not easily viewed as an active action, but the OSG‟s 
strategy that related to their relative diversity as contextualised was their retention of that 
diversity.  There were multiple organisations that participated in the OSG, thus a multiplicity 
of voice and, effectively, connection to a wider demos (hence the reference to democracy).  
From one perspective, it could be viewed that this did not result in any specific institutional 
design/change because the OSG voice was superseded in the wider assembly context.  
However, it could equally be argued that the OSG‟s retention of their diversity and 
multiplicity of voice contributed towards the demise of the assembly in its form at that time 
because the stakeholders would not bring one OSG position in the traditional majoritarian 
representative style that the local government section (who had made firm their leadership) 
would have wanted. 
 
Having stated this, it must be recognised that the OSG were keen to stress the positive aspects 
of their relationships with both the business group, where they perceived and promoted their 
kinship, and the local government section, pointing towards the large degree of consensual 
working.  Exploring instances of institutional change, as the OSG respondents described 
them, raised two examples of organisations moving from the OSG to the business group as 
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well as a challenge to the scrutiny chair role and the establishment of an equality and diversity 
partnership for the assembly.  However, critically examining these instances led to further 
questioning about instances where the OSG did not change or challenge decisions that could 
have worked to their detriment, or could have institutionalised a marginalised position for the 
OSG.  These were the uptake of a proportion of OSG seats by town and parish councils that 
effectively could have fit in the local government section, the ratio of local government to 
stakeholder proportions and, finally, the proportion of business and others between the 
stakeholder component of the assembly. 
 
Despite (my) viewing these as examples of „collusion‟ against the OSG, though, it became 
clear that the data more firmly pointed towards an overwhelming feeling of consensus.  The 
OSG did not feel that they were in a marginalised group relative to business or the assembly 
as a whole, but that the assembly had developed a clearly consensual style of working.  These 
instances transpired to be simply isolated instances rather than discursive constructions that 
contributed towards institutional design.  They might have contributed towards institutional 
design/change, in that they were instances of acceptance of local government attempts at 
institutional design/change but they were not discursively constructed as such.  Indeed, they 
were exactly the instances that the wider discursive construction was designed or strategically 
selected to hide.  The assembly members pulled together behind this emerging story of 
consensus and did not mention what I had viewed as collusion unless teased out of them (due 
to my own normative stance of supporting the idea of a „truly‟ collaborative assembly).   
 
Thus, aiming to analyse the attempts at institutional design/change (or non-change/challenge) 
from these discursive constructions labelled frames in the first case led to the key finding of a 
  
  
   
  
268 
 
shared story across the group frames.  It was in building up specifically the relationship aspect 
of the frame that directed the analytical probing over the sectoral divides.  What this case 
study reveals is that there was previously perhaps excessive attention paid to the separation 
between the groups to the detriment of the sharing between them.  The data had initially 
pointed to the significance of sectoral groupings in this case and, methodologically, the 
attention on group frames was warranted given the theoretical assumption that group 
identification and belonging were important in this multi-sectoral collaborative environment.  
The constructivist institutionalist framework had been developed to analyse the connection 
between individuals and institutions, and the empirical site had directed attention towards 
representatives of a group (as any public policy environment invariably would, be that a 
sector, constituency, political party etc.).  Therefore these group frames were sought in the 
data but, while these were found or forged, there also emerged a collective story about 
consensus that seemingly brought the separate groups together.   
 
This raised a complex issue concerning the separation of groups and the impact of time.  It is 
perhaps understandable that in the early stages of collaboration actors would be supported by 
what was familiar already and what was also the factor that marked their entry into this policy 
process.  These actors were brought into the regional arena from sectors that they already 
worked in or for and on the grounds of some sort of representational link (to be developed) 
with that sector, and so it was assumed that this sectoral grouping would have an impact in 
this intersubjective institutional design/change process.  Thus it was important to gain an 
understanding of those positions, but the data then pointed to the gradual erosion of the group 
divides and the construction of collective consensus, presumably and effectively over time.   
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8.2 Sharing stories in the North West Regional Assembly 
 
Chapter 7 presents the North West Regional Assembly case study.  It focuses on the stories 
actors tell about the development of this assembly, which are, effectively, stories about the 
institutional design/change process.  These stories present themselves in a much more organic 
format than the position frames that required more selection and categorisation of the data in 
the previous case.  However, this point is relative; the data still required first the breakdown 
then the reconstruction of data into the story format as traditionally conceived of with a 
beginning, middle and end, because they were often intertwined or ran in snippets across the 
length of the transcript.  Translating this format specifically to the institutional design/change 
process, the traditional story format was mirrored as „complaint, justification and aspiration‟ 
to plot the developmental dramas. 
 
The first section of chapter 7 gives a detailed account of the background in this case, more so 
than that which was given in the WMRA case, because the NWRA appeared to go through 
much more institutional design/change both before and after the legislation that introduced 
and allowed for the regional assemblies (the RDA Act 1998).  The history of the assembly 
was generally recounted from earlier than the legislation, referring to the North West 
Regional Association in place from 1992 and the North West Partnership that the association 
morphed into in 1995.  There were also connections made to earlier governmental structures 
that bore some resemblance to the region in that they were larger than the regular size of local 
authorities (the Greater Manchester and Merseyside metropolitan county councils that were in 
place between 1972 and 1986), which in turn led to connections made with the large 
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Lancashire County Council in place before and throughout the period of regionalism under 
analysis in this thesis.  
 
Following this, the chapter presents the three stories detected in the data.  The first relates 
directly to the history briefly summarised above.  Its tellers use, or discursively select, the pre-
existence of these large county council structures to justify the idea that the North West region 
had „always‟ been made up of the (now) „sub-regions‟ of Greater Manchester, Merseyside and 
Lancashire as well as Cheshire and Cumbria.  This story complains about excessive localism 
and party politics and creates wider collaboration as an aspiration, using the extant sub-
regions as a means to get from the (then) current situation towards the ideal.  This is closely 
related to the second story, which concentrates on streamlining the NWRA.  Building on the 
complaints and the aspirations of the first story, which effectively dealt with streamlining the 
local authority component of the assembly, this second story focuses on the streamlining of 
the stakeholders.  It plots a crisis event of „the walk-out‟ in which a number of high-profile 
(business) stakeholders left the assembly (and a number of local authorities also threatened to 
leave).  This story structured such volatility as something to move away from, and aspired to 
create instead an assembly that was better able to work constructively for the region.  The 
story reasoned a streamlined and high-profile tier to be more „efficient‟ and „effective‟ for 
regional decision-making. 
 
Both of these stories play into the third, which takes a broader perspective and situates the 
region in its national context.  Its central drama is the North East „“no” vote‟ which refers 
shorthand to the referendum on directly elected status for the assembly in the North East 
region that returned an unfavourable response and effectively extinguished the proposal for a 
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referendum and directly elected status for the assembly in the North West region, too.  The 
lack of organisation robust enough to withstand the expected onslaught from central 
government was the complaint in this story, drawing on and creating a commotion of the local 
party politics of Councillors and the problematic stakeholder engagement.  Ideally, there 
needed to be in place a region-wide decision-making body for and of the North West, and that 
needed to be efficient and effective to be palatable (and thus justifiable) to central 
government. This story collects together the actors behind a common cause, much like the 
story of consensus in the West Midlands region.   
 
What these stories are doing is overcoming divisions.  Critically examining the stories with 
reference to the WMRA case leads to questioning about the positions and relationships 
involved in the stories.  When probed, the actors retell their stories from a slightly different 
perspective.  The resultant process gives the impression of telling the „truth.‟  The actors 
reframe their stories back to reveal the positions from which the assembly and its 
development were once viewed.  Framing those forwards, the actors revise any rigidity of 
their own position to accommodate others and create commonalities.  By creating stories 
together with others beyond their own frame of reference, actors build bridges across those 
divides to support and realise the process of institutional design/change.   
 
In the NWRA case, the first story of the sub-regions appears to take the local government 
actors outside of their localised (i.e. local authority and party political) positions to encourage 
a wider collectivism towards the region.  The sub-regions are a step in that direction.  Probing 
this story for the original positions reveals the strength of the former Greater Manchester 
metropolitan county council, in particular, as well as its rivalry with the former Merseyside 
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metropolitan county council.  Playing on this „fact,‟ or indeed strategically acting in relation 
to it and reframing it via the discursive selection of the sub-regions‟ (now „long-standing‟) 
pre-existence, the story accommodates the interests of the Association of Greater Manchester 
Authorities (AGMA) whilst effectively empowering the other sub-regions to balance that 
strength and begin to work towards the region.   
 
The frames, here, are evidently not along the sectoral divides as they are in the WMRA case, 
but along divides within the local government section.  Framing a story about the sub-regions 
enables the localised and party-politicised actors here to move forwards in the institutional 
development of the regional assembly (and, as a methodological tool, reframing them 
backwards enables an understanding of the original frames that the story has developed from 
and also erodes).  In the second story, too, reframing the story about streamlining reveals 
divisions that are not necessarily on sectoral lines but within the region, between an elite set 
and the wider assembly.  The story supported the development of an executive board for the 
assembly, effectively a higher tier, upon which the key stakeholders in the region could 
participate in more efficient and effective decision-making.  The inclusion of „big business‟ 
interests in the region (but not at that time in the assembly pool of stakeholders) became 
essential to this end.  And this was made palatable to other assembly members, some of whom 
were left disgruntled by the preference shown to outsiders, through the discursive construction 
of the earlier experience of regionalism as chaotic and in urgent need of improvement.  Thus, 
whilst the necessity of developing a streamlined assembly was parroted by all, reframing the 
story enabled an appreciation of the tiered groupings in the region.  
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The final story has the effect of bringing everybody together.  Critically analysing it for the 
former frames, it is now clear that there were divisions within the local government section 
and within the stakeholders in the region.  The story of the North East „“no” vote‟ then, brings 
the local government actors and stakeholder together in order to realise an assembly, 
pressurising actors to overcome their sectoral differences for the greater good and 
constructing them behind a new „us and them‟ against anything and everything not of the 
North West (though central government in particular).  It layers over the other stories, giving 
an overall push to institutional development for the NWRA, in order to institutionalise a form 
of regional governance that central government would approve of or, at least, could not easily 
dismantle.  It is equivalent to the WMRA‟s story of consensus, bringing all the actors together 
over their sectoral divisions to realise the assembly.   
 
A number of instances of discursive selection and strategic-relational behaviour have already 
been revealed within this discussion.  The framing of the metropolitan county council rivalry 
as the long-standing presence of sub-regions is an example of how one element of the context 
was selected and constructed into an idea that would enable institutional development.  It is 
relational because it is related to the pre-existing context, which effectively structured the 
options for the institutional design of representation onto the executive board (i.e. three local 
government members per sub-region).  And it is strategic because it contained and maintained 
AGMA‟s hold as well as enabled an efficient and effective assembly (tier) to be realised.   
 
Likewise, the second story discursively selects „the walk-out‟ and constructs around it a need 
to regain order.  It relates the story to a „real‟ event and it strategically achieves the inclusion 
of high-profile business stakeholders onto the emerging executive board structure.  And „real‟ 
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is here presented in inverted commas because, just as the „fact‟ of formal local government 
being necessary to lead the WMRA institutional design/change was presented in the previous 
case study, this „real‟ event need not have been a relevant piece of information nor a 
significant event.  It is undeniably a material fact – it certainly happened – but for some 
interviewees it was insignificant.  It was constructed as significant by those proponents of the 
story that stood to gain from the strategy that it supported.  There were other dramatic events 
that were arguably more significant, but those arguments were not made, either because it was 
not in any actor‟s interest to do so or because any story around them did not impact upon or 
realise any institutional design/change that would render it worthy of repetition.  
 
The third story relates the NWRA to the national scene, discursively selecting and 
constructing the North East „“no” vote‟ as an impetus to quickly approve an imperfect but 
acceptable tiered representation on an executive board with the strategic aim of quickly 
institutionalising the NWRA, or something akin to it specifically of the region and for the 
region as a counter-balance to central control.  This story thus draws attention to central 
government and, by doing so, demonstrates the nested or embedded nature of the institutional 
design/change attempts.  All the other stories draw on, or strategically relate to, the pre-
existing institutional context but what is particularly interesting about the way that is done in 
this story is that while the NWRA looks laterally (to the East) to build a strategy for 
institutional design/change it simultaneously looks to the South but develops a rather 
ambivalent approach to central government.  It discursively constructs central government as 
an entity against which the NWRA has to struggle for some degree of power, thus the story 
uses this relationship as part of the strategy to institutionalise a streamlined tier for the 
assembly.  At the same time, though, with the same „fact‟ of central control, this story also 
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reveals that the NWRA‟s interests are structured a priori to this attempt at design, in aspiring 
to a streamlined format that would gain central government approval.  
 
It could be argued that this interest was constructed by and was the strategy of the elite in the 
region, that it suited the key stakeholders who were seen to be crucial for the operation and 
survival of the assembly to participate on an efficient and effective decision-making unit 
serving the NW region by achieving economic growth (and simultaneously their own 
stakeholder interest) rather than concentrating on creating the means to achieve the same ends 
collaboratively.  And it could be argued that it suited AGMA (itself part of that elite set) to 
conflate its interest in having a streamlined executive board sustaining its influence with a 
central government exigency born of the rejection to any regional bureaucracy, that this was 
AGMA‟s strategic-relational discursive selection. Indeed, the process of reframing the sub-
regions story unearthed data that expressed AGMA‟s dominance in the NWRA‟s institutional 
development, but the intersubjective story for institutional design/change was constructed to 
get around or (reflecting attention away from my critical „collusion‟ interpretation) get over 
such grievances.  
 
Herein lies the role of intersubjectivity.  The intersubjective product – the story – 
demonstrates what was effectively collectively decided to be taken forward for the process of 
institutional design/change.  The North East „“no” vote‟ constructed to achieve a streamlined 
board structure that would meet the approval of central government in the NWRA case, like 
achieving „consensus‟ in the WMRA case, was something that pulled the actors together.  It 
became a repeated line of reasoning that justified the particular institutional design/change 
that transpired.  From a critical perspective, it could be viewed that the story was merely 
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„parroted‟ by all.  But regardless of whether all the actors were „actually‟ convinced or 
„merely‟ acquiesced, these stories effectively became a truth in their respective contexts and 
thus a material reality.  The success of the stories is demonstrated by not only the institutional 
design/change that transpired but also by the lack of clarity regarding the initial sources of the 
strategy.  Only with critical examination, via framing the story backwards, can the actors‟ 
original positions be deciphered, thus raising another round of critical questioning.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have, in this chapter, brought the findings of this research to bear on the projections set out 
in the theoretical framework given in chapter 4.  I have not lost the collection of terms 
developed and employed on the way, even if some of the breakdowns of the concepts and 
ideas could have been forgone.  But I have brought them together into a cohesive package of 
analysis.  This is not to say they have been forced into use, only that the results transpired to 
be relatively straightforward and perhaps could have been achieved without recourse to such a 
collection of terms.  By this, I specifically refer to the breakdown of frames into the different 
angles of the actors‟ positionality and to the breakdown of stories into the component parts to 
chart the development of a plot.  Whilst I maintain that the employment of frames and stories 
together enabled the results to be clarified in this project, a significant – perhaps excessive – 
amount of time and effort was expended in making these work and, at times, distracted from 
the wider project.  The following and final chapter looks at the wider project to draw final 
conclusions, highlight the contributions of the research and direct attention to further points of 
study.  
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CHAPTER 9: FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Thesis conclusion 
 
The preceding chapter has demonstrated how the rules regarding representation in the West 
Midlands and North West assemblies were developed by the strategic discursive selections 
and actions of the actors involved.  Certain actors, namely local government (in both cases), 
had demonstrably more sway in the proceedings than others, because they were well-placed to 
reconstruct their authority and experience of governmental affairs in the local tier and bring 
this to the regional arena.  And the stakeholder members, whilst evidently able to exercise 
some influence over smaller details, largely did not question or oppose this balance of power.  
Thus, the patterns and mechanisms of representations in the assemblies did not transpire into 
any innovative form but maintained, or imported, the „status quo‟ from other tiers of 
government i.e. with elected members effectively „in charge‟ but working closely with other 
actors, while listening particularly attentively to private sector allies. 
 
This summary of the findings, away from the specifics of the discursive constructions of 
frames and stories detailed above, serves to demonstrate the interplay between structure and 
agency that constructivist institutionalism highlights.  The actors clearly had some level of 
agency, because they were able to construct the assemblies and make changes, as evidenced 
by the small-scale changes by and between the stakeholders in the West Midlands and the 
larger-scale restructure in the North West, but this was structured by the pre-existing context.  
The influence of institutions in the wider context, i.e. of democratic representation as it works 
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in local government, rendered the local government actors more powerful.  This was not „fact‟ 
as such in the regional arena, but it was accepted by all involved.  The pre-existing 
institutional context was brought to bear on the regional institutional design and change 
processes so that this was not a „level playing field‟ and, rather, the local government actors 
were already positioned into a controlling faction by all the actors‟ understandings about, and 
perpetuation of, their collective pre-existing institutional context.   
 
As stated in the case study results chapters, a number of the stakeholders, notably those from 
the private sector actors, had already been involved in partnership working with the local 
authorities in the region, which therefore affected an earlier phase of institutional 
development that effectively constructed the designers of this phase of institutional 
development under investigation (as the framework drawn up from the theory of 
constructivist institutionalism set out).  This meant that the inclusion of business stakeholders 
was not wholly novel in the regional assembly phase of development, and that that previously 
hierarchical relationship was brought into the institutional design of the assemblies.  This 
previous partnership working also meant that the business actors enjoyed the fruits of what 
could be described as a longer „run-in‟ to the institutional development of the regional 
assemblies, thereby being more „empowered‟ than the other/ third sector stakeholders in the 
process.  There is still agency on the part of the stakeholders, which is confirmed by how 
actors strategically draw on elements of the surrounding context to justify attempts at change 
as well as an overall lack of attempt to change the organisation and operation of their 
representation because it was „acceptable‟ or „appropriate‟ or „pointless‟ or even a „good 
deal.‟  These terms at once reveal strategic agency whilst also demonstrating the actors‟ 
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understandings that they are already part of a system – a structure – within which they must 
act (or otherwise not be part of it).  
 
This is the picture as seen through the lens of constructivist institutionalism.  It is important to 
note that, with that sentence, I am not saying „constructivist institutionalism works.‟  
Certainly the data fit the theoretical projections of constructivist institutionalism, because it 
was this theory specifically that was being explored. Or, rather, I set out a research 
programme exploring institutions in a way that fit with the ontological position of 
interpretivism, which prefigured any theorizing about institutions.  But the aim was not to 
prove or disprove the theory of constructivist institutionalism, nor to argue through the 
empirical data that constructivist institutionalism is better than the other institutionalisms.  As 
chapter 3 argued in detail, the „choice‟ of constructivist institutionalism was based on 
ontological coherence, and my ability to select and „test‟ other institutionalisms would be 
precluded by my interpretivist „skin.‟  However, I am still able to see how other 
institutionalists would frame the same picture.  Normative institutionalists would hone in on 
the thoughts of appropriateness from both the stakeholders and the local government actors in 
the assembly; the maintenance of the status quo would be seen as the inevitable effect of 
actors already structured into these patterns because of the weight of governmental 
institutions surrounding and penetrating the regional arena.  And rational choice 
institutionalists would hone in on the consequentiality attached to the representative 
proportions; it would be rational for the local government actors to try to retain their power 
and it would be equally rational for the stakeholders to concentrate on protecting their right to 
a 30% share of assembly seats.  
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There is an undeniably clear case for employing historical institutionalism‟s concept of „path 
dependency‟ here.  The maintenance of the status quo and the inevitability of the balance of 
power are both accounted for through this concept, so much so, in fact, that historical 
institutionalists probably would not have recognised any institutional ambiguity in the first 
instance.  Instead, the historical context of the assemblies‟ institutional design shows that the 
development of the regional bodies was a governmental agenda, rather than an organic one, 
and so the process would continue with governmental representatives at the helm.  Even if the 
North East region, where the initiation of institutional development could have been described 
as organic, were taken to full case study depth, historical institutionalists would perhaps point 
to the historic reasons for the politicised actors wanting, fighting for and maintaining some 
degree of regional governance.  And the position of constructivist institutionalism would not 
disagree with that, but would draw attention to the construction of that history to support that 
actor‟s cause, to the agency involved in the discursive selection of fitting elements of the 
structure, rather than to the inevitability of that path.   
 
What constructivist institutionalism thus allows for and demonstrates is interplay between 
structure and agency in the institutional design/change process.  This is better demonstrated 
by the North West case study, specifically by the ability of AGMA to convince others that 
they way forward (out of the ambiguity) was to work on a sub-regional basis, which served 
simultaneously to retain and consolidate AGMA‟s power as well as to inject an idea that 
many actors could support into a process of regional development that had suffered a setback. 
Indeed, even the idea of a setback or a crisis induced by the North East „“no” vote‟ was 
something constructed to play a part in the story supporting AGMA‟s desired institutional 
development for the region.  In a similar vein but in a less obvious way, the apparent lack of 
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power of the OSG in the West Midlands region can be reframed to reveal a strategic move to 
defend the OSG‟s desire not to represent, not to speak with one voice and not to have to 
behave like local government, leaving that role to the councillors, as the pre-existing context 
could be drawn upon to support.  
 
 
9.2 Thesis contributions 
 
As I stated earlier, the point is not to prove or disprove constructivist institutionalism but to 
operationalise it, to explore how it helps to analyse a process that institutionalism on the 
whole has struggled to account for.  I have attempted to do this by designing a complementary 
methodological package to the theory for the analysis of institutional development, firstly by 
translating constructivist institutionalism into a set of projections to identify the component 
features of the institutional design process (context, ideas, designers) and, second, by 
constructing a set of discursive forms to understand the designers and their use of contexts 
and ideas (frames, stories).  There was, en route, a significant methodological journey that 
regularly returned and referred to the philosophical considerations of social science research, 
which perhaps became prioritised to the same extent as the empirical results.  But it was only 
through this that the empirical results could be navigated, could start to take shape and make 
sense of actors‟ sense-making processes.  The complex layers of meaning had to be 
deconstructed to identify the component parts as well as reconstructed to identify the 
processes of institutional design and change.   
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It was specifically by taking forward two cases at different points of the regionalist agenda 
that enabled this analysis.  While the context-specific nature of interpretivist research 
precludes comparisons between case studies to arrive at truths that are generalisable across, in 
this case, all the regional assemblies, the constant reflexive and critical engagement with the 
data encouraged by interpretivism enabled my development as a researcher to question my 
initial readings of the data.  Otherwise, a more superficial understanding of the data perhaps 
would have seemingly „stated the obvious‟ and confirmed my assumptions about the relative 
weakness of the stakeholders rather than appreciated the complexity of the interplay of 
structure and agency that was revealed through working back and forth between the cases.  
And what transpires is a story of findings that does, in fact, have general relevance, if not 
applicability; through the empirical work in this thesis, I put forward a case of collaboration in 
a public policy environment whereby different types of actors were differently able and 
differently motivated to affect processes of institutional design and change.   Pursuing two 
regional assemblies to full case study depth, particularly these two cases which contrasted 
significantly in their levels of developmental activity, revealed the process of actors‟ 
discursive selections and related actions.  
 
Therein lie the contributions of this thesis.  Empirically, this thesis presents primary research 
of the „insider‟ perspectives of regional assembly processes.  Whilst the assemblies received a 
fair amount of academic attention in their early days, interest – both public and academic – 
waned after the North East referendum, but this thesis generates findings about how these 
bodies continued to exist and, in doing so, it gets into the internal workings of the assemblies, 
rather than treating them as whole and solid units of government.  On a more abstract level, 
the empirical findings of this thesis contribute an example of collaborative governance, more 
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specifically of institution building in sites of governance where there is a degree of ambiguity, 
which, as the introductory chapter set out, is of interest to current public policy practice and 
theory.  
 
Furthermore, the marriage of the theory of constructivist institutionalism and the methodology 
of interpretivism is, perhaps, the central contribution of this thesis.  There is significant 
overlap in the projections of these „-isms‟ – with constructivist institutionalism focussed on 
institutions but drawing out the role of discursive selection and its subsequent strategic action, 
and with interpretivism focussed on actors‟ meaning-making of their situations thus drawing 
out their agency in relation to their institutionalised understandings.  They travel in different 
directions but are complementary, stemming from the same ontological base of anti-
foundationalism, so they both draw attention to what is socially constructed, but their 
historical development has meant they are focussed on different points of analysis – 
institutions and meanings, respectively.  In this thesis, I attempt to bring this together, arguing 
that constructivist institutionalism is an interpretivist researcher‟s theoretical lens though 
which to look at institutions.  This brings a level of coherence to the interpretivist explorations 
into institutions and a way for interpretivists to debate on a topic of central importance to 
political science and public policy, across the spectrum of ontological/epistemological 
positions, not focussed solely on meaning and discourse etc., but understanding the relevance 
of these concepts to other topics.  At the same time, this union, as it has been set out in this 
thesis, equips the researcher empirically exploring constructivist institutionalism with a set of 
conceptual tools from interpretivism by which to navigate and analyse the primary data.   
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This methodological development was perhaps the biggest challenge of the thesis.  Battling 
through questions about the value of interpretivist research and the generalisability of the 
findings led to a somewhat protracted development of conceptual tools through which to 
analyses the data.  The two case studies were, at times, almost treated as if they were at two 
different points of the same regionalist trajectory, revealing a normative position (supporting 
regional assemblies and a significant proportion of stakeholder representation within them) 
that, arguably, an interpretivist researcher should not have if the tenet of interpretivism is to 
unearth a range of views and not interject in the process to privilege any of those views.  This 
employment of the concepts of frames and stories could be described as a strength of the 
thesis, as a methodological contribution that innovatively encouraged a heightened level of 
reflexivity to become a central part of the research process.  It certainly was a route out of the 
dilemma faced between conducting a properly interpretivist, single case study and the 
requirements of the „commissioned‟ element of the project.  And, indeed, as stated above, 
without this iterative analysis, the results would not have captured the terrain of structure and 
agency that constructivist institutionalism was seeking to capture. 
 
In so doing, however, I conducted analyses that were on the peripheries of their theoretical 
bedrock, for example, this thesis could have easily taken just one case study and conducted 
either a frame analysis or a story analysis of the empirical results.  In putting together a set of 
methods for data analysis, I adopted the concepts away from their wider theoretical 
programme which perhaps pulled the project in too many different directions and meant that 
the concepts were only quite superficially dealt with (relative to the literature available on 
them).  But there is certainly some merit in joining or relating together some of the myriad of 
interpretive concepts which can be employed and developed in quite an insular, isolated and 
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mutually exclusive manner.  In that sense, my motivation here was similar to the theoretical 
development: this thesis was about honing in on those areas where there potential overlap and 
room for development by creating and clarifying links.  But the imbalance that transpired in 
justifying the method to layer upon the discursive selection involved in constructivist 
institutionalism meant that my results demonstrated a process of argumentation. 
 
Given this and the heavy reliance on particular transcripts in the analysis, I see a future 
research agenda in locating those particularly powerful individuals involved in institutional 
design and change.  How do certain actors become leaders in the institutional development 
process, leading others to be convinced of their stories and changing frames to widen 
inclusion behind those stories?  Even if the specific concepts of frames and stories were 
deemed superfluous to need, it would be interesting to focus on those particular individuals 
whose words are parroted and whose institutional preferences are perpetuated.  And whilst it 
would be interesting to continue to keep abreast of the developments in the sites that were the 
regional assemblies, these arenas are perhaps too narrow to explore those individuals without 
revealing their identity.  However, the difficulty in exploring an alternative site of ambiguity 
is the risk entailed in that ambiguity: like the regional assemblies, it is difficult to explore 
institutional design without knowing whether that institution will take hold or not.  But some 
form of governance in the regions will likely continue and this research will provide a fruitful 
base from which to conduct some longitudinal analysis of institutional construction by 
individual designers.   
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9.3 Final words on governance, institutions and ambiguity 
 
Returning to the starting point of this thesis, it is fair to reflect that the overall stories of 
institutional development in the West Midlands and North West regional assemblies certainly 
were not the rosy stories of novel collaborative governance that many had wanted them to be.  
That different people unencumbered by traditional governmental ways of working could have 
taken advantage of an ambiguous situation by developing new institutions with some appeal 
to enacting a different kind of democracy was an idea that was scuppered with the publication 
of the SNR.  Of course, the objective researcher is not supposed to have such a normative 
position but the inclusive nature of the interpretive position – unearthing those previously 
marginalised viewpoints through critical analysis – follows through into the empirical world.  
And what remains is a call for a more deliberative form of political analysis, like that 
promoted by Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), or a phronetic social science, as promoted by 
Flyvbjerg (2001), whereby researchers are much more directly involved, almost as 
„facilitators‟ in their sites of research.  That would certainly create impact by mitigating state-
centric moves made in line with the latest swing in adversarial politics.  But, in the meantime, 
attempts to overcome ambiguity and design institutions of collaborative governance in the 
regional arena will continue to be subject to the direction of the pre-existing institutional 
apparatus of the local and central government.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
  
287 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
A) Meetings attended 
 
 
Meeting Date  
English Regions Network Stakeholders meeting  28/11/06 
English Regions Network Annual Conference 13/03/07 
East of England Regional Assembly Stakeholders meeting 17/04/07 
North East Assembly Executives meeting 14/05/07 
Yorkshire & Humber Regional Assembly Stakeholder meeting 15/05/07 
English Regions Network Stakeholders‟ meeting 12/06/07 
English Regions Network Stakeholders‟ meeting 11/09/07 
South East England Regional Assembly Plenary 14/11/07 
English Regions Network Stakeholders‟ meeting 04/12/07 
West Midlands Regional Assembly Conference 28/01/08 
North West Business Leadership Team Forum 08/04/08 
WMRA Other Stakeholder Group meeting 17/04/08 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Example interview guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) How does the regional assembly work? 
2) How did you come to be involved in the regional assembly? 
3) How do the different assembly members work with each other? 
4) How was the way the assembly works decided upon? 
5) How have you seen the assembly change over time?  
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C) (i) West Midlands case study – schedule of interviews 
 
 
WMRA Interviewee reference Interview date Length Notes 
Other Stakeholder 
Group 
WMRA_OSG01 22/04/08 59:27  
WMRA_OSG02 28/04/08 53:40  
WMRA_OSG03 01/05/08 01:05:52  
WMRA_OSG04 02/06/08 01:29:58  
WMRA_OSG05 04/06/08 42:15  
WMRA_OSG06 11/06/08 42:29  
WMRA_OSG07 24/06/08 01:21:04  
WMRA_OSG08 19/11/08 01:27:20 Not part of the assembly when interviewed 
WMRA_OSG09 13/07/09 50:41  
Private sector WMRA_BG01 16/04/08 01:24:51  
WMRA_BG02 25/09/08 33:44  
WMRA_BG03 03/03/09 49:02  
WMRA_BG04 29/05/09 46:26 Telephone interview 
WMRA_BG05 25/06/09 32:46 Not part of the assembly when interviewed 
WMRA_BG06 28/07/09 31:14  
Public sector WMRA_PS01 11/06/08 Approx. 1 
hour 
Not part of the assembly when interviewed 
Not recorded – consent not given  
WMRA_PS02 11/11/08 45:22  
WMRA_PS03 04/06/09 47:00  
WMRA_PS04 19/06/09 47:37  
WMRA_PS05 15/07/09 50:02  
WMRA_PS06 24/07/09 38:29 Telephone interview 
Not part of the assembly when interviewed 
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C) (ii) North West case study – schedule of interviews  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NWRA 
 
Interviewee reference Interview date Length Notes 
Social, environmental 
and  
economic partners 
(SEEPs) 
NWRA_SEEP01 08/04/08 01:11:57  
NWRA_SEEP02 08/04/08 51:09  
NWRA_SEEP03 09/04/08 02:13:00  
NWRA_SEEP04 09/04/08 Approx. 1 hour Not recorded – consent not given 
NWRA_SEEP05 15/04/08 01:32:49  
NWRA_SEEP06 15/04/08 17:18 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP07 16/04/08 29:16 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP08 17/04/08 51:44 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP09 17/04/08 19:19 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP10 18/04/08 01:19:54 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP11 30/05/08 13:00 Telephone interview 
NWRA_SEEP12 05/08/09 42:52 Telephone interview 
Not part of the assembly when interviewed  
Local government NWRA_LG01 20/02/08 Approx. 1.5 
hours 
Not recorded – equipment failure 
NWRA_LG02 22/02/08 01:17:36  
NWRA_LG03 22/07/09  13:06 Telephone interview 
NWRA_LG04 28/07/09 30:33  
NWRA_LG05 28/07/09 52:08  
NWRA_LG06 29/07/09 39:49 Telephone interview 
NWRA_LG07 03/08/09 37:40 Telephone interview 
D) ERN policy paper                               
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Introduction 
 
This paper is part of a series of research papers that focus on the stakeholder members of 
the English regional assemblies and aim to generate a greater understanding of the 
stakeholder perspective of regional working.  The specific issue focussed upon in this paper 
is that of the representative role of the social, economic and environmental partners 
(SEEPs).  Representation is a key issue throughout the political system, leading to debates 
about representativeness and electoral systems.  This paper presents the range of 
stakeholder opinion on representation and considers the tensions of the stakeholder role, 
highlighting the dilemmas faced by stakeholders and regional assemblies.  
 
This paper does not attempt to offer specific solutions to the challenges of stakeholder 
representation or promote one particular model for the future of regional working.  It provides 
a framework for understanding the range of stakeholder opinion, which has been gained 
through in-depth semi-structured interviews, and presents a series of choices to be 
considered in the development of regional working.  The SEEP members are the focus of 
this study but it must be acknowledged that this reflection is not limited to the SEEPs; local 
authority representatives, too, have to question their representative role in the region, for 
example with regards to geography – do the local authority members represent their ward, 
their council or the region?  For many assembly members the responses to these questions 
raise complex and unresolved issues about representation, as will be demonstrated and 
explored in this paper.   
 
The first section of the paper examines the concept of representation, locating the 
stakeholder experience in a wider context of debate around the complex nature of the term.  
The paper then considers the difficulties of stakeholder representation and highlights the 
dilemmas involved in the role.  Finally, in light of the current consultation regarding the future 
of regional governance, this paper explores alternative models of stakeholder engagement 
and representation. 
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Representation 
 
The concept of representation  
In order to understand stakeholder representation in the regional assemblies, it is helpful first 
to understand the concept of representation more generally.  The term „representation‟ is not 
easy to define.  In attempting a clear and concise definition of representation, it quickly 
becomes obvious that there are a number of different meanings or dimensions bound to this 
concept.  This complexity has been recognised in discussions and debates regarding the role 
of politicians, and more recently it has become relevant in discussions and debates about 
other actors („partners‟ or „stakeholders‟) given their inclusion in the policy-making process. 
 
A recent study exploring the experiences of those involved in local strategic decision-making 
highlighted the complexity of representation and identified several meanings for 
„representative‟ as tabulated below19: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This same complexity exists at the regional tier of governance.  Given the lack of 
predetermined form and function of the regional assemblies as well as the novelty of the 
situation or lack of tradition at this level, those concerned have frequently questioned the 
representative role of regional assembly members.  Responses vary and the range of 
meanings matches that presented in the table above.  For a greater appreciation of this 
complexity it is helpful to understand the detail of stakeholder engagement, which reveals 
much about what and how stakeholders represent.   
 
Stakeholder engagement  
Social, economic and environmental partners are engaged in regional assemblies to ensure 
that social, economic and environmental concerns are taken into account in the process of 
policy-making at the regional level.  SEEPs represent these sectors or, as many from the 
wide and diverse social sector prefer, a „community of interest‟ via region-wide strategic 
organisations.  Some of these organisations became established at approximately the same 
time as the assemblies, as part of the wider regional agenda, and thus almost naturally 
                                                 
19
This is taken from Maguire, K. and F. Truscott (2006) Active Governance: The value added by 
community involvement in governance through local strategic partnerships. York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
Range of meanings for ‘representative’ 
 
 
Elected by  Has achieved a majority vote in a process agreed as legitimate by 
those represented 
 
Similar to  Has characteristics, experiences, interests or skills in common with 
the group, community or organisation represented 
 
Nominated by  Has been asked, invited or appointed by a group, community or 
organisation 
 
Presenting a case for Is present to advocate a particular cause or protect a particular 
interest. This may be on behalf of group, community or organisation 
or for a more abstract constituency – e.g. the environment 
 
Answerable to  Will in some way be held accountable for their actions and 
decisions. This may be at formal meetings, through briefings and 
reports, or what was described as ‘walking on the streets’, i.e. by 
living in close proximity to those they represent 
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became SEEP members, whereas other SEEP members were invited into the regional 
assemblies and others presented their case for being involved.  
 
In general, in most regions, stakeholders can become assembly members if they can 
demonstrate their ability to represent at the regional level the sector in which they are 
involved.  In practice, this usually means that stakeholders have a two-tiered route into the 
assembly: they belong to and work in an organisation on a daily basis, sometimes referred to 
as their „day job‟ or their „parent‟ or „home‟ organisation; and this organisation in turn belongs 
to an umbrella, regional organisation for the sector through which the stakeholder enters the 
regional assembly, usually referred to as the „nominating‟ organisation or body.  In some 
cases stakeholders only belong to this latter regional organisation or their home organisation 
is naturally a regional organisation, for example a senior officer of a body that speaks for a 
sector at a regional level or a regional officer of a national organisation that speaks for a 
sector could both be SEEP members.  
 
Whilst SEEPs are officially nominated into their regional assembly seat, many undergo a 
formal election procedure to become the representative for their nominating body.  SEEPs 
are clear that it is this latter, sector-wide organisation that they represent at the regional level, 
rather than their parent or home organisation.  The stakeholders interviewed for this study 
were resolute and unhesitating in their responses to this question.  They experience no 
conflict between their nominating organisation and their sector; in effect, as one stakeholder 
succinctly put it, „they are one and the same thing.‟  Furthermore, all SEEPs are accountable 
to this nominating organisation and they fulfil this requirement through a variety of methods, 
such as formal meetings, regular emails and written reports. 
 
As at the local level, there are several dimensions to the representative role of SEEPs.  The 
table above can be used to summarise this point in relation to the stakeholder members of 
regional assemblies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear that the stakeholder representative role is multi-faceted.  The complexity of the role 
as well as the variety of interpretations of what the stakeholder role should and should not 
involve has given rise to a number of tensions.  These tensions require further attention for a 
greater understanding of stakeholder representation. 
 
The SEEP representative role 
 
Elected by  Many SEEPs undergo a formal election procedure to represent 
their sector or community of interest in the regional assembly 
 
Similar to  SEEPs, given their ‘day job’ in their ‘home’ or ‘parent’ organisation, 
are well connected to the sector or community of interest they 
represent; SEEPs have characteristics, experiences, interests or 
skills in common with their ‘constituency’ 
 
Nominated by  SEEPs are formally nominated to the regional assembly following 
the internal selection process of their nominating body (whether this 
is by election or appointment) 
 
Presenting a case for Regional assembly stakeholders present the cases for the social, 
economic and environmental interests of the region in the decision-
making process 
 
Answerable to  SEEPs are accountable to their nominating organisations through a 
variety of methods 
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Understanding stakeholder representation 
 
Having gained an appreciation of the complexity of representation as well as an 
understanding of the process of stakeholder engagement, this paper will now explore the 
difficulties of stakeholder involvement in the regional assemblies.  This section presents the 
range of opinion on stakeholder representation as a series of dilemmas about what 
stakeholders should do and how stakeholders should be organised.  These issues have 
emerged from the experience of SEEPs in regional assemblies in their current form and 
function, and an examination of these issues could contribute towards the current 
consultation that provides an opportunity to resolve these dilemmas for the future of regional 
working. 
 
Delegate/Trustee 
In the political system, both in theory and in practice, the ambiguity of representation has 
been recognised.  There have been attempts to clarify the role of the representative, perhaps 
partly due to the sensitive nature of political representation, and normative judgements about 
the way in which political representation works have developed.  There are two commonly 
cited categories of representation, that of the delegate and the trustee.  The delegate model 
of representation posits that a representative acts strictly in accordance with the instructions 
or mandate of the group from which that representative is delegated.  In contrast, the trustee 
representative is entrusted to exercise their personal judgement on issues whilst acting in the 
interests of those they represent.  Seen as alternatives, these two notions of representation 
have dominated debates about representation. 
 
In the regional assemblies, too, there are debates about whether stakeholders should be 
delegate representatives or trustee representatives.  Many believe that the SEEP members 
are engaged to provide the voices of the social, economic and environmental sectors, seeing 
the stakeholder role as a two-way channel of information between the regional assembly and 
the SEEP sectors.  However, the stakeholders‟ relationship with their sector or community of 
interest is questioned because of the practical difficulties of the role, for example the size of 
the constituency.  This raises doubts about the delegate representative role as one 
perspective illustrates: 
 
“...if you represent someone you have a personal relationship with them…  We 
have a constituent group of 18, 600 organisations – I would never say I 
represent them...” 
 
Yet many recognise that the SEEP role entails a significant degree of pro-activity on behalf of 
their constituency and highlight this particularity as a legitimate part of representing the 
interests of their sector: 
 
“Very often we are pushing new agendas.  So we‟re not necessarily consulting 
with our members [asking] „is this important?‟ What we see is: there‟s a new 
policy or strategy being talked about and we want to get a foothold in there, 
we want to find out more about it, we want to send information out to the 
sector, we want them to get engaged, so it‟s quite pro-active…” 
 
It is apparent that the issue is complex and, for many stakeholders, it is unresolved.  
Respondents in this study were reluctant to identify themselves as one type of 
representative or the other and they highlighted that the role often involved an interplay 
of both the delegate and trustee modes of representation.  Either this needs greater 
recognition and understanding, or if one type of representation is considered more 
  
  
   
  
5 
 
suitable there needs to be more clarity about the role to ensure that appropriate 
representatives are involved in the regional decision-making process. 
 
Informant/Decision-maker 
Turning to the detail of the decision-making process, there follows a dilemma about what 
stakeholders do once they have reached the regional table.  Are stakeholders supposed to 
present their perspective for the benefit of the decision-makers, or are they supposed to use 
their perspective to help negotiate a collective assembly decision?  Are they informants to 
the decision-making process or are they regional assembly decision-makers?  Opinion on 
this issue is divided and diffident, although it is generally perceived that the stakeholder role 
does not stop at simply presenting the priorities and preferences of the sector but includes 
actively shaping the outcomes of assembly work for the greater good of the whole region.   
 
The design of the regional assemblies, however, can be a barrier to this broader role.  Most 
of the regional assemblies have developed a similar organisational structure, which includes 
some form of executive board and a number of subgroups, committees or partnerships, as 
they are variously known, as well as a full assembly.  Stakeholders value their inclusion in 
the subgroups, which enable SEEPs to use their expertise and provide a forum for collective 
deliberation.  Whilst these are not the arenas in which final decisions are made, stakeholders 
prefer this constructive work to the frequently ineffectual full assembly meetings.  
Commenting on this, one stakeholder remarked:  
 
“I have no idea what it‟s like to be a back-bench MP, but I suspect it‟s like 
being a back-bench MP – you‟re kind of lobby-fodder if you‟re simply an 
assembly member and you‟re not part of one of those groups…”  
 
In this environment, feelings of loyalty to the joint assembly decision or of regional assembly 
collectivity are not engendered.   Describing the formal process of the full assembly 
meetings, one stakeholder commented: 
 
“We were all kept in separate rooms.  We used to turn up an hour before the 
assembly, and the SEEPs would be in one room and the [party political groups 
would be in others], and then we all came together in this main assembly 
meeting and there was just formal business and then people left.  And so 
there was never an attempt to integrate the groups…” 
 
Compounding this problem the final decision-making power in most of the regional 
assemblies rests with the executive board, on which it is difficult to include more than a few 
SEEP members and function efficiently.  This means that most stakeholders, whilst able to 
contribute significantly to the policy-making process, do not have decision-making power, 
and this leads to another related dilemma. 
 
Individual/Collective 
Given the executive board structure, there arises a dilemma regarding the relationship 
between the SEEP representatives at the inner core of decision-making and the wider SEEP 
group.  There is a lack of understanding or a lack of agreement as to whether the 
stakeholders on these boards should be representing their sector or community of interest, 
as they are engaged in the regional assembly to do, or whether at this board level the 
stakeholder representatives should be representing the wider SEEP group.  In most of the 
regional assemblies there are no explicit rules or guidance about whether the stakeholder 
role changes from the full assembly and subgroups to the inner core and where there are 
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rules stating that stakeholders involved on the board should represent the whole SEEP 
group, these are not always followed or enforced.  One stakeholder elaborated why: 
 
“...we‟re there to represent some fairly diverse interests and those interests 
don‟t always align readily, and if they don‟t, I don‟t think any member of that 
SEEP group should feel constrained to express their views as they see 
them...If SEEP was seeking to act like a single voice, then I think it would not 
fulfil its purpose, which is to provide input from those different perspectives...” 
 
The problem here is complex.  There are differences of opinion about the stakeholder role at 
this level, as well as a number of difficulties that arise from each option, for example: 
- If SEEPs act as a collective, how can the diverse range of stakeholder perspectives 
be accommodated by a single voice?  If the board-level SEEPs are expected to 
present the whole range of perspectives, rather than a single collective position, do 
stakeholders become informants rather than decision-makers in the decision-making 
process? 
- If, on the other hand, individual stakeholders are involved in the inner core of 
decision-making to represent their sector or community of interest, rather than the 
wider SEEP group, how should the board-level SEEPs be selected?  Which of the 
stakeholder interests should be included on the board, and what, then, would be the 
purpose of the SEEP group? 
 
This latter point about selecting specific stakeholders for specific roles leads directly to 
another dilemma facing stakeholders and the regional assemblies. 
 
Issue-based/Continuous involvement 
Related to the issue of the SEEP collective, there is a question about when or the extent to 
which stakeholders should be involved in regional policy-making.  At present, the regional 
assemblies have collections of SEEP representatives from which stakeholders are 
channelled in to various subgroups.  This is usually a decision taken in the SEEP group and 
stakeholders are usually selected according to their expertise and interests or sometimes 
according to stakeholders‟ availability.  This means that stakeholder representatives are 
continuously involved in all aspects of regional assembly work, and this can also lead to 
fruitful, sometimes unexpected, alliances between different regional assembly members.   
 
Harnessing the knowledge and skills of stakeholders alongside local authority members in 
this way has been one of the resounding successes of the regional assemblies.  The 
discontinuation of the regional assemblies puts this achievement at risk.  Stakeholders will 
continue to be involved in the regional policy-making process but the dilemma here is how 
they will be engaged.  Should stakeholders be invited to participate in decision-making on an 
issue by issue basis or in specific policy areas according to their expertise and interests?  Or 
should stakeholders be continuously involved in all areas of regional policy-making? 
 
Involving stakeholders on an issue by issue basis or in specific policy areas according to 
their expertise and interests is logical.  This usefully employs the knowledge and skills of 
stakeholders in the policy-making process.  However, how will stakeholders be selected for 
the specific roles?  Whilst some of the alliances that have been forged so far could potentially 
continue with little disruption, how will stakeholders be found for new policy issues and 
problems?  There may be obvious choices but there is a risk that the selection will be 
narrowly defined, not allowing for the full range of diverse interests to be considered as has 
been enabled by the SEEP groups in regional assemblies thus far.  Organising a collective 
SEEP group after the regional assemblies could enable the development of well-rounded 
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policy to continue, however there are practical barriers to this if stakeholders lose their 
administrative and financial support. 
 
There are no straightforward solutions to these problems and no perfect model to fit all the 
regions.  These dilemmas oblige standpoints, enabling priorities and preferences about 
SEEP representatives to be discerned and new ways of working to be designed. 
 
 
The future of stakeholder engagement 
 
The recent Sub-national Review (SNR) announced the discontinuation of the regional 
assemblies in their current form and function20.  The document contained little mention of 
stakeholder involvement in future arrangements for the region but the subsequent SNR 
consultation document has made clear that stakeholders will continue to be engaged in 
regional working21.  The consultation exercise provides an opportunity for actors at the 
regional level to address questions about the organisation and inclusion of stakeholders in 
the future regional policy-making process, which will now be led by the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) and supported by a forum of local authority leaders.   
 
The series of dilemmas presented in this study can be used as a framework to consider what 
parts of stakeholder engagement are necessary and what are desirable.  This can be taken 
forward to inform the development of the regional policy-making infrastructure.  Taking the 
dilemmas above together, the options presented can be combined to create a number of 
models for stakeholder engagement in the post-SNR region.  There are two packages of 
options that clearly stand out and can be viewed as opposite ends on a spectrum of 
stakeholder inclusion.  One model advocates a technocratic approach to future regional 
working and the other favours a more inclusive policy-making infrastructure. 
     
   
Dilemma Model 1 Model 2 
Stakeholder relationship with their constituency Delegate Trustee 
Stakeholder role in the regional assembly Informant Decision-maker 
Stakeholders' relationships Individual Collective 
Type of involvement Issue-based Continuous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 HM Treasury, BERR and CLG (2007) Review of sub-national economic development and regeneration. 
London: HM Treasury. 
21
 BERR and CLG (2008) Prosperous place: Taking forward the Review of Sub National Economic 
Development and Regeneration. London: BERR. 
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Model 1 
 
In this first model, stakeholder 
representatives bring their expertise to 
specific, focussed areas of regional 
working, as is current practise in the 
regional assembly subgroups, thus 
retaining the quality of decisions in the 
policy-making process.  The stakeholders 
are informants in the process, delegated 
from their sector or community of interest 
to represent its view without compromise 
and without any obligation or loyalty to the 
end decision.   
 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Alternatively, stakeholder representatives 
could maintain their current SEEP groups 
or create an open and wide forum of 
stakeholders, generating a continuous 
dialogue on all aspects of regional policy 
on behalf of their sector and communities 
of interest.  This does not mean that 
consensus between different stakeholders 
or between stakeholders and other 
decision-makers is necessary but 
constant dialogue may foster greater 
understanding and acceptance of the 
collective end decision.  And within this 
model there is still scope for specialists to 
have a louder voice in specific, focussed 
areas.   
 
The models proposed here represent the two extremes of opinion on stakeholder inclusion.  
They are internally coherent because, whilst the principle of stakeholder involvement is 
generally agreed, the models represent opposing attitudes to what is a necessary or 
desirable level of stakeholder inclusion.  The first presents a minimalist approach to 
stakeholder engagement that streamlines regional policy-making and promotes efficiency.  
Stakeholders are delegates, answerable only to their constituency, and they are informants, 
providing their sector‟s perspective on specific policy issues.  Stakeholders are valued for 
their knowledge and skills, and are given the opportunity to usefully employs these and 
contribute towards regional working, but decision-making power rests with the RDAs, the 
leaders of local authorities and the Government.  The second model builds on the 
partnership working forged in the regional assemblies, adapting the current form of 
stakeholder engagement to fit around the Government‟s agenda of prioritising economic 
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growth.  Here, stakeholders are entrusted by their sectors to help make well-rounded, 
sustainable and collective decisions in all policy areas for the region as a whole. 
 
These models are adaptable.  They can be modified to suit the priorities and preferences of 
the regions.  The choices presented by each dilemma need to be made within the 
parameters of what is possible in each region.  For example, organising a SEEP collective 
may be desirable in many regions but such a body requires administrative and financial 
support from the RDAs, the local authorities or the individual stakeholder organisations, 
which may not be possible in all regions.  The models can also be modified with ideas from 
other examples of stakeholder engagement.  Whilst wholesale adoption of other models is 
not recommended, employing specific practises from other models can be useful to support 
the regional model.  For example, borrowing from Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), the 
first model could be complemented by annual conferences on the state of the region or 
regular conferences on particular themes, which would be open to all stakeholders and could 
enable new alliances to be forged for collaborative work on new policy problems. 
 
The SNR consultation is an opportunity to propose innovative ideas and to design effective 
methods for the future regional policy-making process.   By confronting the tensions of the 
current stakeholder representative role, the process of stakeholder engagement, too, can be 
improved, thus ensuring the continuation of collaborative regional working. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The stakeholder role, like any representative role, is complex.  There are several meanings 
associated with the term „representation,‟ which each describe different but related aspects 
of the role.  This study has focussed on the dilemmas of the SEEP representative role, 
demonstrating that there is a range of opinions on whether stakeholders should be delegates 
from or trustees of their sectors and communities of interest, and then whether they should 
inform regional decision-makers of their sectors‟ perspectives or actively participate in the 
decision-making process.  These tensions lead to further considerations regarding the 
stakeholders‟ relationships with each other and the continuity of their involvement in regional 
working.  All these issues need to be addressed in order to improve the regional policy-
making process. 
 
The current SNR consultation provides an opportunity to shape the future of regional 
working.  This study has presented a series of dilemmas to be considered in this process 
and, bringing these together, two basic models of stakeholder engagement have been 
proposed.  This paper does not attempt to promote either model as a specific solution as the 
shape of regional decision-making process will depend on specific regional circumstances.  
The dilemmas and the models together provide a framework for understanding and 
accommodating the complexity of stakeholder representation. 
 
Stakeholder representation, and representation more generally, will continue to be a complex 
issue.  The difficulties faced are not limited to stakeholders; the local authority members of 
regional assemblies, too, face questions about what they represent and how they represent.  
And in the wider political system, questions are continuously raised about representation, for 
example with regards to the representativeness of those elected and the suitability of 
electoral systems.  In the regions, actors now have the unique opportunity to shape the 
future form of stakeholder representation, to build on the past and to enhance the capacity of 
stakeholder representation. 
300 
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